New Perspectives on
Political Economy
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal
Vol. 12, No. 1–2, 2016
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 3
New Perspectives on Political Economy
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal / Vol. 12, No. 1–2, 2016
New Perspectives on Political Economy is a peer-reviewed semi-annual bilingual interdisciplinary
journal, published since 2005 in Prague. The journal aims at contributing to scholarship
at the intersection of political science, political philosophy, political economy and
law. The main objective of the journal is to enhance our understanding of private property-,
market- and individual liberty-based perspectives in the respected sciences. We also belive
that only via exchange among social scientists from different fields and cross-disciplinary
research can we critically analyze and fully understand forces that drive policy-making and
be able to spell out policy implications and consequences. The journal welcomes submissions
of unpublished research papers, book reviews, and educational notes.
Published by CEVRO Institute Academic Press
Editorial Address:
New Perspectives on Political Economy
CEVRO Institute, Jungmannova 17, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
Manuscripts should be submitted electronically. All manuscripts and correspondence
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ISSN 1801-0938 (on-line)
ISSN 1804-6290 (print)
New Perspectives on Political Economy4
Editor-in-chief:
Josef Šíma, President, CEVRO Institute, Prague
Managing editor:
Pavol Minárik, CEVRO Institute, Prague
Advisory editor:
Ladislav Mrklas, CEVRO Institute, Prague
Associate editors:
Pavel Pšeja (political science), Masaryk University, Brno
Michal Kořán (international relations), Institute of International Relations, Prague
Alena Zemplinerová (political economy), Institute of Economics, Academy of Science,
Prague
Roman Cardal (political philosophy), CEVRO Institute, Prague
Jakub Kříž (law), CEVRO Institute, Prague
Book review editors:
Jan Jireš CEVRO Institute, Prague
Language editor:
Anthony Hennen
Editorial Board:
Terry Anderson, Hoover Institution,
Stanford University
Peter Boettke, George Mason University
Hardy Bouillon, Trier University
Enrico Colombatto, University of Turin
Christie Davies, University of Reading
Frank van Dun, Ghent University, Faculty
of Law
Richard Ebeling, Northwood University
Richard Epstein, New York University
School of Law
Robert Higgs, The Independet Review
Jesus Huerta de Soto, Universidad Rey
Juan Carlos
Jorg Guido, Hulsmann Université Anger
Zdeněk Kühn, Charles University, Faculty
of Law
Miroslav Novák, CEVRO Institute
Svetozar Pejovich, Texas A&M University
David Schmidtz, University of Arizona
Gerald Steele, Lancaster University
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 5
Snatching the Wrong Conclusions from
the Jaws of Defeat: A Resourceship
Perspective on Paul Sabin’s The Bet: Paul
Ehrlich, Julian Simon, and Our Gamble
over Earth’s Future. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2013).
Part 1: The Missing History of Thought:
Depletionism vs Resourceship.
Pierre Desrochers1
, Vincent Geloso2
Abstract
Historian Paul Sabin’s The Bet aims to present the first full-fledged account of the 1980 wager
on the future prices of five metals between biologist Paul Ehrlich and his collaborators, and
economist Julian Simon. The Malthusian Ehrlich predicted that growing populations would
rapidly deplete the world’s finite supply of valuable resources, causing their prices to rise.
Simon countered that, in a market economy, prices and technological change would result
in resources being used more efficiently, new deposits discovered, and substitutes developed,
resulting in less scarce resources and lower prices. Unfortunately, Sabin’s account is marred
by a lack of historical perspective, an oversimplification of Simon’s theoretical framework,
and a quest to find a middle ground between mutually exclusive positions.
Keywords
Paul Ehrlich, Julian Simon, Malthusianism, neo-Malthusianism, Cornucopianism,
resourceship, eugenics
1	 Associate Professor, Department of Geography, University of Toronto Mississauga,
pierre.desrochers@utoronto.ca
2	 London School of Economics
New Perspectives on Political Economy6
1. Introduction
The story of the bet between neo-Malthusian biologist Paul R. Ehrlich and optimistic economist
Julian L. Simon was first told over 25 years ago in The New York Times Magazine by
journalist John Tierney (1990). Simon (1981 p. 39) challenged Ehrlich to put his money
where his catastrophist mouth was by offering to “stake $10,000 in separate transactions of
$1000 or $100 each” on his belief that “the cost of non-government-controlled raw materials”
would not rise in the long run, with the minimum period of time covered by the bet being
one year. If, as Ehrlich believed, the store of non-renewable resources was absolutely finite
and subject to ever-increasing demand, then prices would rise. Simon, however, argued
that in a market economy characterized by freely determined prices and secured property
rights, a rise in the price of a valuable resource could only be temporary as it would provide
incentives for people to look for more of it, to produce and use it more efficiently, and to
develop substitutes. In the long run, resources — including non-renewable ones — would
become less scarce as they are ultimately created by the renewable and ever-expanding human
intellect.
Ehrlich (1981 p. 46), along with collaborators John P. Holdren and John Harte, accepted
“Simon’s astonishing offer before other greedy people” jumped in and offered “to pay him
on September 29, 1990, the 1990 equivalent of 10,000 1980 dollars (corrected by the CPI)
for the quantity that $2,000 would buy of each of the following five metals on Septem-
ber 29, 1980: chromium, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten.”
Between 1980 and 1990 the world’s population grew by more than 800 million people as
standards of living rose. In spite of this, the prices of all commodities selected by Ehrlich
fell — from 3.5% for copper to 72% for tin — as new deposits were brought into production
and new substitutes created. Ehrlich honored his financial engagement, but never acknowledged
the superiority of Simon’s outlook.
This story has been told many times, but no account delved deeper than Tierney’s original
article until the publication of The Bet: Paul Ehrlich, Julian Simon, and Our Gamble
over Earth’s Future by Paul Sabin, a historian and environmental studies professor at Yale
University. Born and raised in a family where “environmental sentiments” ran deep, Sabin
“held fast to that ethic in [his] teens, through college, and into [his] professional career”
(Sabin 2013 pp.IX–X). Somewhat displeased with Tierney’s narrative — whom he describes
as a “personal fan of Julian Simon, rather than a neutral observer” (Sabin 2013 p. 182) — his
book is marketed as the first full-fledged account of the wager and an attempt to mend the
divisive fences erected by his main characters and their primary political proxies, American
Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Indeed, Sabin never tires of reminding his
readers of his attempt to “reduce the partisan conflict surrounding environmental policies”
(Sabin 2013 p. XI), to provide a “more sober and nuanced assessment of policy alternatives”
(Sabin 2013 p. 8), and to find a “moderate middle ground for sober discussion” (idem
p. 193) between the “extreme voices [who] have come to dominate American politics” on
“polarizing and divisive political questions” such as climate change (Sabin 2013 p. 217). As
he sees it, the real problem is ultimately Simon and Ehrlich’s “often vitriolic” tone and “un-
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 7
willingness to concede anything” that “exacerbate[d] critical weaknesses in each of their
arguments” (Sabin 2013 p. 219).
Many reviewers have praised Sabin for his professed even-handedness, acknowledging
that where he “once saw resource conservation as the only possible answer to scarcity and
the limits of nature,” his “moral certainties” are now “more elusive” (Sabin 2013 p. XII).
Simon and others who “argued that human creativity and market forces allow societies to
adjust to changing circumstances and to expand efficiency and productivity,” he realized,
helped “fend off calls… to slow or halt economic growth in a manner that would have affected
millions, or even billions, of people around the world” (Sabin 2013 pp. 218–219).
Simon’s victory also popularized the important insight that “scarcity and abundance are
in dynamic relationship with each other. Abundance does not simply progress steadily to
scarcity” (Sabin 2013 p. 221). Sabin further admits that “excessive pessimism has a cost”
as “[e]xaggerated fears of resource scarcity can easily lead to poor economic management,
including stifling price controls, panicked efforts to limit production or consumption, and
national investment strategies predicated on high resource prices that turn out to be ephemeral”
(Sabin 2013 p. 222). The Yale scholar even concedes that “human history over the past
40 years has not conformed to Paul Ehrlich’s predictions” and that “sustained population
growth” and “growing human prosperity suggest that humanity has remained much further
from its natural limits than… Ehrlich predicted” (Sabin 2013 p. 220). In other words, just as
Simon had foreseen, human populations have grown in numbers and become wealthier and
healthier while virtually all environmental indicators have shown marked improvements.3
Sabin (2013 pp. 184–189), however, suggests that policy events played in Simon’s favour
and that Ehrlich’s and other environmental scientists’ warnings helped avert “genuine ecological
disasters,” showed “the risks of dangerous new technologies,” laid the “groundwork
for the new environmental regulatory regime established in the 1970s” that “drastically
curbed air and water pollution in the United States,” “raised profound questions about
the purpose of consumption and whether more really meant better,” and showed “how
important natural ecosystems are to human well-being” (Sabin 2013 p. 218). Furthermore,
by “focusing solely and relentlessly on positive trends, Julian Simon made it more difficult
to solve environmental problems” while failing to acknowledge that “the environment got
cleaner partly because warnings by environmentalists like Paul Ehrlich prompted regulatory
action” (Sabin 2013 pp. 222–223). Even worse, Simon’s “rosy view of the future” even
“undermined – and continue to discourage – efforts to address environmental problems in
the present. His optimism paradoxically inhibited the kinds of problem-solving market and
technological innovations that produced the improvements that he celebrated” (Sabin 2013
p. 223).
As will be argued in this two-part essay, Sabin’s interpretation displays either ignorance
or a debatable reading of the historical evidence, a lack of understanding of market process-
3	 A website run by Simon’s intellectual fellow travelers that documents this case is http://humanprogress.org/.
See also https://ourworldindata.org/.
New Perspectives on Political Economy8
es, an extremely generous account of Erhlich’s writings, and a distortion of Simon’s stance
on environmental policy. Somewhat disappointing too is the considerable space devoted to
peripheral aspects of the main protagonists’ personal lives (e.g., Ehrlich’s mountain cabin
or Simon’s contempt for his father) at the expense of a broader historical perspective on key
assumptions, ideas, and facts. Furthermore, by closely aligning Ehrlich’s and Simon’s views
along U.S. partisan political lines, Sabin creates an artificial left/right outlook on conflicting
perspectives that have traditionally found supporters and detractors on both sides of the
political spectrum. Most frustrating to these writers, however, is Sabin’s attempt to strike
a middle ground between mutually exclusive worldviews, for either valuable resources are
finite or else human creativity will find a way around scarcity.
Our review essay is structured as follows. The first part revisits the standard conflicting
arguments over population growth, resource availability, and environmental impact as they
were developed from the distant past to the dawn of the modern environmental movement.
Our goal is to provide readers with the intellectual history that is missing from historian
Sabin’s book. In doing so, we illustrate that the optimistic perspective of which Simon was
the latest proponent had been validated on countless occasions even if it proved much less
influential in popular debates and policy circles than the pessimistic tradition which Ehrlich
represented. The second part will discuss Ehrlich’s and Simon’s formative years, along
with Sabin’s presentation and interpretation of their writings and wager. Our reflective conclusion
will discuss why after two centuries of a rather one-sided ideological confrontation
the losing side still holds so much sway over otherwise highly educated and well-meaning
people.
2. Population Growth and Natural Resource Scarcity Debates Up
to World War II
Sabin offers a few clues that Simon and Ehrlich were but the latest protagonists in a longstanding
feud between what are best characterized as the “depletionist” and “resourceship”
perspectives.4
Readers are thus told about William Godwin, a 19th-century philosopher who
“anticipated Julian Simon’s critique of Ehrlich” (Sabin 2013 p. 6), and Fairfield Osborn’s
and William Vogt’s 1948 best-sellers that “warned about overpopulation and resource scarcity”
(Sabin 2013 p. 16).
In truth, concerns about demographic and economic growth-induced depletion of soils,
minerals, and biomass resources; optimum population; decreasing returns; ecological balance
and steady-state economics go back much further. As the economist Alfred Marshall
(1890 p. 223) observed over a century ago, if the “study of the growth of population is
4	 The labels “resourceship”and “depletionist” have been used by, among others, Bradley (2007) and Furedi
(2010).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 9
often spoken of as though it were a modern one,” it has “in a more or less vague form… occupied
the attention of thoughtful men in all ages of the world.” Confucius (551–479 BC)
and some of his followers argued that excessive population growth may reduce output per
worker, lower standards of living, and create strife (Chen 1911). Some ancient Indian writings
showed “profound appreciation of the problems of Food and Populations” (Hutchinson
1967 p. 9). Plato (app 380 BC; app 360 BC), Aristotle (app 350 BC), and later writers
also opined on the topic.5
In his brief overview of the controversy over the population growth and resource availability
nexus in the English-speaking world, Bennett (1949 p. 17) identified four periods of
intense popular interests before the modern environmental era. The first followed the publication
of Malthus’ (1798) Essay on the Principle of Population. The second took place in
the late 1890s as part of a debate on the “relative merits of agrarian and industrial national
economies” that followed the rise of Germany and a then “ephemeral shortage and high
price” for wheat. The last two occurred in the aftermath of the First and Second World
Wars that were attributed by some writers to demographic and economic pressures.6
What
follows is a summary of the main points of contention as to the interrelations between
economic development, population growth, and resource availability during these time pe-
riods.7
Classic Arguments
Depletionism
Although he later acknowledged his lack of originality, 8
the classic depletionist statement
is the first edition of Thomas Robert Malthus Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) in
5	 Broader discussions of demographic and economic growth and resource availability can be found in Stangeland
(1904), Spengler (1933a; 1933b; 1998), Schumpeter (2006/1954), Barnett and Morse (1963), Hutchinson
(1967), United Nations (1973), Simon (1998), and Huggins and Skandera (2004). United Nations (1973)
and Caldwell (2005) further include surveys of past sociological, demographic, and other contributions to the
subject. See also ff #6.
6	 See Spengler (1966) for another, albeit less detailed, periodization of these debates.
7	 Among arguments not discussed here are Coale and Hoover’s (1958) thesis that, ceteris paribus, higher fertility
rates negatively impact aggregate savings in less developed economies and the contention that population
growth inherently increases inequalities.
8	 Hutchinson (1967 p. 136) observes that the “fame of Malthus’ Essay has somewhat obscured the fact that the
pessimistic doctrine of population was already well developed and well stated before he wrote” his first edition.
In the revised versions (1803 and later), Malthus (1826 non-paginated) acknowledged being originally
only familiar with the writings of David Hume, Adam Smith, Richard Price, and Robert Wallace. Apart from
Plato and Aristotle, he later discovered the contributions of “some of the French Economists; occasionally
by Montesquieu, and, among our own writers, by [Benjamin] Franklin, Sir James Stewart, Mr. Arthur Young,
and Mr. Townsend.” The first author to have anticipated Malthus’ key arguments is arguably the Italian Jesuit
Giovanni Botero (1540–1617) in his 1588 Delle Cause della Grandezza delle Città translated in English in 1606
as “On the Causes of the Greatness of Cities” (Botero 1606/1588).
New Perspectives on Political Economy10
which he stated that food production expands linearly while population grows exponentially.
Malthus later supplemented, amended, and qualified the content of the first edition, but
he arguably always believed in the potential inability of humanity to produce enough food
to keep up with unrestrained population growth. In his mind and those of his followers,
the threat of “overshoot” and its attending decline, famines, wars, and population collapse
justified some forms of voluntary or coercive restraints. 9
Another famous British depletionist tract is the economist William Stanley Jevons’ The
Coal Question (1866/1865) that warned of fuel shortage in little more than a century. The
issue was critical, as neither wind power nor petroleum would prove adequate substitutes.
Once the United Kingdom had lost its “main agent of industry,” Jevons (1866/1865 nonpaginated)
argued, its inhabitants would “either sink down into poverty,” adopt “wholly
new habits,” or witness an exodus of their youth to better-endowed countries like the United
States. His most original insight was that ever more efficient use of a resource would increase
its overall consumption, something which now is labeled “Jevons’ paradox” or the
“rebound effect.” Jevons’ inspiration was the understanding that labor-saving technologies
ultimately create more employment than they eliminate because, by lowering the price of a
good, they create new markets for it or leave more money in the pockets of consumers for
other purchases, thus creating new and more numerous jobs.
What follows is our summary of the main recurring themes, beliefs, and concerns common
to depletionists:
1.	 Everything else being equal, a reduced population will enjoy a higher standard of living.
While he admitted that the inhabitants of a country “depopulated by violent causes”
such as wars would “probably live in severe want,” Malthus (1826 non-paginated)
suggested that population reduction without destruction of the capital stock (e.g. the
aftermath of an epidemic disease) would benefit the remaining inhabitants as they
could “cultivate principally the more fertile parts of their territory.” In a world where
resources are finite, the biggest slices of pie get cut at the least-crowded tables.
