This chapter explores the evolution of EU policies designed to counter hybrid threats across successive Council presidencies. The salience of this issue markedly increased following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, which underscored the operationalisation of the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine. In response, the EU has progressively institutionalised its approach, notably through the establishment of dedicated working groups such as the Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats. A tripartite initiative led by France, Czechia, and Sweden further resulted in the development of a "hybrid toolbox" aimed at strengthening the Union’s capacity to address these challenges. The formulation of policy in this domain, however, has been shaped by divergent threat perceptions among MSs. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, informed by their historical and contemporary exposure to Russian hybrid tactics, have been particularly vocal in advocating for robust countermeasures. In contrast, Mediterranean states initially exhibited a lower degree of engagement, reflecting differing strategic priorities. Disparities also emerged in conceptual framing: while Germany and France predominantly employed the term "hybrid threats," Czechia advanced the notion of "hybrid interference" to capture the full spectrum of malign activities. Institutionally, the EU has sought to bolster its response through the deployment of "hybrid threat attachés" and the integration of hybrid threats into crisis management exercises. Over time, the definitional scope of hybrid threats has broadened, extending beyond cyberattacks and disinformation to include the instrumentalisation of migration as a coercive tool. Against this backdrop, this chapter provides a critical assessment of the evolving EU approach to countering hybrid threats, offering insights for future presidencies seeking to refine and advance these policy frameworks.