2.	 Decreasing returns to investment. Beginning with the second edition of the Essay, decreasing
(or diminishing) returns to investment became the intellectual keystone of
depletionism. In other words, the cream would be skimmed first and the low-hanging
fruits given priority. Over time, extracting the same value out of less concentrated
resources would become more difficult and expensive. Malthus (1826 non-paginated)
thus argued that making less productive parts of the landscape fit for agricultural
production would require more time and labor than were previously necessary. As a
result, “the additions that could yearly be made to the former average produce must
be gradually and regularly diminishing.” Marshall (1890 p. 203) restated this concern
when writing that “whatever may be the future developments of the arts of agriculture,
9	 In Malthus’ defense, he was always uncomfortable with coercive policies and emphasized instead voluntary
measures such as delaying marriage. Bonar (1885), Smith (1951), Hutchinson (1967), Petersen (1979), and
Mayhew (2016) are more comprehensive treatments of Malthus’ population writings.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 11
a continued increase in the application of capital and labor to land must ultimately
result in a diminution of the extra produce which can be obtained by a given extra
amount of capital and labor.” Diminishing returns would obviously affect every nonrenewable
commodity. 10
Jevons (1866/1865 non-paginated) thus similarly observed
that, over time, the price of coal would become “much higher than the highest price
now paid for the finest kinds of coal” because the most “cheaply and easily accessible”
fields and seams would always be developed first.
3.	 Past successes in overcoming natural limits is irrelevant to present conditions. Historical
successes in overcoming resource scarcity are typically deemed irrelevant by depletionists
because of new and drastically changed circumstances. In modern technical
parlance, nonlinearities and discontinuities in the relevant relationships make extrapolations
from past data unwarranted. In simpler words, whatever the time, location,
or resources, humans now live in a world where thinking about the present or the
future in terms of past advances can only result in decline or catastrophe.
For instance, Jevons (1866/1865 non-paginated) surveyed the work of previous writers who
had mistakenly suggested an imminent coal shortage “when the question was not so urgent
as at present.” By 1865, however, better data on coal availability and rapidly rising rates of
consumption had changed everything. He therefore dismissed the notion that, just as coal
had proven a superior alternative to animal power, scientific and technological advances
would develop a superior substitute for coal. Especially “inexcusable” because it was uttered
by a “scientific man” was Dyonisius Lardner’s 1840 statement that “long before such
a period of time shall have rolled away, other and more powerful mechanical agents will
supersede the use of coal.” A few decades later, the prominent American plant breeder
and depletionist Edward Murray East (1922 p. 9) opined in his influential book
11
that the “present age is totally unlike any previous age” as a result of the
annihilation of isolation and space. “Thanks to steam and electricity,” he wrote, “the world
as a whole is more of a single entity than were some of the smaller kingdoms of Europe in
the 15th century.”
Resourceship
The depletionist perspective has long been challenged by writers whose outlooks spanned
the political spectrum. Among economic analysts one finds detailed critiques from authors
influenced by the Marxist, Institutionalist, Neoclassical, and Austrian schools, 12
but
10	 This being said, many otherwise pessimistic authors granted that this needn’t be the case for the manufacturing
sector (United Nations 1973).
11	 According to Wolfe (1928a p. 535), the book appeared at “the right psychological moment and was widely
read.”
12	 See, among others, Brätland (2008), Bradley (2007; 2009a), DeGregori (1987), Harvey (1974), Neumayer
(2000), Perlman (1982), Perelman (1979), and Wolfgram and Aguirre (2004).
New Perspectives on Political Economy12
common intellectual roots run deeper. For instance, Malthus’ original Essay was partly
motivated by a desire to rebuke the (mostly) classical liberal French thinker Condorcet’s
(1796/1795 p. 250) belief that “nature has fixed no limits to our hope” and British anarchist
William Godwin’s (1793b non-paginated) assertion that “[t]hree-fourths of the habitable
globe is now uncultivated. The parts already cultivated are capable of immeasurable improvement.
Myriads of centuries of still increasing population may pass away, and the earth
be still found sufficient for the subsistence of its inhabitants.” 13
Many writers opined that more people not only meant more mouths to feed, but also
more arms to work and more heads to create solutions to pressing problems. Resources
would always remain limited in light of virtually unbounded human desires, but they could
paradoxically become less scarce over time provided that innovative solutions were developed.
Populations could thus grow almost indefinitely as a result of better nutrition, sanitation,
medical care, and overall standards of living.
Resourceship theoreticians typically elaborated some versions of the following arguments.
14
1.	 A larger population that engages in trade and the division of labor will deliver greater
material abundance per capita. One hundred people with 100 different skill sets who
specialize in what they do best and trade with each other will produce and consume
far more than 100 times more than one individual. As the British economist Edward
Cannan (1922/1914 non-paginated) wrote, if, as an old proverb said, with “every
mouth God sends a pair of hands,” why shouldn’t an “increased number of people be
able to grow a proportionately increased amount of produce?” Indeed, why couldn’t
they produce proportionally ever more as “they would be able to draw greater advantage
from [the] division of labour?” Cannan (1922/1914 non-paginated) similarly
disagreed with the notion that agricultural productivity would be greater if population
numbers had remained small because fewer brains meant that fewer advances would
“have been discovered and introduced.”
Decades earlier, the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say (1821 non-paginated) had similarly
judged the belief that a reduction in population would “enable those which are left to
enjoy a greater quantity of those commodities of which they are in want” nonsensical because
it ignored the fact that a reduction in manpower simultaneously destroyed the means
of production. After all, one did not see in thinly populated countries that “the wants of the
13	 The original title of Malthus’ essay was An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Effects the Future Improvement
of Society; with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet and Other Writers. Godwin
(1793a; 1793b) was himself reacting to earlier pessimistic writings and later wrote a rebuttal to Malthus (Godwin
1820).
14	 Spengler (1933a p. 439) provides a longer list that includes religious, distributive, and international trade argu-
ments.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 13
inhabitants are more easily satisfied.” To the contrary, it was “abundance of productions,
and not the scarcity of consumers, which procures a plentiful supply of whatever our necessities
require.” This is why the most populous countries were generally better supplied.
2.	 Human creativity can deliver increasing returns. Apart from being innate traders, human
beings are also creators of new and better (or less damageable) ways of doing things.
A long-standing tenet of resourceship is that the more human brains, the greater the
likelihood of new beneficial inventions. 15
As the British political economist William
Petty (1888/1682 p. 49) observed over a century before Malthus, it was “more likely
that one ingenious curious man may rather be found out amongst 4,000,000 than 400
persons.”
Writing in 1771, the French economist Nicholas Baudeau (1910 p. 13, translation from
Hutchinson 1967 p. 98) suggested that the “productiveness of nature and the industriousness
of man are without known limits” because production “can increase indefinitely” and
as a result “population numbers and well-being can go on advancing together.” In a reply
to and further personal conversation with Malthus, the American diplomat Alexander Everett
(1823 p. 26) suggested that an expanded division of labor not only made people more
productive, but further laid the foundation for “the invention of new machines, an improvement
of methods in all the departments of industry, and a rapid progress in the various
branches of art and science” that resulted in a level of labor productivity that far exceeded
the proportional increase in population numbers. As he put it, a belief in decreasing returns
ultimately assumed that “labor becomes less efficient and productive in proportion to the
degree of skill with which it is applied; that a man can raise more weight by hand, than by
the help of a lever, and see further with the naked eye than with the best telescope” (Everett
1823 p. 28). In truth though, because labor productivity depends almost entirely on skill
and science, the introduction of new skills would in time deliver an abundance of products
in ways that are “unbounded and incalculable” (Everett 1823 p. 40).
The Scottish agricultural writer James Anderson (1803 p. 294) had similarly observed
that human creativity could deliver increasing returns despite less valuable lands being
brought under cultivation:
Nothing can be more certain, than that the productions of a country can be increased
by human exertions; and that this increase of produce can, by judicious
management, be gradually augmented in a country which admits of being cultivated
almost without any limitation. If these facts be admitted, it will follow, that
by due attention to carry forward improvements in agriculture, the population of
a country many gradually increased to an indefinite degree, and the people still
find abundant subsistence from the productions of their own fields, even where
15	 Hutchinson (1967 pp. 100–104) discusses several past writings on this subject.
New Perspectives on Political Economy14
there seemed to be no superabundant produce at the time the population began
to increase.
A few years before he co-authored the Communist Manifesto, Friedrich Engels (1844 nonpaginated)
argued that the “productive power at mankind’s disposal is immeasurable,” and
that the “productivity of the soil can be increased ad infinitum by the application of capital,
labour and science.” In later decades several German and Russian writers expanded on
this point (Grigg 1979). For instance, the anarchist theorist and geographer Pyotr Kropotkin
(1912/1898 non-paginated) observed that the high agricultural productivity of Belgian
farmland should not be attributed to a belief that
the soil of Belgium is [inherently] more fertile than the soil of [the UK]. On the
contrary, to use the words of Laveleye, ‘only one half, or less, of the territory offers
natural conditions which are favourable for agriculture’; the other half consists of a
gravelly soil, or sands, ‘the natural sterility of which could be overpowered only by
heavy manuring.’ Man, not nature, has given to the Belgium soil its present productivity.
With this soil and labour, Belgium succeeds in supplying nearly all the food
of a population which is denser than that of England and Wales…
Commenting on the market gardens that then surrounded Paris, Kropotkin (1912/1898
non-paginated) wrote that in “market-gardening the soil is always made, whatever it originally
may have been.” It was therefore a “usual stipulation of the renting contracts of the
Paris maraîchers that the gardener may carry away his soil, down to a certain depth, when
he quits his tenancy” because he had created it (Kropotkin 1912/1898 non-paginated).
Cannan (1922/1914 non-paginated) opined that while one might occasionally observe
“diminution of returns,” these were typically only temporary until the development of “inventions
and the introduction of better methods.” Indeed, the belief that “diminishing returns
was the general rule throughout history” was “so contrary to the results of direct
observation that it seems difficult to believe that it could ever have been accepted.” As a
matter of fact, “no reasonable person can have any doubt that the productiveness of agricultural
industry has enormously increased” and that “the population of the civilized world
is much better fed, and yet has to spend far less a proportion of the whole of its labour on
the acquisition of food.” If agricultural returns had actually diminished in agriculture, a
“larger and ever larger proportion of the world’s labour would clearly have to be expended
in producing food,” something that was obviously not the case.
3.	 Human beings differ from other animals. Optimistic outlooks on population and resources
reject the application of biological metaphors or ecological constraints (e.g.
carrying capacity) on economic systems because of humans’ trading and creative
abilities. As the economist Henry George observed in his book Progress and Poverty
(1879 non-paginated), of “all living things, man is the only one who can give play to
the reproductive forces, more powerful than his own, which supply him with food.”
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 15
Other animals survive on what they find and can only grow as numerous as their food
source allows, but increases in human numbers are possible because of their ability to
produce more food. 16
As he saw things:
If bears instead of men had been shipped from Europe to the North American
continent, there would now be no more bears than in the time of Columbus, and
possibly fewer, for bear food would not have been increased nor the conditions of
bear life extended, by the bear immigration, but probably the reverse. But within
the limits of the United States alone, there are now forty-five millions of men where
then there were only a few hundred thousand, 17
and yet there is now within that
territory much more food per capita for the forty-five millions than there was then
for the few hundred thousand. It is not the increase of food that has caused this
increase of men; but the increase of men that has brought about the increase of
food. There is more food, simply because there are more men (George 1879 non-
paginated).
George added that a key difference between animal and man was that both “the jay-hawk
and the man eat chickens, but the more jay-hawks the fewer chickens, while the more men
the more chickens.” Similarly, “both the seal and the man eat salmon, but when a seal takes
a salmon there is a salmon the less, and were seals to increase past a certain point salmon
must diminish.” Humans, however, “by placing the spawn of the salmon under favorable
conditions” can increase their number to such an extent as to more than make up for their
catches. In the end, George argued, “while all through the vegetable and animal kingdoms
the limit of subsistence is independent of the thing subsisted, with man the limit of subsistence
is, within the final limits of earth, air, water, and sunshine, dependent upon man
himself.” The ultimate limit to human population was therefore physical space.
4.	 Past successes are grounds for optimism. In his discussion of John Stuart Mill’s pessimistic
writings, Cannan (1922/1914 non-paginated) took issue with his ambivalence
as to whether or not future improvements could overcome decreasing returns. As he
put it, Mill limited his discussion to “fairly recent times” in which “it does not appear
to be possible either to prove or disprove [the argument].” A longer-term perspective,
however, typically yielded a more promising outlook. While commodity prices go
through cycles, in the long run, valuable resources typically become less scarce and
less expensive. As such, future projections based on very recent trends should not be
taken seriously.
16	 Of course, ants and termites invented farming millions of years before humans, but their innovative abilities
remain extremely limited.
17	 Modern research has since established that native populations were once much more numerous, but this
doesn’t affect the validity of George’s argument.
New Perspectives on Political Economy16
5.	 Opposition to coercive measures. Many writers who shared the resourceship perspective
believed that, because of their doomsday outlook, most depletionists would never
limit themselves to incentive-based policies. In the words of French mutualist theorist
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1886/1848 p. 6), Malthusianism was “the theory of political
murder; of murder from motives of philanthropy and for love of God.” While its supporters
“act in good faith and from the best intentions in the world” and “ask nothing
better than to make the human race happy,” they “cannot conceive how, without some
sort of an organization of homicide, a balance between population and production
can exist” (Proudhon 1886/1848 p. 7).
Turn of the 20th Century Debates
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the opening of new territories, technological
developments (e.g. improved breeds and production technologies, steamships and railroads,
canning and artificial refrigeration), and a more global and complex division of labor
resulted in a rapidly growing population better fed than ever before and the “almost universal…
reject[ion]” of the Malthusian doctrine in the United States (Ekirch 1963 p. 40). 18
As
the economist Albert Benedict Wolfe (1928a pp. 530–531) commented a few years later,
for decades before the First World War “the problem of population had [slumbered] in innocuous
desuetude. Indeed, the popular impression was that a population problem in an
economic or Malthusian sense no longer existed.” While organized labor favored immigration
restriction for fears it would result in low wages and unemployment among the native
population, “any suggestion that immigration would tend to produce overpopulation would
have been laughed at” and the expression “birth control” had yet to be invented.
In 1904, the outgoing president of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, Carroll D. Wright (1909 pp. 898–899), commented that the Malthusian and other
doctrines of the “iron law of wages, the wages fund, and the law of diminishing returns”
had been superseded by scientific and technological advances and theories “more rational
and more in line with the facts.” While the law of diminishing returns remained valid, its
effects were overshadowed by countless innovations, such as the introduction of electric
light in greenhouses. Indeed, although geographical expansion had been the “immediate
means of depriving the doctrine of its force,” it was “intensive agriculture and the discoveries
of science” that played the key roles. Apart from agricultural production, relevant
scientific advances included steamships, railroads, and telegraphy that resulted in famines
being “avoided or minimized,” “prices [being] equalized,” and the state of the “markets of
the world [being] known every day.” Malthusian theory might be revived at some future
date, Wright suggested, but it would not be “in our day, nor will it be in our century.” Sadly,
18	 It obviously still had a few supporters, especially in the wake of the filling up of the American frontier. Malthusianism
was arguably more widespread and influential in Great Britain (Spengler 1933b; Bennett 1949; Hoff
2012; Robertson 2012).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 17
the onset of the First World War soon reversed professional opinion and revived popular
interest in Malthusian scenarios (Wolfe 1928a; 1928b; 1929).
Although less well known than the depletionist and resourceship perspectives, debates
around the possibility of reconciling economic growth and environmental protection also
have a long history that needs to be discussed in order to assess Sabin’s claims and conclu-
sions.
3. Population and Environmental Degradation in Historical
Perspective
Population/Economic Growth and Environmental Degradation
Long-standing complaints on the deleterious impact of population and economic growth on
environmental quality have taken at least two forms. The first is of the “not in my backyard”
variety. In a classic statement, John Stuart Mill (1909/1848 non-paginated) commented
that if there was indeed enough room for population growth “supposing the arts of life to
go on improving” and “capital to increase,” it was nonetheless “not good for man to be kept
perforce at all times in the presence of his species” because a “world from which solitude is
extirpated is a very poor ideal.” Solitude, he argued, was essential to improve one’s character,
such as for instance while meditating in “the presence of natural beauty and grandeur.”
A more pressing concern in the eyes of many writers, however, was unsustainable agricultural
pressures on the landscape. Plato (app. 360 BCb) complained that Athens’ backcountry,
once “full of rich earth” and displaying an “abundance of wood,” was in his time
only able to sustain bees because all the “richer and softer parts of the soil [had] fallen
away, and the mere skeleton of the land [was] being left.” George Perkins Marsh later
observed in his classic Man and Nature (1867/1864 p. 4) that besides historical records
that documented the past fertility of the regions stretching from Spain and North Africa
to Mesopotamia and Armenia, the “multitude and extent of yet remaining architectural
ruins, and of decayed works of internal improvement” all pointed toward “former epochs
[when] a dense population inhabited those now lonely districts” that could only have been
sustained “by a productiveness of soil of which we at present discover but slender traces.”
By the late 19th century, a significant number of British historians believed that medieval
farming practices had exhausted the soils of England (Lenner 1922) while Marxist theoretician
Karl Kautsky (1988/1899 p. 247) echoed the fears of many by arguing that American
agriculture was unsustainable because it was “based on robbing the soil which it sooner or
later exhausts.” Those notions gained further political traction through the Conservation
Movement whose perspective was summarized by Frederick Winslow Taylor’s Principles of
Scientific Management (1911 non-paginated): “We can see our forests vanishing, our waterpowers
going to waste, our soil being carried by floods into the sea; and the end of our coal
and our iron is in sight.”
New Perspectives on Political Economy18
For a few decades after, land erosion was the dominant concern of environmentally
minded intellectuals and government officials. According to British writers Graham Vernon
Jacks and Robert Orr Whyte’s The Rape of the Earth: A World Survey of Soil Erosion
(1939): “As the result solely of human mismanagement, the soils upon which men have attempted
to found new civilizations are disappearing, washed away by water and blown away
by wind.” The “destruction of the earth’s thin living cover,” they argued, was “proceeding at
a rate and on a scale unparalleled in history, and when that thin cover – the soil – is gone,
the fertile regions where it formerly lay will be uninhabitable deserts.” There was obviously
“a limit to the extent to which applied science can temporarily force up soil productivity,
but there is no limit except zero to the extent to which erosion can permanently reduce it”
(1939 p. 18). Unless agriculturalists the world over mended their ways, most regions (save
northwest Europe because of its climatic and soil advantages) would know a faith similar
to “former civilizations and empires whose ruined cities now lie amid barren wastes that
once were the world’s most fertile lands” (1939 p. 21) Erosion, they proclaimed, was the
“modern symptom of maladjustment between human society and its environment. It is a
warning that Nature is in full revolt against the sudden incursion of an exotic civilization
into her ordered domains” (1939 p. 26).
Pollution was also on the minds of countless writers and activists. In 1912, the president
of the New York Zoological Society, Henry Fairfield Osborn, commented that, with
the exception of conservation areas, nowhere was “nature being destroyed so rapidly as
in the United States” (1912 non-paginated). Not only did “vulgar advertisements hide the
landscape,” but “air and water are polluted, rivers and streams serve as sewers and dumping
grounds, forests are swept away and fishes are driven from the streams. Many birds are
becoming extinct, and certain mammals are on the verge of extermination.”
By the late 19th century, the depletionist perspective became increasingly entangled with
the eugenics movement. 19
One rationale for this convergence was that the quality of the human
stock was believed by some to have been degraded because of the very conditions that
had made the demographic boom of the time possible. As prominent eugenicist H. G. Wells
put it in his novel Kipps (1905 non-paginated), the “extravagant multitude of new births”
was “the essential disaster of the 19th century.” Henry Fairfield Osborn, who described
himself as being first a “trained and experienced observer of animal and of human evolution,”
commented that eugenics was a “long known and universal law, namely the survival
of the fittest and elimination of the unfittest” (1934 p. 29). Attention to this process in the
1930s was made mandatory by numerous cataclysms that included “over-population” and
the “over-multiplication of the unfit and unintelligent” (1934 p. 29), two results of which
were the “over-destruction of natural resources, now actually world-wide” (1934 p. 30) and
19	 Key eugenic arguments go back at least to Plato (app. 380 BC). While Malthus anticipated some tenets of the
movement, he was skeptical that intelligence could be bred the same way physical characteristics could. More
detailed histories of the eugenics movement, including some of its entanglements with conservationists, can
be found in Allen (2013), Chase (1977), McCormick (1989), Hodgson and Cotts Watkins (1997), Bashford
and Levine (2010), Gibson (2002), and Zubrin (2012).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 19
the “over-population beyond the land areas, or the capacity of the natural and scientific
resources of the world” (1934 p. 31). An example of the latter was the island of Java whose
population had increased from 12 to 40 million individuals in a few years. While these new
mouths could be fed through agricultural improvements, they were “taking up of every acre
of land, even to the mountain tops,” an option that had “not solved the overcrowding problem”
as evidenced by attempts to “export [Java’s] surplus of people to other less-populated
islands.” The only “permanent remedy” to such cases, Osborn argued, was the “improvement
and uplift of the character of the human race through prolonged and intelligent and
humane birth selection aided by humane birth control” (1934 p. 29).
Population/Economic Growth and Environmental Impact and Remediation
While historically many people viewed factory smoke as an alternative preferable to material
deprivation, one can nonetheless identify two long-standing optimistic perspectives on
economic development and the environment. The first celebrated the replacement of “useless”
forests and grasslands by agricultural production for health reasons that went beyond
improved nutrition. In his Discourse on Trade (1905/1690 non-paginated, spelling adapted
to modern usage), Nicolas Barbon commented matter-of-factly that whether by “draining
great bogs, lakes, and fens, and cutting down vast woods, to make room for the increase of
mankind, the air is grown more healthy; so that plagues, and other epidemical diseases, are
not so destructive as formerly.” Although he did not understand how draining marshes had
wiped out many disease vectors, the American diplomat Alexander Everett (1823 p. 87)
observed that “independently of the yellow fever, the inhabitants of the whole interior part
of the [United States] suffer from disease occasioned by the unwholesome exhalations
that arise from a rich and humid soil, opened for the first time to the influence of the sun.”
By contrast, the “eastern and middle states, which have long been settled, and are now
pretty well cleared, and comparatively populous, are the only ones which can be considered
as positively healthy.” Everett added that “as the more rapid increase of population takes
place in the new states, it is plain that it cannot be accounted for by the supposition of an
uncommonly salubrious climate. In fact, there are probably few parts of Europe in which
the check of diseases not resulting from intemperance or want is felt so strongly as it is in
the United States.”
Speaking at The Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations (or Great Exhibition)
of 1851, Queen Victoria’s consort Albert observed that “man is approaching a more complete
fulfillment of that great and sacred mission which he has to perform in this world.” By
using his reason “to discover the laws by which the Almighty governs his creation, and by
making these laws his standard of action,” he would “conquer nature to his use.” He added
that science “discovers these laws of power, motion, and transformation; industry applies
them to the raw material which the earth yields us in abundance, but which becomes valuable
only by knowledge” (Anonymous 1851 p. 254).
Interestingly, a portion of the profits generated from this event was used to sponsor a
permanent exhibit that would illustrate how to reconcile economic development and environmental
remediation by turning industrial residuals and emissions into valuable by-prod-
New Perspectives on Political Economy20
ucts, another optimistic perspective widely shared at the time. While the notion that waste
products could be turned into valuable inputs is obviously as old as the practice of deriving
clothing from skins, tools from bones, and fuel from residual matter, several 19th-century
writers documented how self-interest had motivated manufacturers to develop the practice
as never before. 20
For instance, an anonymous commentator observed that the means used
by Akali producers to deal with their highly toxic air emissions was to send them up through
“chimneys so lofty as to overtop our loftiest steeples, in order to carry away the enemy as
far above the region of vegetation as possible” (1852 p. 98). It was nonetheless obvious that
just as “the best way of destroying an enemy is to make him a friend, so the best way of getting
rid of a noxious gas is to find a method by which it may be retained in a useful form”
(Anonymous 1852 p. 98). When this would be done, those chimneys would “remain as so
many huge monuments of the ignorance of the past” (Anonymous 1852 p. 98). In time,
Alkali producers would indeed convert their polluting emissions into valuable by-products
ranging from bleaching powder to sulfuric acid (Desrochers and Haight 2014).
In the third edition of his compendium Waste Products and Undeveloped Substances (1876
p. 10), the journalist Peter Lund Simmonds, who was then in charge of this waste exhibit,
observed that “one of the greatest benefits that Science can confer on man is the rendering
useful those substances which being the refuse of manufactures are either got rid of at great
expense, or when allowed to decompose produce disease and death.” After documenting
both past successes and current challenges in almost 500 pages, he suggested that the topic
was not exhausted “since every day furnishes new instances of what has become one of the
most striking features of modern industry – to let nothing be lost, and to re-work with profit
and advantage the residues of former manufactures,” as well as pointing out that while he
could further expand on the subject matter, he would undoubtedly “weary the reader with
too ponderous a volume” (1876 p. 577).
Commenting on Simmonds’ work, the physician and writer Andrew Wynter observed
that “‘[w]aste not, want not,’ is a maxim instilled into us from our earliest childhood” and
that “in the universal alembic of nature, not only is nothing lost, but… the most offensive
refuse contains within itself the essence of things which astound our senses with their
beauty” (1876 p. 155). While the “coarse efforts of man in analyzing his so-called waste, are
not to be mentioned in the same breath with the perpetual but silent operations of our great
mother,” it was nonetheless “interesting to observe” that “as the pressure of the population
increases, the efforts [man] is making to utilise every particle of refuse which arises in large
communities” (1876 p. 155, emphasis added). What Wynter, Simmonds, and many others
intuitively understood is that a more sophisticated division of labor constantly created not
only new problematic residuals, both also new knowledge and niches that paved the way to
profitable by-product development.
20	 This story is told in much more detail in Desrochers (2008; 2009; 2012), Desrochers and Reed (2008), Desrochers
and Leppälä (2010), and Desrochers and Haight (2014).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 21
This perspective was largely endorsed by Karl Marx who, in the third volume of Capital
(1909/1894 pp. 120–1 and pp. 95–6), observed that with “the advance of capitalist production
the utilisation of the excrements of production is extended” and that the “so-called
waste plays an important role in almost every industry,” a trend he credited to the search
for increased profitability as these “excrements… reduce the cost of the raw material to the
extent that they are saleable. For a normal loss is always calculated as a part of the cost of
raw material, namely the quantity ordinarily wasted in its consumption. The reduction of
the cost of this portion of constant capital increases to that extent the rate of profit.” He
even described industrial waste recovery as “the second great branch of economies in the
conditions of production” after economies of scale.
In a chapter titled “Resources from test tubes, waste heaps, and junk piles,” the economist
Erich Zimmermann described the “movement away” from “the limitations of nature”
that resulted from the activities of both synthetic organic chemists and the reclamation
industries. Although nature was once “the only reservoir from which man drew the raw
materials of production,” by his time “a growing number of industries can choose between
virgin, or primary, source of supplies, and secondary sources of supplies, salvaged from the
waste heap and the junk pile, or artificial substitutes, especially synthetic products” (1933
p. 762). “By investing natural products with new utilities,” chemists had made possible “the
fuller use of natural substances” and promoted “the economy of natural resources.” Salvage
activities, such as lead or steel recovery, similarly enhanced “the value of nature’s contribution”
by reducing “the drain on her stores” (1933 p. 763).
Because a comprehensive survey of by-product development “would fill volumes,” Zimmermann
described only a few outstanding examples, such as cottonseed, bagasse (a
by-product of sugar production from sugar cane), scrap steel and (mostly) meat packing
wastes (1933 p. 769). From these cases he inferred that “the boundary lines between waste
products and by-products are vague” and in a modern thriving economy “the transfer from
one category to the other is an almost daily occurrence” (1933 p. 768). Scientific and technological
advances made it possible “to lower the cost of waste elimination; for reduction
in such cost may render profitable, and therefore economically justified, practices of waste
elimination which otherwise might be technically feasible but unwarranted for economic
reasons” (1933 p.  767). He concluded his chapter by speculating that ““synthetic chemistry,
by-product utilization, waste elimination, and the recovery of secondary materials” (1933
p. 763) would over time equalize the distribution of economic activities on the globe and
increase true material abundance.
New Perspectives on Political Economy22
4. Depletionism and Resourceship in the Post-World War II USA 21
Interest in the population-resources nexus surged again at the end of World War II. Similar
to what one often hears today in debates on food security, John Boyd Orr observed that to
provide “sufficient food for all mankind, taking account of the anticipated increase in population,
it would be necessary to about double world food production in the next 25 years”
and that perhaps as much as “as an increase of 110 per cent would be needed,” thus raising
the question of “whether the earth can provide sufficient food for the rapidly increasing
population” (1952 p. X).
In terms of content, what happened was the re-staging of a classic play in modern garb
rather than the discovery of new insights. 22
On the depletionist side, the early actors were
by and large former eugenicists whose institutional network obtained a second lease on
life by raising concerns about the alleged catastrophic consequences of recent medical advances
(e.g. the greater availability of sulfa drugs, penicillin, and Atabrine) and ambitious
public health campaigns (e.g. hookworm eradication and DDT spraying). Rapidly decreasing
mortality rates, they argued, would result in unprecedented population growth and (at
best delayed) deadly blows in terms of resource availability and environmental destruction.
Rebuttals on the resourceship side first came from diverse voices, but neoclassical resource
economists soon became more prominent.
Table 1 lists some of the most important semi-popular English books on depletionism
and resourceship published between the mid-1940s and the Simon-Erhlich bet.
Table 1: Significant Depletionist and Resourceship Books, 1940–1980
Depletionism Resourceship
Burch, Guy Irving and Pendell, Elmer.
Population Roads to Peace or War (1945)
Zimmermann, Erich. World Resources and
Industries (1933/1951/1964/1972)
Vogt, William. Road to Survival (1948) Mather, Kirtley F. Enough and to Spare
(1944)
Osborn, Fairfield Jr. Our Plundered Planet
(1948)
Hanson, Earl Parker. New Worlds Emerging
(1949)
21	 Jarrett (1958), Luten (1980), Hodgson and Cotts Watkins (1997), and Ahlburg (1998) discuss the range of
opinions on population growth and the (un)availability of natural resources in the years or decades prior to
their publication. Fairchild (1949) gives a sense of the importance and mindset of the depletionist/soil erosion
camp. Wolfgram and Aguirre (2004) survey various schools of thought that emerged in the 1960s. Recent
broader treatments of postwar Malthusianism, both in terms of intellectual content and policy, can be found
in Linnér (2003), Connelly (2008), Hoff (2012), Robertson (2012), and Bashford (2014). Chase (1977) and
Zubrin (2012) are more opinionated anti-Malthusian accounts.
22	 Arguably the only significant new argument was the Coale Hoover (1958) thesis that population growth burdened
less-advanced countries by hampering capital formation
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 23
Osborn, Fairfield Jr. The Limits of the Earth
(1953)
De Castro, Josué. The Geography of Hunger
(1951)
Brown, Harrison. The Challenge of Man’s
Future (1954)
Barnett, Harold J. and Morse, Chandler.
Scarcity and Growth (1963)
Sax, Karl. Standing Room Only (1955) Maddox, John. The Doomsday Syndrome
(1972)
Paddock, William and Paddock, Paul.
Famine 1975! (1967)
Beckerman, Wilfred. In Defence of
Economic Growth (1974)
Ehrlich, Paul. The Population Bomb
(1968)
Kahn, Herman. The Next 200 Years (1976)
Meadows, Donella H., Meadows, Dennis
L., Randers, Jørgen and Behrens, William
W. III. Limits to Growth (1972)
Simon, Julian. The Ultimate Resource
(1981)
Source: Compiled by the authors.
What follows is an overview of some of the contributions that set the stage for Ehrlich and
Simon to be the representatives of their respective sides.
Depletionism in the Post-World War II Era
Prominent American eugenicists who embraced depletionism after World War II include
the sociologist and demographer Kingsley Davis who commented that “in the long-run,
earth’s population has been like a long, thin powder fuse that burns slowly and haltingly
until it finally reaches the charge and explodes,” (1945 p. 1), and the biologist Garret Hardin
whose eugenics-inspired passages in his classic article The Tragedy of the Commons
(1968; 1974) are often omitted in environmentalist anthologies.23
More significant at first
though was Guy Irving Burch and sociologist Elmer Pendell’s Population Roads to Peace or
War (1945). In a revised 1947 edition they argued that the land was already full “while our
population is large and rapidly growing” and that, by 1951, one could see “forming for the
American people, a future marked by conditions like those which prevailed in the times of
scarcity and want which Europe used to know so well in past centuries and under which
it now suffers” (Burch and Pendell 1947 p. 2). As their title implied, overpopulation would
again result in war unless world peace was secured by mandated and organized population
reduction.
Two books published the following year proved extremely significant: Fairfield Osborn’s24
Our Plundered Planet and William Vogt’s Road to Survival.25
Osborn’s book was quickly
23	 Most prominently that “freedom to breed is intolerable” and those “who are biologically more fit to be the custodians
of property and power should legally inherit more.”
24	 Born Henry Fairfield Osborn Jr., he was the son of Henry Fairfield Osborn.
25	 The backgrounds, lives, messages, and impacts of Osborn and Vogt are discussed in more detail in Desrochers
and Hoffbauer (2009), Hoff (2012), and Robertson (2012).
New Perspectives on Political Economy24
reprinted eight times and translated into 13 languages while Vogt’s was the biggest environmental
best-seller prior to Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962). It was soon translated
into nine languages while condensed excerpts (translated into 11 languages) were published
over several issues of Reader’s Digest. The economist Jacob Oser summarized Vogt’s contribution
as a “pure, distilled, concentrated dose of all the Malthusian pessimism of these last
160 years” in which Shakespeare’s “A pox on you” was “not as a malediction” but “a blessing”
(1956 pp. 36–37). Zimmermann observed that both books were “stirring up thought
on resource problems as it has never been stirred up before” (1951 p. 814).
In his foreword to Road to Survival, the influential financier and political advisor Bernard
Baruch summed up Vogt’s message: “Because of the great abundance of the earth’s resources,”
he argued, “we have taken them for granted. But now, over most of the globe… we are
face to face with a serious depletion of ‘resource capital.’ More than one country is already
bankrupt.” Such a state of affairs had “wiped out civilizations in the past” and would again
deliver the same result. Decreasing returns could be found everywhere, for widespread mismanagement
had reduced much of the earth’s productivity to such an extent that “what
one man-hour of labor could formerly produce, now requires ten, fifty, or even a hundred
man-hours” (1948 p. IX). Vogt further argued that the environmental crisis was then of
worldwide proportions as humanity formed “an earth-company, and the lot of the Indiana
farmer can no longer be isolated from that of the Bantu” because environmental degradation
ultimately affected everyone (1948 p. 285). Not unlike a parasite whose destructiveness
“is limited by the absence of intelligence,” humans had used their brains to “tear down”
nature and compromised their very survival in order to enrich themselves (1948 p. 95).
Among other problems, Osborn discussed the case of Egypt where year-round irrigation
had been developed to support the production of cash crops such as cotton and tobacco
(1948 p. 110). As a result, Egyptian soil was “steadily deteriorating” while cotton yields
were falling. Similar outcomes could be observed in countless overgrazed grasslands, even
in Australia where sheep producers had tried “to gain from the land more than it is capable
of producing” (1948 pp. 158–159). In time, Osborn argued, environmental degradation
would prove even deadlier than the Second World War (1948 pp. VII, 69). Even American
success was one “great illusion” because it was built on the “most violent and the most
destructive” use of forests, grasslands, wildlife and water in the history of civilization (1948
p. 175). In the end, even the increased lifespan observed in many countries was illusory, for
it hid “evidences of a slow, silent, pervading deterioration of human health” through the
“appearance of a whole series of ‘new’ illnesses” commonly referred to as “degenerative
diseases” (1948 p. 85).
Both Osborn and Vogt denied the possibility of a technological fix. Vogt viewed a fall in
living standards as “unavoidable” because technological advances, far from providing solutions
to pressing problems, had made matters worse (1948 p. 80). Agricultural mechanization
had been “of dubious value to the land, as it is more purely extractive than older methods,”
brought lesser quality land under cultivation, was too dependent on rapidly dwindling
petroleum reserves and triggered a drift away from rural to urban areas, thereby reducing
“the effectiveness of the self-contained rural population as an economic shock absorber”
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 25
during future recessions (1948 p. 147). Osborn similarly cautioned that the “miraculous
succession of modern inventions” made it difficult to conceive “that the ingenuity of man
will not be able to solve the final riddle – that of gaining a subsistence from the earth”
(1948 pp. 199–201). Yet the “grand and ultimate illusion” was that “man could provide a
substitute for the elemental workings of nature.” For instance, “technologists may outdo
themselves in the creation of artificial substitutes for natural subsistence,” but chemical fertilizers
could never be thought of as “substitutes for the natural processes that account for
the fertility of the earth” because, in the long run, “life cannot be supported... by artificial
processes” (1948 p. 68).
Where Osborn and Vogt differed somewhat was in their prescriptions, with the latter being
more radical. Vogt thus commented that while “[e]conomic, political, educational, and
other measures” were indispensable, he had no qualms about coercive policies such as linking
foreign aid to population reduction provisions (1948 p. 265). For instance, the United
States should not “subsidize the unchecked spawning” of poor people in countries like
India and China until they adopted a “rational population policy” (1948 p. 77). He further
considered public health measures unadvisable, for a high death rate could be considered
“one of the greatest national asset” of poor economies (1948 p. 186) and pests like tsetse
flies and malaria carrying mosquitoes “blessings in disguise” as well as the “protector of
important resources” (1948 pp. 28–31). Indeed, the “flank attack on the tsetse fly with DDT
or some other insecticide” carried out by “ecologically ignorant sanitarians, entomologists,
and medical men” (1948 p. 257) was actually going to make things worse because there was
no “kindness in keeping people from dying of malaria so that they could die more slowly of
starvation” (1948 p. 13). The modern medical profession was setting the stage for a disaster
of epic proportions by continuing to believe that it had “a duty to keep alive as many people
as possible” and, “through medical care and improve sanitation,” being responsible “for
more millions living more years in increasing misery” (1948 p. 48).
For his part, Osborn was seemingly content to achieve population control by relying on
the “complete co-operation on the part of both government and industry, backed by the
public’s insistence that the job shall be done” (1948 p. 200). Such an undertaking would require
“the co-ordinated effort of every group, governmental and private, that is dedicated to
the cause of conservation” and would need to be “established throughout our educational
system so that coming generations will grow up aware of the situation that lies at the root
of the well-being of our nation” (Ibid.).
As Chase observed, in later years Vogt’s “argument, every concept, every recommendation
[became] integral to the conventional wisdom of the post-Hiroshima generation of
educated Americans” (1977 p. 381). Both books became mandatory readings in several
institutions of higher education and a “whole generation of impressionable young people
were to come under [their] influence,” including Paul Ehrlich and Al Gore (Chase 1977
p. 381; see also Cockburn and St. Clair 2000).
The post-war success of the depletionist doctrine, however, cannot simply be explained
by its intrinsic appeal. As Kasun documents, eugenicists regrouped at the time, “renaming
their organizations, forming new ones, and, above all, burrowing into the councils of
New Perspectives on Political Economy26
power” (1999 p. 217). By the early 1960s their movement had re-emerged as a Campaign to
Check the Population Explosion and, in so doing, “capture[d] the imagination of the mass
media” (Ibid.). One can get a sense of then-acceptable opinion through Archibald V. Hill,
president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, who asked publicly
“[i]f men were certain that the present overpopulation trends would eventually engulf them,
would they be right in withholding such things as insecticides, fertilizers, and anti-malarial
and anti-tubercolosis drugs?... If men bred like rabbits should they be allowed to die like
rabbits?” (quoted in Hillaby 1952 p. 4).
Resourceship in the Post-World War II era
While depletionists came to prominence, a few articles, books and studies re-stated and
documented the resourceship case, often earning their authors the derogatory moniker of
‘Cornucopians,’ an allusion to the mythical Greek “horn of plenty” (Cornucopia).26
In his massive World Resources and Industries: A Functional Appraisal of the Availability
of Agricultural and Industrial Resources, first published in 1933 and substantially updated
in later years (1951, 1964, and 1972),27
economist Erich Zimmermann (1888–1961)28
developed
an approach to his subject where, before the emergence of humans, “the earth was
replete with fertile soil, with trees and edible fruits, with rivers and waterfalls, with coal
beds, oil pools, and mineral deposits; the forces of gravitation, of electro-magnetism, of
radio-activity were there; the sun set forth his life-bringing rays, gathered the clouds, raised
the winds; but there were no resources” (1933 p. 3). A “static interpretation” of any given
resource’s value was therefore pointless, for it changes “not only with every change of social
objectives, respond[s] to every revision of the standard of living, change[s] with each new
alignment of classes and individuals, but also with every change in the state of the arts –
institutional as well as technological” (1933 p. 216). As Zimmermann further specified in
the revised version of his textbook:
Resources are highly dynamic functional concepts; they are not, they become, they
evolve out of the triune interaction of nature, man, and culture, in which nature
sets outer limits, but man and culture are largely responsible for the portion of
physical totality that is made available for human use… knowledge is truly the
mother of all resources (1951 pp. 814–815).
26	 The expression was used widely in the 1950s (Desrochers and Hoffbauer 2009). For Julian Simon’s misgivings
about the term, see Dragos Aligica (2009).
27	 The latter two editions were published posthumously and the last edition was revised by other authors.
28	 Howell (1996) and McDonald (1995) are more detailed biographical treatments of Zimmermann. Bradley
(2007; 2009a; 2009b), DeGregori (1987), and McDonald (1995) discuss his key insights, the tradition he
came from, and his neglect by mainstream resource economists. One survey of resource economics that mentions
Zimmermann’s work – although it misspells his name – is Barnett and Morse (1963).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 27
Zimmermann’s contribution, however, is typically omitted in surveys of the history of resource
economics, perhaps because of its roots in the German Historical School and American
institutionalist traditions, but it was and remains somewhat influential in (especially
economic) geography.29
The book also had some impact in the private sector with industry
associations such as the American Petroleum Institute buying and distributing copies.
Another salvo against the “dire shadow of the Malthusian principle” was penned by the
Harvard geologist Kirtley Fletcher Mather in a short (and typically poorly reviewed) book
titled Enough and to Spare (1944 p. 10). As Mather reminded his reader, the “subtle hold
upon the populace secured by the totalitarian dictators of Germany, Italy, and Japan [was]
due in large part to the apparent validity of the [Malthusian-inspired] argument that virile,
capable, and ambitious nations must ‘grab while the grabbing is good’ because the day is
close at hand when ‘there will not be enough to go around’” (1944 p. 12). While he agreed
that “peace, prosperity, and security” were unattainable if the Malthusian principle was
valid (Ibid.), this was fortunately not the case. Although this might have been obvious with
agriculture (especially since the advent of synthetic nitrogen fertilizer) and hydropower,
Mather contended that the supply of minerals would last a few hundred and perhaps even
a few thousand years (1944 p. 15).
Despite good news overall, some problems loomed on the horizon, such as the fact
that the “discovery of new oil fields is no longer keeping pace with the exhaustion of the
older fields” (1944 p. 18). Deficiencies in local production, however, could be made up by
“imports from abroad or by synthetic products from other domestic sources, or else [by
substituting] other forms of power for that derived from gasoline” (Ibid.). Humans would
probably one day, when pressed by either necessity or financial considerations, find ways to
extract valuable resources from oil shale whose “known reserves…are almost unbelievably
extensive”30
(1944 p. 21). Additional reserves were also “certain to be discovered whenever
the decreasing output of the world’s oil wells puts a premium upon other sources of oil” and
other resources, including the development of new profitable ways to exploit lower grades
(Ibid.). “Summing it all up,” Mather wrote:
for nearly all of the important nonrenewable resources, the known or confidently
expected world stores are thousands of times as great as the annual world consumption.
For the few which like petroleum are available in relatively small quantities,
substitutes are known or potential sources of alternative supply are at hand in
quantities adequate to meet our current needs for many thousands of years. There
29	 The comments about geography are based on personal observations and conversations with retired geographers.
The book was often mandatory reading in graduate courses in economic geography in the 1960s and
1970s and was classified as such in North American libraries. It is still referred to in the sub-discipline (Hanink
2000; Hayter and Patchell 2011).
30	 Lest the reader be confused, oil shale (rich in kerogen) is not the same as “fracking” petroleum-bearing shale
rock formations for tight oil.
New Perspectives on Political Economy28
is no prospect of the imminent exhaustion of any of the truly essential raw materials,
as far as the world as a whole is concerned. Mother Earth’s storehouse is far
more richly stocked with goods than is ordinarily inferred (1944 p. 29).
The bottom line, as stated on the book dust cover jacket, was that the nation or the man
looking to conquer ‘breathing room’ at the expense of his neighbor instead of cooperating
with him was doomed. Malthusian theory that had “frightened mankind into warfare”
had no basis in fact and the abundance of the earth’s non-renewable resources guaranteed
“‘enough and to spare’ for this generation and generations to come.”
Resourceship-inspired reactions to Vogt and Osborn
Five detailed contemporary critical assessments of Vogt’s and Osborn’s books are illustrative
of the resourceship stance in the post-war era.31
A Time anonymous reviewer questioned
the political implications of Osborn’s and (mostly) Vogt’s neo-Malthusian stance,
for if even rich nations had too few resources to keep their populations passably well-fed,
then what should be done if not go conquer and clear other lands of their populations (1948
non-paginated)? Hadn’t Germany, a country whose inhabitants had “stretched” the sandy
acres of the Prussian plain through innovative farming practices and highly skilled industry,
already gone to war twice because of the prevalence of this unwarranted philosophy among
its people? He further argued that Vogt’s assertions on soil had been totally discredited by
“real agricultural scientists” who considered “every main article of the Neo-Malthusian
creed” as “either false or distorted or unprovable.” Arguing that an acre of soil is inherently
limited in terms of its productive capacity or biotic potential ignored the fact that humans
were capable of improving it in various ways. Indeed, such a belief could only be held by
individuals who had turned their back on progress. While Vogt was correct to point out
that humans did not maintain soils as diligently as perhaps they could have, he had ignored
tremendous recent progress in this area. Vogt’s basic outlook on human reproduction, especially
his stance that, as long as food is available, humans would reproduce like “fruit flies,”
was similarly untenable, for it had long been know that richer people typically tend to have
fewer children. In the end, “real scientists” could only find a few iota of truth in Osborn’s
and Vogt’s “errors, prejudices, mysticism and reckless appeals to emotion,” although their
“static” philosophy gave “great comfort” to the type of state planner who believed that finite
resources needed to be strictly controlled.
A few months later, Merrill K. Bennett, then executive director of the Food Research
Institute at Stanford University, published a short essay against the “current [overpopulation]
scare” in Scientific Monthly. His main target was the “conservationists, notably the
soil conservationists,” including the “outstanding, perhaps extreme, examples” of Vogt and
Osborn, who seemingly “uncover[ed]…practically everywhere, evidence of permanent soil
31	 As will be discussed below, some later reports sponsored by the U.S. government and Resources for the Future
were also to a large extent indirect answers to Osborn and Vogt
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 29
erosion by water and wind, and of depletion of soil fertility” (1949 p. 19). Looking back
five decades, a time when “world population growth was enormous,” Bennett instead saw
marked “evidence of improvement in per capita food supplies.”
While demonstrable improvements were “widespread,” “positive deterioration suggested
in some places” was “subject to doubts not readily dispelled” or could most often “be
explained in terms of political interference with economic development” (1949 p. 23). Advances
had been achieved not only through increased acreage, but through technological
developments of all kinds that increased yields, conserved soils, reduced spoilage, and delivered
other benefits. One conclusion logically derived from the historical evidence was
that, “in all probability,” the “point of maximum productivity will be shifted upward as time
passes because technological advances will be made, even if we cannot predict either the
degree or the pace of advance.” Of course, “nothing in history or theory tells us what the
output may be, in volume or value, at the point of maximum productivity” (1949 p. 23).
There was no question, however, that even in light of current conditions and knowledge,
there existed at the time of his writing a “truly enormous gap” between “actual productivity”
and “maximum productivity” under optimum conditions (1949 pp. 23–24). Perhaps
this gap could be explained by a range of factors such as the inherent conservatism of some
landowners or bad institutions and incentives, but the most compelling, in his opinion, was
a “lack of demand or of the development of demand.” (1949 p. 24)
Bennett further argued that much valuable land could still be developed, especially in the
tropics, if problems such as lack of modern transportation infrastructure and the presence
of disease-transmitting insects could be addressed. As far as soil erosion was concerned,
he deferred to Charles E. Kellog, chief of the Soil Division Survey at the United States Department
of Agriculture, who a few months earlier had debunked much of the cataclysmic
soil erosion literature by pointing out that “a large part of the arable soils of the world are
made better by good farming than they were naturally” and that it was to be expected that
“each popular writer” on the topic “was trying to outdo the others in dramatic statement”
(1949 p. 25).32
Toward the end of his essay, Bennett wrote that “[p]essimism about maintenance or improvement
of per capita food supply, even where population is densest, is not intellectually
necessary, not compelled on the basis of historical fact or logic” (1949 p. 26). To follow the
path traced by Vogt, Osborn, and other pessimists would “hamper invention, stifle capital
accumulation, hinder investment domestically and internationally, and hence to retard the
general economic development, one aspect of which is improvement of national diets.” If
the paths toward progress and sensible policies – and not only in terms of human reproduc-
32	 Kellog’s full statement read as follows: “Generally, when a rural population becomes poverty-stricken, it fails
to maintain its soil. An exploited people pass on their suffering to the land... Where farmers can take a long
view of production over a period of ten years or more, there are very few instances of conflict between those
practices that give most return and those that maintain the soil from loss of fertility, erosion, destruction of
soil structure, or other deterioration-and not only maintain it: a large part of the arable soils of the world are
made better by good farming than they were naturally” (1948 p. 479).
New Perspectives on Political Economy30
tion and land use – were followed instead, “time may prove today’s pessimists to have been
wrong, as with the pessimists of yesterday.” (Ibid.)
Another direct attack on Vogt and Osborn was published by University of Delaware
geographer Earl Parker Hanson as New Worlds Emerging (1949).33
Marketed as a rebuttal
to the “Jeremiahs of geography, sociology and economics” (1949 p. 369), Hanson argued
that “it is never a land that is over-populated, in terms of inhabitants per square mile; it
is always an economy, in terms of inhabitants per square meal” (1949 p. 14) and that, at
any rate, much was land still available for development in various parts of the world, from
the Amazon basin to the lower Arctic. Denouncing the erosion “hysteria” into which the
modern world was “being stampeded” (1949 p. 135), Hanson had no patience for the claims
that natural resources should be conserved “not sanely by way of making the most of them,
but hysterically, as an isolated party of explorers might hoard and ration its dwindling food
supplies” (1949 p. 12). He refused to consider people as “liabilities” rather than “assets and
potential resources” (1949 p. 13) or that a region could be considered “over-populated” in
terms of a population/space ratio alone without factoring in the potential benefits of economic
development (1949 p. 14) that would in time produce “more in order to have more
to go around” (1949 p. 370). As he put it:
To proclaim a numerical limit on the world’s arable lands, while decrying the technical
advances with which that limit can be stretched by many millions of acres,
is to turn one’s back on reality. Even birth control on a large scale can be accomplished
only by raising standards of living through industrialization. Not only do
people need money for buying contraceptives, but they need many children for
cheap labor so long as they live in poverty and degradation. They will be more
likely to think about having fewer children when they are in a position to worry
about sending them to college. (1949 p. 272)
Erich Zimmermann’s chapter devoted to “resource adequacy” was another scathing critique
of Vogt and Osborn (1951). Among other problems, both men argued forcefully that
the only way to prevent disaster was to make sure that “birth control spreads over the earth
like wildfire,” but other than Western “industrial progress” (1951 p. 817), no one knew how
“to set and feed that wildfire” (1951 p. 814). Another paradox was that the “very knowledge
of ecology on which Vogt and Osborn base their attack against modern methods of production
is a gift of industrial civilization” and that the “remedies of reclamation, research, and
education depend on the surplus and leisure that industry and the use of inanimate energy
give us” for, after all, if “industrial man has raped the earth and wantonly impaired its productive
powers, he also has furnished the wisdom to recognize his folly and may yet supply
the means to make amends” (1951 p. 815).
33	 Mather (2003) provides much biographical information on Hanson’s career. The story of how he came to
write his book is detailed in Desrochers and Hoffbauer (2009).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 31
Zimmermann fundamentally disagreed with Vogt’s notion that the earth could not be
“stretched” by observing that indeed it could, be it from breeding drought and frost-resistant
wheat varieties, transforming the pampas so that they could sustain cereal production, developing
by-products from cattle waste, reducing spoilage loss by refrigeration, developing
animal feed with high protein and vitamin content, or substituting tractors for animal labor,
in the process making millions of acres devoted to animal feed available for human food
production and compensating for the lost manure with commercial fertilizers. One could
also read about the “transformation of run-down farms into veritable gardens of Eden”
through the work of “a congregation of experts – soil experts, plant and animal experts,
chemists, engineers – and a vast assemblage of machinery – bulldozers, terracers, harrows.”
(1951 p. 816). These experts were unavoidably “trained in institutions supported largely by
the wealth created by modern machine industry” while the “machines and the fuels that
power them are the direct products of that industry” (Ibid.).
Finally, the English translation of Brazilian physician and geographer Josué de Castro’s
The Geography of Hunger34
became a rebuttal to the “Malthusian scarecrow” (1952 p. 15)
and to William Vogt, the “standard-bearer of the neo-Malthusians,” whom he accused of
viewing “famished populations, raising the pressure of the world by their delirium of reproduction”
as “criminals” who deserved “an exemplary punishment” and were “condemned
to extermination, either by individual starvation or by controlling reproduction until the
born-to-starve disappear from the face of the earth” (1952 pp. 16–17). Building on “objective
data, biological and social facts” (1952 p. 17) along with the work of authors ranging
from Marx to Hanson, de Castro argued that the “first error” of Malthusian doctrine was
“to consider the growth of population as an independent variable, isolated from other social
phenomena, whereas in fact such increase is strictly dependent on political and economic
factors” (1952 p. 15). Among other baseless scares was the notion that “food production
cannot be increased because we have reached the practical limits of soil utilization as well
as of human saturation,” whereas in fact only about 10 percent of the land that could be put
under cultivation was being used at the time while “production per acre in most of the world
could be greatly increased by rational agricultural practices” (1952 p. 17), including better
protection from insects and diseases. De Castro was especially dismissive of Vogt when he
commented that “soil productivity, of course, is not an absolute. Like population density,
it is a variable, a function of the prevailing kind of economic organizations. The soil has
neither absolute productive limits – Vogt’s ‘biotic potential’ – nor absolute demographic
limits” (1952 p. 284). He added that the “relation of population to the soil has been handled
with an inaccuracy and a blind empiricism repugnant to the scientific spirit” (Ibid.).
Like other anti-Malthusians before him, de Castro made the case for scientific advances
and illustrated future possibilities by documenting how, among other achievements, poor
Japanese immigrants experienced in working “thankless soils” had purchased “for nearly
nothing” degraded coffee-growing land in and around São Paulo and developed a “magnifi-
34	 The first edition was published in Portuguese in 1946.
New Perspectives on Political Economy32
cent green belt” that was then contributing much to the produce supply of the Brazilian
industrial heartland (1952 p. 285). De Castro ended his book by highlighting that the real
road to survival was “still within the sight of man” and “marked by the confidence he must
feel in his own strength.” It did not lie “in the neo-Malthusian prescriptions to eliminate
surplus people, nor in birth control, but in the effort to make everybody on the face of the
earth productive” (1952 p. 312).
Empirical Studies of Scarcity
As detailed in histories of modern environmental economics (Kula 1998; Bradley 2009a), a
few landmark studies published in the 1950s and 1960s gave strong empirical support to the
resourceship perspective. In the United States, the President’s Materials Policy Commission
(otherwise known as the Paley Commission for its chairman, former CBS head William
Paley) sponsored and published a five-volume report entitled Resources for Freedom,
Foundation for Growth and Scarcity (1952) that reported an increase in available reserves
and a diminution in the price of depletable resources as a result of entrepreneurial efforts
and technical advances. Invoking an embryonic version of the precautionary principle, its
authors nonetheless advocated some forms of government planning that included, among
other things, investment in solar energy research and use of coal as a “bridge fuel.”
The work of the Paley Commission was carried on through the creation of the think
tank Resources for the Future in 1952. Although somewhat depletionist in its original
outlook — Fairfield Osborn was a key founding member (McCormick 1989) — RFF soon
published studies on resource availability that confirmed and expanded the commission’s
main findings, most prominently Neil Potter and Francis T. Christy’s Trends in Natural
Resource Commodities (1962) that presented a wide range of time-series data on resource
commodities and Harold J. Barnett and Chandler Morse’s Scarcity and Growth (1963) that,
among other things, interpreted this data. Their short answer was that, with the exception
of forestry, resource scarcity was not a meaningful issue. Not only had unit costs gone down
in all other sectors, but economizing or saving resources for future generations was deemed
nonsensical as “the economic magnitude of the estate each generation passes on — the income
per capita the next generation enjoys — has been approximately double that which it
received. The most important legacy, they argued, was not “stocks of untapped resources,”
but “knowledge, technology, capital, instruments and economic institutions” that allowed
the future creation of new resources (Barnett and Morse 1963 pp. 247–248).
Other empirical studies with similar results were produced at the time by economists
and demographers such as Dale Jorgensen, Zvi Griliches, Richard Easterlin, William Nordhaus,
and Allen Kelley (Kula 1998; Hoff 2012), but the work of American economist
Simon Kuznets and Danish agricultural economist Ester Boserup had arguably the most
significant impact. Interestingly, Kuznets’ (1967 p. 171) findings changed his overall outlook
from depletionism to a strong belief that “[m]ore population means more creators
and producers, both of goods along established production patterns and of new knowledge
and inventions.” Far from impeding economic development by siphoning off savings and
depleting finite resources, he discovered that rising populations increased the capital stock,
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 33
created economies of scale, and spurred innovation. For her part, Boserup’s studies of less
advanced economies shed light on the fact that a rising population increased labor productivity
and efficiency in land use by inducing more intensive practices (1965).
Reflective Conclusion
As the chemist and geographer Daniel B. Luten observed on the eve of the Simon-Ehrlich
bet, since the late 18th century “the question of limits to growth and optimism and pessimism
regarding the human prospect [has been] debated without consensus” while interest
in the issue has “waxed and waned more times than can be counted” (1980 p. 125).
Depletionists would sound the alarm, but in the context of functioning market economies
the resourceship perspective would prove to be correct. In the post-war era, however, depletionism
once again captured the minds and hearts of a majority of academics and policy
makers. It is with this background in mind that the contributions of Paul Ehrlich and Julian
Simon must be examined, along with the way historian Paul Sabin presents their perspectives
and draws conclusions from their bet (2013). This will be the subject of the second
part of this review essay.
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New Perspectives on Political Economy42
Snatching the Wrong Conclusions from
the Jaws of Defeat: A Resourceship
Perspective on Paul Sabin’s The Bet: Paul
Ehrlich, Julian Simon, and Our Gamble
over Earth’s Future. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2013).
Part 2: The Wager: Protagonists and
Lessons.
Pierre Desrochers1
, Vincent Geloso2
Abstract
Historian Paul Sabin’s The Bet aims to present the first full-fledged account of the 1980
wager about the future prices of five metals between biologist Paul Ehrlich and economist
Julian Simon. Ehrlich predicted that a growing population would rapidly deplete the
world’s finite supply of valuable resources, causing their price to rise. Simon countered that,
in a market economy, prices and technological change would result in more efficient use of
resources, new deposits discovered and substitutes developed, making resources less scarce
and prices lower. Unfortunately, Sabin’s account of this bet is marred by a lack of historical
perspective, an oversimplification of Simon’s theoretical framework, and a quest to find a
middle ground between mutually exclusive positions.
Keywords
Paul Ehrlich, Julian Simon, Malthusianism, neo-Malthusianism, Cornucopianism,
resourceship
1	 Associate Professor, Department of Geography, University of Toronto Mississauga,
pierre.desrochers@utoronto.ca
2	 London School of Economics
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 43
1. Introduction
The first part of this review essay revisited arguments over population growth, resource
availability, and environmental impact as they developed from the distant past to the dawn
of the modern environmental movement. The goal was to introduce readers to the intellectual
history missing from historian Paul Sabin’s book on the Julian Simon-Paul Ehrlich
bet. In the process, it was illustrated that the “resourceship” perspective, of which Julian
Simon would be the latest proponent, had historically proven its validity over the depletionist
outlook that Ehrlich represented. This second part discusses Ehrlich’s and Simon’s
formative years, along with Sabin’s presentation and interpretation of their writings and
of the wager. The reflective conclusion discusses why, after two centuries of a one-sided
ideological confrontation, the losing side still holds so much sway over highly educated and
well-meaning people.
2. Protagonists
Ivy-league educated Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon were born in 1932 of Jewish parents and
raised within a short distance of each other in the suburbs of Newark, New Jersey. From
then on, their lives differed drastically.
At the University of Pennsylvania Ehrlich majored in biology and was able, after completing
his doctorate at the University of Kansas, to turn his childhood passion for entomology
(especially the study of butterflies) into a permanent position at Stanford University.
Influenced by William Vogt (1948) and other depletionists as an undergraduate student,
he began to write short pieces and to give public talks on population and resources in the
early 1960s, a hobby that eventually led to his 1968’s The Population Bomb (Turner 2009).
He would spend the remainder of his career researching and writing about conservation
biology, coevolution, landscape ecology, population dynamics, the people/resource nexus,
and cultural evolution, activities for which he won numerous awards and substantial funding,
including over $1 million in prize money in the 1990s alone (Sabin 2013 p. 206).3
A
recurring complaint about his character is that he typically addressed his critics with insults
rather than debate.4
3	 See Ehrlich’s personal webpage at https://ccb.stanford.edu/paul-r-ehrlich.
4	 Perhaps his most famous dig of Simon was that “[g]etting economists to understand ecology is like trying
to explain a tax form to a cranberry. It’s as if Julian Simon were saying that we have a geocentric universe at
the same time NASA’s saying the earth rotates around the sun. There’s no reconciling these views. When you
launch a space shuttle you don’t trot out the flat-earthers to be commentators. They’re outside the bounds of
what ought to be discourse in the media. In the field of ecology, Simon is the absolute equivalent of the flatearthers”
(quoted in Simon 1998: non-paginated). Ehrlich often referred to Julian Simon as a “specialist in
mail order marketing” (Sabin 2013 p. 176) and, in Social Science Quarterly, disparaged his writings as “wrong,”
New Perspectives on Political Economy44
Julian Simon’s career path until his untimely death in 1998 was much less straightforward.
A Navy ROTC scholarship allowed him to graduate from Harvard with a degree in
experimental psychology and a lifelong fondness for philosopher and psychologist William
James. As he highlighted on his CV, during schooling he worked as an “encyclopedia salesman,
caddy, cost accountant, drugstore clerk, self-employed sign painter, brewery worker,
tin-can factory worker, technical writer, free-lance magazine writer, grass-seed factory worker,
and cab driver.”5
Upon graduation he spent three years as a Navy line officer, followed
by a couple of years of employment in the private sector. He then attended the University of
Chicago where he obtained an MBA and, having no academic ambition, a doctorate in business
economics in 1961 for which he wrote a dissertation on patterns of book uses in a large
library. As he later acknowledged, he never took “a course in demography and only two in
economics at any level” (Simon 2002 p. 286). Following a few more years in the private
sector in advertising-related positions, he became of professor of (successively) advertising,
marketing, business economics, and business administration, first at the University of
Illinois and later the University of Maryland (Simon 2002 chapter 24).
Like Ehrlich, Simon maintained interests beyond population economics and wrote much
about issues as diverse as advertising and marketing management, research methods, statistics,
and immigration.6
At a more practical level, he was the brain behind the airline oversales
auction system. Unlike Ehrlich, he felt like an outcast among academics as he never
benefitted from large research grants and often ended up teaching large service classes on
topics such as research methods and statistics (Simon 2002). As Sabin (2013 p. 207) further
tells us, Simon never belonged to any significant economic journal editorial board, was
never “invited to give talks at prominent economic meetings,” and increasingly struggled to
get his work published in reputable professional journals.
“incompetent,” and “moronic,” and wondered out loud why he couldn’t “at least find a junior high school science
student to review” them (Ehrlich 1981:47). The Ehrlichs further called Simon the leader of a “space-age
cargo cult” of economists convinced that new resources would miraculously fall from the heavens and that the
ultimate resource the world would never run out of was “imbeciles” (Tierney 1990). Ehrlich went so far as to
tell a Wall Street Journal reporter in 1995 that “If Simon disappeared from the face of the Earth, that would
be great for humanity” (Sabin 2013 p. 203). To list a few more invectives from Sabin’s book: Writing about
the Green Revolution, Ehrlich criticized “narrow-minded colleagues who are proposing idiotic panaceas to
solve the food problem” (pp. 22–23). He justified the founding of the (short-lived) Club of Earth in 1988 to
denounce the “idiocy you get from economists and politicians” (p. 174). People who didn’t understand why he
emphasized population, be they academics, politicians, or environmentalists (a prominent target in the early
1970s was Barry Commoner) were “the ones who have to take their shoes off to count to 20” (p. 176) or simply
“clowns,” “morons,” “idiots,” and “fools” (pp. 55 and 207).
5	 From his online CV at http://www.juliansimon.com/vita.html. See also Dragos Aligica (2007 pp. XI–XIII).
6	 From his posthumous website at http://www.juliansimon.com/.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 45
3. Paul Ehrlich on Population and Resources
Viewed in a longer historical perspective, The Population Bomb’s (Ehrlich 1968) sale figures
(over 2 million copies) are puzzling. As the political scientist Charles T. Rubin observed,
the book originally drew little attention because “throughout the sixties, it appears that
everybody was concerned about overpopulation” and its basic arguments were by then
“familiar” (1994 p. 78). Luten suggests it is best understood as “climaxing and in a sense
terminating the debate of the 1950s and 1960s” (1986 p. 298). And yet, thanks to frequent
appearances on The Tonight Show and the popular impact of the first oil shock in 1973,
Ehrlich brought old ideas to new heights and achieved popular celebrity status.
The outlook of Ehrlich and his key collaborators (his wife Anne and physicist John
Holdren7
) on the population-resource nexus was vintage depletionism and remained remarkably
consistent over time.8
He believed in a “stable optimum population size” that
would respect “inviolable biological and physical limits” (Sabin 2013 p. 35), denounced
“growthmanic economists and profit-hungry businessmen,” told Americans to prepare for
the “end of affluence” (Sabin 2013 p. 100), and warned of a “coming social tidal wave” over
increasingly scarce resources (Sabin 2013 p. 3). He made the case for “population control
over technological change to avert looming disaster” (Sabin 2013 p. 30) because “technology
could not replace services provided by ecosystems to regulate climate, water cycles,
solar radiation, and other essential processes” (Sabin 2013 p. 133). His most influential
contribution was the I=PAT identity in which “each human individual has a negative impact
on his environment” whether he lives in an agrarian or technological society (Ehrlich and
Holdren 1971 p. 1212).9
On the resource front, Holdren and Ehrlich (1971 p. 8) claimed that “[t]oday the frontiers
are gone, and the evidence is mounting that technology cannot hold the law of diminishing
returns at bay much longer.” This was especially true with the “rapacious depletion
of our fossil fuels” then already forcing producers “to consider more expensive mining techniques
to gain access to lower-grade deposits” (Holdren and Ehrlich p. 18). The Ehrlichs
explained rapidly rising oil prices by the fact that “[m]ost of the easily accessible sources of
7	 Ehrlich met his future wife when she was an undergraduate studying French at the University of Kansas. As
of this writing, Holdren was, among other administrative positions, Director of the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy. His original interest in the population/resources nexus was sparked by geochemist
Harrison Scott Brown’s 1954 The Challenge of Man’s Future, a book that, as noted by Sabin (2013 p. 29),
showed “elements of eugenic thinking” in terms of “genetic soundness” and the “deterioration of the species.”
8	 Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1975/1974,1990, 2013; Ehrlich and Holdren 1971; Ehrlich, Ehrlich and Holdren
1977/1970; Holdren and Ehrlich 1971.
9	 Ehrlich and Holdren’s original formulation was I = P x F, where I = total impact, P = population size, and F =
impact per capita. I = PAT refers to I (environmental impact, typically the numerical value of some pollutant)
= P(opulation size) x A(ffluence, typically GDP per capita) x T(echnology, typically the amount of pollution
per unit of GDP). Preston (1996) and Chertow (2000) are broader histories of the concept, its problems, and
the more general impact of population growth on environmental quality. Waggoner and Ausubel (2002) is a
techno-optimistic take on the identity.
New Perspectives on Political Economy46
fossil fuels and mineral resources are long gone, and the rising prices reflect the necessity
to dig deeper, travel farther, and refine lower-grade ore in order to obtain them” (1975/1974
p. 100). Indeed, “a genuine world shortage of pumpable petroleum appear[ed] certain by
the turn of the century if demand continues to grow as it did in the 1960s” (Ehrlich and
Ehrlich 1975/74 p. 44).10
To our knowledge, Ehrlich’s most concise discussion of the gravest “defects in the cornucopian
argument” is the following:
1.	 The presumption that advanced technology will make energy very cheap;
2.	 The presumption that abundant, cheap energy — if available — would prove to be a
sufficient condition for abundance of all kinds;
3.	 The serious underestimation of the degree of environmental degradation that would
be generated by the proposed cornucopian technologies;
4.	 The even more serious underestimation of the impact on human well-being that major
environmental disruption portends (Ehrlich et al. 1977 p. 954).
Ehrlich and his collaborators then discussed some environmental impacts in more detail,
including “[c]arbon dioxide… produced by combustion of fossil fuels in quantities too large
to contain [that] may already be influencing climate” and the “gravest threat to human wellbeing…
[i.e.] the loss of natural services now provided by biogeochemical processes” (1977
p. 955). (Actually, Ehrlich’s take on increased anthropogenic CO2
emissions as a “serious
limiting factor” to growth goes back at least to the late 1960s (Shelesnyak 196 p. 141)).
Because humanity’s choice was limited to either planned decline or collapse, he offered
several options for the former. For population control they included mandatory sterilization,
temporary infertility (achieved through pills or tampering with public drinking water),
parenting permits, drastic restrictions on immigration, triage (selecting a small number of
survivors out of a mass of doomed individuals), tying food aid to strict population control
measures, the public funding of new birth control techniques, tax disincentives for childbirth,
and luxury taxes on layettes, cribs, diapers, diaper services, and expensive toys. For
lifestyle choices, he suggested rebuilding city centers, curbing suburban sprawl, overhauling
the “entire pattern of transportation in the United States,” new efficiency standards for
buildings and appliances, survivalism-inspired techniques (gardening, foraging and storing
water), and purchasing more resistant clothing (Sabin 2013 p. 99). Overall success, however,
mandated the creation of a “powerful governmental agency” to coordinate “whatever
steps are necessary to establish a reasonable population size in the United States” and the
rest of the planet (Sabin 2013 p. 40). Ehrlich deemed higher employment as a result of these
measures unavoidable, but nonetheless preferable to utter social collapse. And in the un-
10	 Bailey (1993) contains additional doomsday quotes and predictions by Ehrlich along with short discussions
of his intellectual framework.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 47
likely case his prescription was wrong, fewer people would enjoy more resources per capita
and the environment would be left better off.
As evidenced in some of his most recent writings, his certainties and philosophical outlook
remain unchanged (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2013). For instance, he recently told a New
York Times reporter that while he “would not echo everything that he once wrote,” he
“remains convinced that doom lurks around the corner,” that what “he wrote in the 1960s
was comparatively mild” and that his “language would be even more apocalyptic today”
(Haberman 2015 non-paginated). Indeed, on May 21 2014 he went so far as to claim on a
HuffPost Live webcast that in the near future humans would have to contemplate “eat[ing]
the bodies of [their] dead” in order to survive.11
4. Julian Simon on Population and Resources12
Like many academics of his generation, Simon was originally drawn to population issues
because he believed that “rapid population growth was the major threat to the world’s
economic development” and he could use his expertise to “understand” and “combat” the
problem in less advanced economies (1977 p. XXI). Familiarizing himself with the issue,
however, he noticed a “contradiction between the bare theory and the bare facts” (Simon
1977 p. XXI). While poor raw data was one possible explanation, he “sought a reconciliation”
by looking into the work of scholars such as M. K. Bennett, Theodore Schultz, Ester
Boserup, Simon Kuznets, and the “great book which [was his] tutor,” Barnett and Morse’s
Scarcity and Growth (Simon 1996 non-paginated).13
His final conversion to resourceship occurred in 1969 while on his way to discuss family
planning programs with USAID officials in Washington D.C. Passing by a sign to the
Iwo Jima memorial, he remembered a eulogy in which the chaplain wondered how many
geniuses had unnecessarily perished there. As Simon later recalled: “Then I thought, have
I gone crazy? What business do I have trying to help arrange it that fewer human beings
will be born each of whom might be a Mozart or a Michelangelo or an Einstein — or simply
a joy to his or her family or community, and a person who will enjoy life” (2002 pp. 242–
243). With the zeal of a convert, he published a series of resourceship-inspired academic
articles. This work culminated in his most academic book on the subject, The Economic
Consequences of Population Growth (1977), in which he argued that in the long run (a few
decades) the overall benefits of population growth greatly exceeded short-term problems. A
11	 “Hope On Earth: A Conversation.” HuffPost Live (May 21, 2014), http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/segment/
hope-on-earth-paul-r-erlich-michael-charles-tobias/537672c6fe34447c4e000323.
12	 Dragos Aligica (2009) is another introduction to Simon’s thoughts on this issue.
13	 These contributions are discussed in more detail in part 1 of this review essay. See also Bradley (2009) and
Kula (1998).
New Perspectives on Political Economy48
1980 Science article “reprinted in many magazines and newspapers with a total circulation
of many millions” (Simon 2002 p. 267) and the semi-popular The Ultimate Resource (Simon
1981b; revised edition 1996) then secured his place as the most well-known public exponent
of resourceship and an original contributor to the topic.1
In the words of Easterlin: “Julian
Simon was not the only scholar arguing against the Malthusian and neo-Malthusian view,
but there is little doubt that he was the most vehement, persistent, and articulate spokesman
of the anti-Malthusians and attracted, in return, the most vigorous attacks” (2000
p. XV). Ahlburg similarly observed that Julian Simon was “among the most prominent
analyst of the relationship between population and development as well as the most prolific
commentator on issues of public policy concerning population growth” (1998 p. 317).
As he acknowledged in The Ultimate Resource 2, his insights were hardly original. The
“theory and factual base” of the book’s key arguments was “not at all novel or radical,
though it seems so to non-economists. Indeed, much of what is written here had been
settled wisdom before I came along” (Simon 1996 non-paginated). His real contribution
had been to “push these ideas further than most, but this is not a theoretical difference;
the main novelty here on resource topics is the broad data that I provide, together with the
explicit assertions about non-finiteness which might even be considered implicit in some
predecessors’ writings” (Simon 1996 non-paginated).
Simon also edited a collection of classic writings on population and resources and gathered
numerous historical time series (1998). He dismissed critics who viewed “all the evidence
of history [as] merely ‘temporary’ and must reverse ‘sometime’” as being “outside the
canon of ordinary science” (Simon 1996 non-paginated). Quoting the development economist
Peter T. Bauer, he firmly believed that “it is only the past that gives us any insight into
the laws of motion of human society and hence enables us to predict the future” (Simon
1996 non-paginated). If the future was going to differ from the past, he added, “the bias is
likely to be in the direction of understating the rate at which technology will develop, and
therefore underestimating the rate at which costs will fall” (Simon 1996 non-paginated).
Simon’s final conclusion was that “[m]ore people and increased income cause problems
in the short run – shortages and pollutions. Short-run scarcity raises prices and pollution
causes outcries. These problems present opportunity and prompt the search for solutions.
In a free society, solutions are eventually found… In the long run the new developments
leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen” (1995 pp. 24–25).
Simon was criticized on a range of subjects, but two recurring complaints are more
crucial for our argument. The first is that he was a “population density” determinist who
believed that population numbers mattered more than institutions and culture. While there
1	 Simon’s broader contribution to population economics (i.e. beyond the population-resources nexus) was
more significant than his take on resource economics. In the words of Joseph J. Spengler, arguably America’s
most prominent population economist of the 20th
century, Simon’s 1977 The Economics of Population Growth
“was a path-breaking work, not merely in terms of challenging particular studies incorporated in it but above
all in its espousal of a number of theses that run counter to prevailing opinion” (Simon 1977 p. XXIX). Ahlburg
(1998) contains a more critical discussion of the book’s model, findings, and ethical stance.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 49
is some truth to this, he stated on a number of occasions he considered himself a political
economist in the broad tradition of David Hume, Adam Smith, and Friedrich Hayek2
who
believed that “human imagination can flourish only if the economic and political system
gives individuals the freedom to exercise their talents and take advantage of opportunities”
(1996 non-paginated). In short, the world’s problem was not “too many people, but a lack
of political and economic freedom” (1996 non-paginated).
The second complaint is that he advocated a “do-nothing” approach to pollution problems.
Yet Simon never said that “all is well everywhere,” nor did he “predict that all will be
rosy in the future” as a “better future does not happen ‘automatically’ and without effort”
(1995 p. 21). What he argued was that policymakers should focus on problems that caused
demonstrable harm rather than on false alarms or trivial claims.3
Simon also rejected the
notion that government programs are necessarily superior to the spontaneous actions by
individuals and non-governmental organizations (Dragos Aligica 2007 p. 8).
Finally, one can speculate from a few remarks on the work of urban theorist Jane Jacobs
(1969) that, had he lived longer, he might have come to focus his attention on the uniquely
beneficial role of large and diverse urban agglomerations as the locus of human problemsolving
as opposed to population density in the abstract (Kuran 2000 p. 105).
5. Sabin on Economic Theory and Environmental Policy
While the outcome of the bet was extremely favorable to Simon, its terms made it possible
for his opponents to dismiss its relevance because of the volatility of commodity prices
(that are also affected by political upheavals and technological changes), alternative timeframes
(such as a different 10-year period) that would have favored Ehrlich,4
the alleged
ecological irrelevance of commodities (as compared to problems such as the destruction of
natural capital), and claims that Ehrlich simply got his timing wrong in terms of unavoidable
outcomes.5
2	 See, among others, Simon (1996; 2002) and Kuran (2000).
3	 Simon’s thoughts on pollution are summarized in chapters 15–18 of The Ultimate Resources 2 (1996). For his
thoughts on climate change, see chapter 5 of Myers and Simon (1994a).
4	 The paper cited by Sabin in support of this position is Kiel et al. (2010). For a rebuttal of this argument written
by a supporter of Simon, see Perry (2013).
5	 Ehrlich famously commented: “The bet doesn’t mean anything. Julian Simon is like the guy who jumps off the
Empire State Building and says how great things are going so far as he passes the 10th floor. I still think the
price of those metals will go up eventually, but that’s a minor point. The resource that worries me the most is
the declining capacity of our planet to buffer itself against human impacts. Look at the new problems that have
come up: the ozone hole, acid rain, global warming. It’s true that we’ve kept up food production — I underestimated
how badly we’d keep on depleting our topsoil and ground water — but I have no doubt that sometime
in the next century food will be scarce enough that prices are really going to be high even in the United States.
New Perspectives on Political Economy50
Sabin lends credence to Simon’s detractors by writing that “when the global economy
fell into recession in the early 1980s, economic activity slowed and demand for minerals
dropped” (2013 p. 185). Yet one could argue that although there was a severe recession in
the USA and other countries at the time, gross world product continued to grow near its
strong historical trend throughout the decade.6
In our opinion, Simon never intended his bet to be a perfect encapsulation of the resourceship
perspective. Instead, one should view it as a ploy by a marketing expert, probability
and statistics teacher, and serious poker player to publicize the counter-intuitive
notion that natural resources are not finite in any meaningful economic sense. Simon thus
knew beforehand he would have won this gamble “at all earlier times in history,” but also
that his odds were long if the period involved was short because of commodity cycles and
market-distorting political interventions (1994a p. 160). Nevertheless, he obviously deemed
the risk of giving Ehrlich the opportunity to select a time period of one year worth the
publicity.
Apart from issues such as the notion that the Consumer Price Index might overestimate
the cost of living7
or the fact he deemed human life valuable in and of itself notwithstanding
falling living standards, Simon discussed the limitations of his wager on a few occasions.8
He observed:
Commentators said that a single bet proves little, and they are right. Hence I offered
to repeat the wager, but there were no takers. The commentators also said
that the bet was too narrow and should encompass environmental and other measures
of human welfare. Hence I broadened the offer as follows: I’ll bet a week’s or
a month’s pay that just about any trend pertaining to material human welfare will
improve rather than get worse. You pick the trend — perhaps the death rate, the
price of a natural resource, some measure of air or water pollution, or the number
of telephones per person — and you choose the area of the world and the future
year in which the comparison is to be made (Simon, n.d. non-paginated)
Simon further specified the following details as to a second wager:
1.	 Five years or more, to ensure that there is time for conditions to change and to reduce
the likelihood of statistical blip.
If we get climate change and let the ecological systems keep running downhill, we could have a gigantic population
crash” (cited by Tierney 1990 non-paginated).
6	 See, for instance, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_world_product. We would like to thank an anonymous
referee for this suggestion.
7	 See among others, Lebow and Rudd (2003) and Costa (2001). We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer
for drawing our attention to the issue.
8	 See especially Simon (1996 chapter 1) and Simon (n.d.).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 51
2.	 Measures of actual welfare rather than intermediate conditions. That is, mortality and
morbidity, for example, rather than incidences of particular diseases.
3.	 The measures that I would consider most appropriate are: Life expectancy; ambient
concentrations of air and water pollutants — that is, the cleanliness of air and water;
purchasing power of any group; ownership of specific household goods; costs of natural
resources; amount of leisure time; amount of schooling; amount of housing space.
4.	 I would prefer to make multiple bets — perhaps a collection of countries rather than
one country, for example, or a variety of measures of human nutrition — rather than
on just one item (Simon n.d. non-paginated).9
Simon’s stance was best summed up in his (in)famous “long-run forecast in brief:” “The
material conditions of life will continue to get better for most people, in most countries,
most of the time, indefinitely. Within a century or two, all nations and most of humanity
will be at or above today’s Western living standards. I also speculate, however, that many
people will continue to think and say that the conditions of life are getting worse” (1995
p. 642). As he added elsewhere: “[P]eople in the future will live longer lives than they do
now, with higher incomes and better standards of living, and the costs of natural resources
will be lower than at present” (1994a p. 160).
The crucial point is that while Simon believed that the scarcity of any given commodity
could be measured by “a price that has persistently risen” as a measure of material wellbeing
this indicator was much less satisfactory than the relative weight of any commodity
in one’s budget or the price of goods in terms of real wages (Simon 1996 pp. 25–26). One
problem is that the demand for many goods (e.g. computers and smartphones) increases
with income, thus increasing the demand — and therefore the price — of some required raw
materials, at least in the short run. Because of this, Simon constantly emphasized the need
to go beyond a static analysis of scarcity. To repeat and clarify, once incomes have increased,
the derived demand might result in higher commodity prices, but will simultaneously create
new incentives to alleviate this scarcity by increasing productivity in the production and use
of a resource and by promoting the development of substitutes. Over time the real prices of
commodities will drop, but proportionally less so than the increase in real wages.
The economic history literature provides numerous such illustrations through the computation
of welfare ratios in which a given wage rate for a fixed number of days worked is
divided by a fixed basket of goods. The ratio is then the number of times that fixed basket
can be acquired (Allen 2001; Lindert and Williamson 2016). Some researchers also inverse
the ratio to see how many minutes, hours, or days of work were required to acquire
one such basket or one particular good (Cox and Alm 2000; Sharp and Weisdorf 2012).
For instance, an American worker earning the average wage in 1920 would have required
9	 Simon (n.d.) then discussed critically the counter bet offer made by climatologist Stephen Schneider and Ehrlich
(see Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1996: 100–104 or the relevant excerpt at http://web.stanford.edu/group/CCB/
Pubs/Ecofablesdocs/thebet.htm).
New Perspectives on Political Economy52
approximately an hour of work each to pay for a pound of bacon, a pound of butter, or a
dozen oranges while his counterpart in 2014 would have required about a fifth of that time
for each commodity.10
A sole focus on real prices obfuscates rather than invalidates Simon’s
core argument.11
Another issue is that a commodity’s price might rise or remain somewhat constant in
spite of the lower real prices, greater availability, or more efficient use of the final or intermediary
products derived from it. For instance, between 1950 and 2011, energy intensity
in the United States decreased by 58 percent per real dollar of GDP (US EIA 2013), a fact
often forgotten in discussions of the overall economic impact of rising crude oil prices. U.S.
cattle prices between the middle and late 19th
century also provide insight into this issue. At
the time, slaughtered cattle would yield roughly 50 percent of its “live weight” as “dressed
weight” (or meat with some bones, cartilage and other body structure still attached) as
many bones, sinews, hooves, internal organs, heads, tails, and other non-edible parts (save
leather) were thrown away (Rothenberg 1979). A few years later, however, new developments
such as the expansion of the railroad network and artificial refrigeration made possible
the rise of great meat-packing complexes in Chicago, Omaha, and Kansas City where
once discarded residuals could be turned into a wide range of lucrative by-products (Desrochers
and Reed 2008). Greater efficiency of slaughterhouses and improved distribution
networks allowed retail prices for beef meat to drop (HSUS 1975), while farmgate price for
live animals either increased (Desrochers and Reed 2008) or remained relatively constant
(McFerrin and Wills 2013) throughout the period. In other words, because of competition
among meat-packers for both raw materials and processed meat market shares, farmers
could obtain more (or just as many) dollars per cattle head while consumers paradoxically
benefitted from lower prices for meat. In such a situation, prices for live animals would not
be an adequate measure of “improvements in the material conditions of life.”
Thirdly, technological innovations that increase productivity might drive up the price of
a commodity without this truly reflecting the scarcity of the resource. Whale oil is a case in
point. The decline of the whaling industry in the United States began around 1850 at which
point real prices began to increase (Bardi 2007). However, economic historians agree that
this was not because of resource depletion or overfishing (Davis, Gallman, and Hutchins
1988). Kaiser (2013) thus found that the increasing demand for illuminants created pressures
on prices, which in turn motivated the development of substitutes like petroleumderived
kerosene. However, whale bone and oil prices did not fall as kerosene production
expanded and, in spite of falling demand, prices stayed high and even increased. The
answer to this conundrum is opportunity cost as the important surge in American labor
productivity was greater than the observed increase in productivity in the whaling industry.
This meant that the opportunity cost of using workers, capital, and other resources in the
10	 From humanprogress.org, “U.S. cost of groceries, nominal dollars and hours worked, 1920–2014.” This website
lists several other grocery items.
11	 See Easterlin and Angelescu (2012) for a more sophisticated discussion.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 53
whaling industry was great. These workers, capital goods, and other resources were progressively
reallocated to other industries. In the process, the whaling industry faced higher costs
relative to productivity. While marginal players in the whaling industry exited, the supply of
inputs to the whaling industry decreased and prices had to be increased. Hence, prices in
that situation are not reflective of depletion or expansion of resource stock.
Sabin also fails to discuss the (typically incidental) environmental benefits of market institutions
such as competition and property rights,12
along with the negative environmental
consequences of governmental interventions. For instance, he never tells his readers that
U.S. environmental conditions were improving long before Ehrlich and other modern activists
rose to fame,13
that past pollution problems were often addressed through property
rights-based legal actions,14
and that the roots of many 1970s federal regulations are found
in earlier actions by large business concerns who preferred to deal with one overarching
regulatory framework than many disparate ones at the state level (Desrochers 2002; 2010;
Desrochers and Haight 2014). Although not an American case, Julian Simon’s finest debating
moment is illustrative of the problem with Sabin’s ringing endorsement of federal
environmental regulations.
In July 1996, at a public event sponsored by the World Future Society, [Julian]
Simon debated Hazel Henderson… who was trying to make a case that government
regulation was responsible for reduced air pollution… [She] came armed with a
graph showing a decline in pollution levels in London since the late 1950s. The
slope of the line was clearly downward, illustrating, she said, the effect of London’s
Clean Air Act of 1956.
In his rebuttal period, Simon presented a graph of his own. Whenever he presents
any data, his practice is to present the figures going all the way back to day one,
to the start of record-keeping on the parameter in question. You have to focus on
aggregate trends over the long term, he insists, not just pick and choose some little
fleeting data chunks that seem to support your case. So his own chart of smoke
levels in London stretched back into the 1800s, and the line from the 1920s on
showed a constant and uniform downward slope. “If you look at all the data,” he
said, “you can’t tell that there was a clean-air act at any point” (Regis 1997).
12	 Anderson and Leal (2001) is a more detailed discussion of how market institutions often channel self-interest
for the environmental good.
13	 For instance, air quality in many American cities had been improving for decades prior to the passage of the
1970 Clean Air Act (Goklany 1999).
14	 In the United States, polluters could be subjected to legal sanctions based on common law doctrines of trespass
(any entry on the property of another) and nuisance (indirect or intangible invasions, such as odors and
noises). The outcome could be damages awarded to the plaintiff(s) or an injunction (an order requiring the
cessation of an offensive activity or specifying corrective action) (Meiners and Morriss 2000).
New Perspectives on Political Economy54
The key feature of Simon’s argument was that markets would promote environmental conservation,
but that they needed to be free. Bad economic and environmental outcomes
would be the results of policies as diverse as manufacturing, agricultural, and water subsidies;
biofuel mandate; the suspension of property rights to allow industrial concerns to discharge
polluting residuals; and government rules that mandate the destruction of production
residuals rather than turning them into valuable by-products (Desrochers 2002; 2010).
Simon’s skepticism about the inherent superiority of governmental action in addressing environmental
problems clearly had some real-world foundations. Unfortunately, Sabin does
not discuss these considerations nor Simon’s comments on environmental degradation in
the Soviet Union and its satellite countries in this context (1996 pp. 253–254). Painting
Simon as a naïve Panglossian strikes us as somewhat dishonest, at least inasmuch as his
optimism was predicated upon institutional contexts.
Another problematic aspect of Sabin’s analysis is his lack of discussion of relevant work
published during and after the Simon-Ehrlich bet. For instance, many quantitative economic
historians (or “cliometricians”) have provided further evidence to support Simon’s
view. The work of Robert Fogel (2004) on mortality, human heights, and calorie availability
has recorded the long and gradual elimination of Malthusian pressures in the western
world. Giovanni Federico (2008) has documented massive worldwide improvements in
agricultural productivity since the 19th
century that drastically reduced malnutrition without
increasing land use substantially. Wrigley and Schofield (1981) have built long time
series of vital statistics to study the relationship between economic activity and population
health whose analysis has even led some to question the plausibility of the basic Malthusian
scenario before 1800.
More recently, Broadberry et al. (2015), Nicolinni (2007), and Crafts and Mills (2009)
suggest to various degrees that in Great Britain, Malthusian pressures were largely alleviated
from the 15th
century onward because of increased trade and its attending broader
division of labor that paved the way to the diffusion of ideas, more efficient organization
of economic activities, and the creation of economies of scale. In pre-1815 Germany the
existence of Malthusian pressures is said to have been contingent on poor market integrations
between different regions (Fertig and Pfister 2012). Geloso and Kufenko (2015) make
a similar case with French Canada between the late 17th
to mid-19th
century. Such data
and studies caught the attention of researchers such as Michael Kelly (2013) who rebutted
Ehrlich’s latest apocalyptic article in the prestigious Proceedings of the Royal Society B.
Others, like Galor (2011), used them to develop what economists now call “unified growth
theory” that explains how humankind escaped the “Malthusian trap.” Finally, analysts such
as Lomborg (2001) and Goklany (2007) have relied in part on evidence of this kind in their
attempt to update and expand upon Simon’s works of synthesis on economic, social, and
environmental indicators.
Like many depletionists and pessimists before him, Sabin cannot bring himself to endorse
Simon’s view and resorts to invoking an allegedly global and intractable problem to
invalidate the resourceship outlook. As most other critics who no longer invoke soil erosion
and overpopulation as major crisis that force us to rethink our economic system (to say
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 55
nothing of mass extinction, famine, global cooling, or ozone depletion), his trump card of
global warming is attributed to anthropogenic CO2
emissions (see, among countless others,
Earth Talk 2009; Moran 2015). One can’t help but notice striking similarities between
the rhetoric on overpopulation and global warming, be they simple causality mechanisms
or models (population growth → rapidly depleting natural resources; anthropogenic CO2
emissions → rapidly warming climate) whose predictions do not fit fully with the available
facts, or else that political, academic, and foundational support is once again overwhelmingly
skewed toward catastrophist scenarios derived from modeling exercises. Of course,
the fact that the template to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was arguably
the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems founded in
192815
or that much of the alarm about population growth stemmed from computer projections
and economic models that offered allegedly precise and “scientifically grounded”
doomsday scenarios might explain much in this regard.
Yet, even granting Sabin’s and other alarmists’ take on global warming is insufficient to
indict Simon. True, while admitting (like the authors of these lines) he was not a climate
specialist, Simon (1996 chapter 18) suspected that anthropogenic climate warming was a
dubious scare that was ultimately about fears of population growth. As he put it:
A World Bank paper on the subject concludes, “The global negative externality
represented by rapid population growth in developing countries provides a strong,
new rationale for developed countries, in their own interests, to finance programs
that would reduce population growth in developing countries.” That is, the old
rationales for World Bank population-control programs — economic growth, resource
conservation, and the like — having been discredited, a new “rationale” has
been developed on the basis of speculative assumptions about global warming’s
economic effects derived from controversial climatological science (Simon 1996
non-paginated).
Although Sabin doesn’t explore the issue, fear of overpopulation remains significant among
prominent anthropogenic climate change policy actors. For instance, when asked why Indians
shouldn’t aspire to the same standard of living as Westerners, the former Chair of
the IPCC, Rajendra K. Pachauri, answered: “Gandhi was asked if he wanted India to reach
the same level of prosperity as the United Kingdom. He replied: ‘It took Britain half the
resources of the planet to reach its level of prosperity. How many planets would India require?’”
(Walker 2007).16
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change Christiana Figueres once said that “We should ‘make every effort’ to re-
15	 A history of the IUSIPP (now IUSIP) can be found on the organization’s website at http://iussp.org/en/about/
history.
16	 Pachauri (2015 p. 1) also described “the protection of Planet Earth, the survival of all species and sustainability
of our ecosystems” as “more than a mission” and as his “religion… and dharma.”
New Perspectives on Political Economy56
duce the world’s population in an effort to fight Climate Change,” that “obviously less people
would exert less pressure on the natural resources,” and that humanity is “already exceeding
the planet’s planetary carrying capacity today.” She added that population control wasn’t
enough and that fundamental changes needed to be made to our current economic system
(Adams 2015). Professor Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, director of the Potsdam Institute for
Climate Impact Research and an influential contributor to the encyclical letter Laudato si,
estimates the carrying capacity of the planet at “below 1 billion people” (Revkin 2009).
Simon’s take on a precautionary approach to increased greenhouse gas emissions as a
result of economic development was as follows:
It does make sense that during the next half-century or century there will be increased
energy use as a result of more people as well as increased consumption
per person. Some forecasts project that the former component will be larger, some
the latter. But contrary to the implications of many such writings on the subject,
these events need not be seen as malign. Shifts to nuclear fission and to other new
sources of energy may result in reduced total emissions even as total energy use
goes up — as was the case in the U.K. and the U.S. over the years (Simon 1996
non-paginated).
Simon’s technological optimism on nuclear fission was arguably misplaced, at least inasmuch
as it couldn’t be a substitute in the transportation sector and its economic cost
would be significant. His reference to the substitution of coal by natural gas for electricity
production, such as followed the development of North Sea hydrocarbon deposits in the
United Kingdom, however, proved prescient. As is now widely acknowledged, during the
last decade increased natural gas production through hydraulic fracturing allowed the largescale
substitution of coal by natural gas and delivered significant overall reductions in CO2
emissions in the United States whereas political mandates and reluctance to adopt fracking
in the European Union delivered no such results (U.S. EPA 2015). In addition, Simon’s
argument that economic development was crucial should be viewed in light of the fact that
the areas that would bear the bulk of the effects of global warming are among the poorest
on Earth and their poverty would hinder adaptation (Tol 2009).
Besides, another standard take by Simon was that markets should be left free and that
government policies, either before or after the identification of a perceived crisis, often
create worse outcomes. Fuel subsidies are a case in point. Roughly a quarter of the world
consumption of gasoline has for some time been subsidized, the result of which is artificially
low prices. Preventing prices from rising to market levels distorts information about
resource scarcity and induces, in the case of artificially low prices, individuals to consume
greater volumes. Repelling such policies alone would represent approximately 14 percent
of the reduction needed in terms of GHG to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius and
43 percent of the reduction needed by the energy sector to attain this scenario (Magné,
Chateau, Dellnik 2014; Burniaux and Château 2011; International Energy Agency and Organisation
of Economic Cooperation and Development 2010 p. 585). More generally, it has
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 57
been estimated that perhaps up to two-thirds of the $1,000 billion spent on subsidies related
to agriculture, water, fishery, energy production, forestry, and transport prove damageable
to the economy (through increased budget deficits, unemployment, and trade distortions)
and the environment (through increased pollution and mismanagement of natural resources)
(Kjellingbro and Skotte 2005; OECD 2006). In such cases, repelling a market-distorting
policy is preferable to the creation of new policies to address them as they typically generate
other unintended negative consequences.
Finally, Sabin fails to point out that the correlation between standards of living and
pollution level is overwhelmingly in the direction of “richer is cleaner.” For instance, over
two decades ago Bernstam observed that market economies like the United States were
becoming wealthier and cleaner over time while centrally planned economies like the Soviet
Union stagnated or regressed while becoming increasingly polluted (1990 p. 348). In other
words, the United States was both richer and cleaner than the Soviet Union. Bernstam
explained this apparent paradox by suggesting that the elimination of waste, rather than
increased production or consumption, ultimately determined the environmental impact of
economic growth. Thus, when the growth in output exceeds the growth in resource input
required, increased material wealth will be created while pollution levels decline as a result
of a better overall use of resources. On the other hand, a poorer economy that uses a smaller
amount of resources less efficiently will experience greater environmental damage as a result
of greater polluting emissions.
The reduction in levels of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions on a dollar of wellbeing
basis emitted by developing countries over time is also illustrative. Angus Maddison’s
historical database of income per capita suggests that the current average income in India
and China are equal to the average American income in 1879 and 1927, respectively (Maddison
Project 2013). In those years, individual Americans were responsible on average for
3.55 tons and 15.43 tons of GHG (World Resources Institute, 2014) while in 2008 the
average Indian produced and Chinese average production of GHG was 1.34 tons and 5.74
tons, respectively (idem). In short, living standards in less advanced economies are now 66
percent less GHG-intensive than they were when western societies were at a similar level.
Using Simon’s framework, Sabin could have asked what made these positive trends happen
and how they could be reinforced…
6. Reflective Conclusion
The Bet pitted two strong personalities in a struggle over fundamentally incompatible views
of humanity’s prospects. Julian Simon let the data challenge his preconceptions and followed
it wherever it led him. He abided by academic rules of conduct, advocated personal
liberty, and was proven right by future developments. Despite his remarkable productivity,
he earned very little recognition from his academic peers and couldn’t even get his home
institution, the University of Maryland, to give him a secretary (Michaels 2014).
New Perspectives on Political Economy58
Paul Ehrlich adopted early on and always adhered to a theoretical framework disproved
time and again by the facts. When he engaged his critics at all, it was typically by insulting
them through third parties. And while he shouldn’t be blamed for policies adopted before
he burst onto the public stage, he recommended or endorsed actions that brought much
human suffering. In spite of all this, his popular success and academic standing was and
remains truly remarkable.
While Sabin hints that Simon deserved better from his fellow academics, the Yale historian’s
quest for an elusive golden mean where everyone is guilty to some degree and clearcut
outcomes remain open to interpretation in the end does nothing to rectify the record on
Simon’s theoretical outlook and empirical work. As can also be expected from a professor
of environmental studies, the main villain in his account turns out to be Simon who, 15
years after his death, is blamed for creating policy logjams and fueling uncivil discourse.
In the meantime, Ehrlich keeps issuing “important warnings” such as a recent prediction
that humans might soon have to resort to cannibalism to survive the ecological apocalypse
(Prigg 2014).
That the resourceship perspective remains mind-boggling is to be expected. That so many
well-meaning academics remain enthralled by scenarios of doom after two centuries of debates
in which depletionist projections were repeatedly crushed by future developments is
more puzzling. Simon (1996, 1999) ventured a few explanations, such as how the training
of biologists did not prepare them to understand market processes. Nonetheless, the fact
that Paul Ehrlich keeps being showered with awards despite a remarkably erroneous track
record can only make one wonder about academic incentives and feedback mechanisms in
environmental science and policy.
In the end, Sabin provides his readers with a simplistic and distorted version of Simon’s
arguments that will fail to challenge anyone’s prior beliefs while giving (largely) underserved
praise to Ehrlich. This is even more regrettable in light of much recent work that has
documented and theorized how creative human beings have long come up with new ways
of doing things that delivered greater wellbeing and more manageable environmental problems.
Ironically, perhaps the greatest problem with The Bet is that a professional historian
avoided any meaningful historical perspective on his topic. Deep down, Sabin must know
he could have never been afforded the luxury of providing dubious rationales for Paul Ehrlich’s
vision and statements if he had not lived in Julian Simon’s world.
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A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 65
Classical Communitarianism and Liberal
Anomie: Toward an Individual yet Robust
Theory of Citizenship
Nikolai G. Wenzel1
Abstract
This paper uses the tools of robust political economy to assess a fundamental question of
political theory: citizenship. Traditional conceptions of citizenship are found wanting if the
criterion is the preservation of liberty and individual rights. Classical citizenship places duties
above rights and civic participation over individual autonomy; in the process, it snuffs out
the individual in the name of the collective. Liberal citizenship protects the individual sphere
from political intrusion and thus offers great promise for civil and political rights. Alas, it contains
the seeds of its own destruction, as individuals can lapse into anomie or rebellious chaos.
After assessing the weaknesses of each vision of citizenship, this paper closes with a case
study from Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged: the simultaneously classical and ultra-liberal citizenship
in Galt’s Gulch. While the paper does not offer a resolution – a resolution which many
not completely exist – it seeks to move toward an individual yet robust theory of citizenship.
Keywords
Classical citizenship, liberal citizenship, Locke, Rousseau, Rand, robust political economy
Acknowledgments
For feedback and comments, thanks to Nathan Schlueter, Jon Fennell, Tim Simpson, and participants
at the 2015 meeting of the Association of Private Enterprise Education. Thanks to an
anonymous referee, and to the editors of New Perspectives on Political Economy. Financial
support from the Anthem Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
1	 Research Fellow, University of Paris Law School (Center for Law and Economics), Senior Fellow, Eleutheria
Institute, nikolaiwenzel@gmail.com
New Perspectives on Political Economy66
1. Introduction
Existing conceptions of citizenship are inadequate. Both of the traditional schools have
fatal flaws. The “classical” approach ends up snuffing out the individual in a romanticized
state that is divorced from the reality of political economy. And the proponents of a “liberal”
conception tend to ignore citizenship (at their own peril). In the process of dismissing
both schools as dangerous, this paper starts the quest for a new vision of citizenship, one
that places the individual at the center of the query without subsuming the individual into
the collective or the state. At the same time, a satisfying theory of citizenship cannot ignore
the uncomfortable fact that even champions of individual rights, who are skeptical of state
power, – and perhaps especially champions of individual rights – must contend with the
individual’s role in the political sphere.
I should start with economist James Buchanan’s disclaimer that “I have read some, but
by no means all of the primary and secondary works [in political philosophy]. To have
done so would have required that I become a professional political philosopher at the cost
of abandoning my own disciplinary base. As an economist, I am a specialist in contract.”
(Buchanan 1975/2000, p. XVI) Still, I contend that the outside eyes of political economy
can shed light on questions of political theory.
The question here is as simple as it is complicated: how can individuals live together in
harmony, taking advantage of civilization and division of labor in a complex economy? Citizenship
provides the answer, but the great difficulty lies in the tension between respecting
the individual qua individual, while also finding a mechanism for harmonious cooperation.
This paper thus has an intentional libertarian flavor. I turn, once again, to James Buchanan
for more sophisticated language to express the same point: “I remain, in basic values, an
individualist, a constitutionalist, a contractarian, a democrat – terms that mean essentially
the same thing to me.” Buchanan then explains the ethical foundation of his political phi-
losophy:
That is “good” which “tends to emerge” from the free choices of the individuals
who are involved. It is impossible for an external observer to lay down criteria for
“goodness” independent of the process through which results or outcomes are
attained. The evaluation is applied to the means of attaining outcomes, not to outcomes
as such. And to the extent that individuals are observed to be responding
freely within the minimally required conditions of mutual tolerance and respect,
any outcome that emerges merits classification as “good,” regardless of its precise
descriptive content (Buchanan 1975/2000, p. 19).
I start section I by outlining the two traditional forms of citizenship. I then critique them
from the philosophical premise that the individual, and only the individual, counts as the
measure of what is good (in sections II and III. In section IV, I work toward resolution and
illustrate the problem with a case study from Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged – a paean to individualism
that contains a strong case for classical citizenship.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 67
2. Two Visions of Citizenship
The political theory literature differentiates between two visions of citizenship: classical
and liberal. For example, Rawls (1985) writes of a “stylized contrast” between “the tradition
associated with Rousseau, which gives greater weight to what [Benjamin] Constant
called ‘the liberties of the ancients,’ the equal political liberties and the values of public
life,” on the one hand, and on the other, “the tradition associated with Locke, which gives
greater weight to what Constant called the ‘liberties of the moderns,’ freedom of thought
and conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of property, and the rule of law.”
Indeed, Constant articulated the difference in his essay on the “Liberty of the Ancients
Compared to That of the Moderns” (Constant 1816). “The liberty of the ancients consisted
in exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of complete sovereignty… in voting laws,
in pronouncing judgments; in examining the accounts, the acts, the stewardship of the
magistrates; in calling them to appear in front of the assembled people, in accusing, condemning
or absolving them.” The flip side of this direct involvement in politics was what
the ancients accepted as “the complete subjection of the individual to the authority of the
community…. All private actions were submitted to a severe surveillance. No importance
was given to individual independence, neither in relation to opinions, nor to labor, nor,
above all, to religion.” Constant concludes that “among the ancients the individual, almost
always sovereign in public affairs, was a slave in all his private relations.”
Constant contrasts the liberty of the ancients with the liberty of the moderns. “Among the
moderns… the individual, independent in his private life, is, even in the freest of states, sovereign
only in appearance.” This means “that [the moderns] can no longer enjoy the liberty
of the ancients, which consisted in an active and constant participation in collective power.”
Instead, the liberty of the moderns “must consist of peaceful enjoyment and private independence.”
The ancients were willing to sacrifice individual autonomy because they had actual
influence in political decisions. By contrast, “this compensation no longer exists for us today.
Lost in the multitude, the individual can almost never perceive the influence he exercises…
The exercise of political rights, therefore, offers us but a part of the pleasures that the ancients
found in it, while at the same time the progress of civilization, the commercial tendency of the
age, the communication amongst peoples, have infinitely multiplied and varied the means of
personal happiness.” Hence the modern attachment to individual independence.
Constant concludes that “The aim of the ancients was the sharing of social power among
the citizens of the same fatherland: this is what they called liberty.” By contrast, “the aim of
the moderns is the enjoyment of security in private pleasures; and they call liberty the guarantees
accorded by institutions to these pleasures.” He then points to a combination of changes
that make the liberty of the ancients impossible in a modern setting: larger political entities
that dilute individual votes, the end of an aristocratic leisure to participate in politics that was
based on slavery, and the rise of commerce over war as a means of acquiring wealth.
I now sketch the differences between Rousseau’s classical citizenship (which is parallel
to Constant’s “liberty of the ancients”) and Locke’s liberal citizenship (which fits Constant’s
“liberty of the moderns”).
New Perspectives on Political Economy68
First, we have the classical vision, which is associated primarily with Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
For the quintessence of Rousseau’s thinking on the subject, we can turn to the Social
Contract (Rousseau 2011). In this attempt to find the foundations of legitimate government
(Book I), Rousseau develops a social contract, through which all adherents put themselves
under the supreme authority of the general will (I.vi), which is discovered through majoritarian
democracy (IV.ii). The general will is always legitimate and always strives for the
common good (II.iii). Because the sovereign state’s power emanates from the general will,
a legitimate state can never act contrary to the interests of any individual (I.vii). The state
thus disposes of the citizen’s very life, as dictated by the common good, because the citizen
owes his life to the state, without which he would be in a Hobbesian jungle of rampant
exploitation (II.v). Rousseau closes the Social Contract with an examination of the civic religion
that is required to maintain a free government; while freedom of religion is respected
(so long as it does not conflict with the common good), the state has a duty to advance a
civic religion that teaches citizens to love their duties, to be good citizens and faithful subjects,
and to respect the sanctity of the social contract. While the state cannot obligate its
citizens to believe in the civic religion, it can banish unbelievers (IV.viii).
According to this vision, a “citizen [is] someone who is actively involved in shaping the
future direction of his or her society” (Miller 2000, p. 3). This conception of citizenship
revolves primarily around the duties – rather than the rights – of citizens in their political
life. According to the classical vision, also known as republicanism or civic republicanism
(because of its emphasis on the res publica, public affairs), the good society rests on a
citizenry of politically virtuous men and women who sustain a just government. The key
elements for the citizen are duty, civic virtue, and political participation (Heater 2004,
pp. 4–5). Under this conception, “good citizens are those who feel an allegiance to the
state and have a sense of responsibility in discharging their duties. As a consequence they
need the skills appropriate for civic participation” (Heater 2004, p. 2). Hutchings explains
that Rousseau’s conception of citizenship, as the epitome of the classical vision, “involves
elements of strong democracy as well as very high expectations of citizen commitment to
the community’s good” (1999, p. 9). Rousseau, in sum, emphasizes “the moralizing effects
of thinking and acting as a citizen in terms of identification with the common good as opposed
to individual interest” (Ibid.).
By contrast, we have the liberal vision of citizenship, associated primarily with John
Locke and his liberal2
successors. Locke, like Rousseau, is preoccupied with tyranny – but
2	 I note in passing the distinction between classical liberalism and modern liberalism. Classical liberals believe
in a government limited to the protection of individual rights (plus a few limited functions of correcting market
failures). Modern liberals (also known as left liberals or high liberals) believe in active redistribution of
wealth by the state, beyond the mere correction of market failures. See Tomasi 2012 for details. Semantics
confuse the issue: both contemporary Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. espouse some version of classical
citizenship, where raison d’état trumps the individual, if for slightly different purposes. The liberal vision of
citizenship today is rare, and advocated only by libertarians, classical liberals, and a few refugees from mainstream
politics who are concerned about civil liberties in a rising police state. It would thus be erroneous to
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 69
he ends up with different safeguards. Locke starts by noting the inconveniences of the
state of nature – individual effort at enforcing natural rights; the problems associated with
individuals being judges in their own causes; and the excess of revenge (Locke 2002, II).
Civil government is the remedy for these inconveniences (Ibid.). When they enter into the
social contract, individuals give up their right to judge and punish offenses against natural
rights (VII). While Locke does refer to the common good (XIII), he is cautious to limit the
power of government; the state is strictly limited to the protection of natural rights (XI)
and natural law always stands above human law in the actions of the state (Ibid.) – the state
may not rightly take or destroy property, or enslave or impoverish its citizens (XI). Should
the state act in violation of the laws of nature, it lapses into tyranny and its officials must
be treated like any other violators (XVIII). In such cases, the people may rebel and replace
the state (XIX).
Hutchings explains that “in Rousseau’s account of the social contract the individuals
who make the compact are born anew as citizens whose identities are indissolubly bound
up with the community of which they are a part” (1998, p. 8). He continues: “Whereas
Locke moralises politics by giving it the function of securing natural right, Rousseau politicises
morality by arguing that a new standard of right is generated by the coming together of
a people under the supreme direction of the general will” (Ibid.). From this distinction, we
have the liberal approach to citizenship. Under this conception, citizens are “first and foremost
individuals who are members of, and participants in, a universal moral order” (Hutchings
1999, p. 5). This vision, by contrast with the classical model, “minimizes the active
involvement of the individual in the political order as opposed to civil society” (defined here
as voluntary institutions for collective action, such as families, friendships, clubs, churches,
and markets). The Locke-liberal version views the “citizen as someone who [merely]
chooses between different bundles of (public) goods and services, in the same way as the
consumer chooses between different sets of commodities in the market” (Miller 2000, p. 3).
In sum, the classical version of citizenship sees an organic whole within which citizens
have duties and without which citizens cannot thrive. The liberal version, by contrast, sees
the state as the servant of individuals who operate primarily in the market and civil society.
I now turn to a critique of each approach.
3. Problems with the Classical Vision
Duty, responsibility, politically virtuous citizens, a just government, republicanism, civic
participation, and the common good all sound desirable, if superficially. There is someassociate
republican citizenship with conservatism, or liberal citizenship with modern liberals. To avoid any
confusion, I use the moniker “classical” rather than “republican” to describe Rousseau’s citizenship; indeed, a
republican v. liberal dichotomy could be confusing for today’s linguistic community.
New Perspectives on Political Economy70
thing very appealing to Manent’s conclusion that the political community “puts as many
things as possible in common among its citizens, or, in Aristotle’s formulation, as many
words and deeds as possible” (2006, p. 96). Or to Scruton’s optimistic vision of civic
republicanism, wherein “citizenship is the relation that arises between the state and the
individual when each is fully accountable to the other” and within which “every citizen
becomes linked to every other, by relations that are financial, legal and fiduciary, but
which presuppose no personal tie” (2006, p. 5, p. 7). Scruton concludes cheerfully that
“the nation state is accountable to all citizens since it owes its existence to the national
loyalty that defines its territory and limits its power” (Ibid.). And Rousseau starts with
the premise that the purpose of the political association is the preservation and prosperity
of its members (2011, III.ix).
Alas, goals are one thing, but implementation is another. At its best, the classical vision
of citizenship is noble and inspires individual contributions to the common good. At its
worst, it is naïve, collectivist, and horrifying. I make two critiques, inspired by political
economy, which demonstrate that the very foundations of the classical vision of citizenship
will lead to an overpowering state that suffocates the individual.
Methodological individualism: the Mises critique
We start with a critique of classical citizenship from the perspective of methodological
individualism.3
Why would the individual – as opposed to the community or the nation –
count as the appropriate ethical and political yardstick? At a most basic level, because only
individuals act, and only individuals truly exist. Economists refer to this as “methodological
individualism (Mises [1949/2010], chapter 2, section 4). Agassi explains how individuals –
and only individuals – act, but they act within an institutional context; he refers to this as
“institutional individualism” (1975). But if institutions and groups are key to shaping individual
behavior, it is still individuals who are doing the acting.
Neglect of methodological individualism can lead to troubling results. Philosopher Will
Kymlicka (in Schäfer 1998, p. 85) encapsulates all that is terrifying with the classical vision
of citizenship when he complains about the liberal vision of citizenship that “the bearer of
interests – [and rights] – is always the individual and only the individual. Groups, commu-
3	 A clarification is in order here. Methodological individualism is often confused with ontological individualism,
the doctrine that individuals exist “prior” to society and have the properties they do independently of
society. Methodological individualism recognizes that only individuals act – but methodological individualism
does not deny that there are many social structures, from language to culture, or manners and more, that have
profound influence on people’s choices. For example, most Americans speak English. They (generally) do so
because they must, in order to be understood by those with whom they live and interact. In many cases, much
of their thinking will necessarily take place in English because it is the only language the individuals know.
Thus, the English language has a causal role in American life. But none of these considerations imply that, for
example, Congress can “act” in any way other than through the actions of individuals such as Representatives.
I thank Roger Koppl (see Koppl and Wenzel [forthcoming.], from which I have adopted this example). For a
deeper review of these issues, see Langlois 1989 or Lewis 2005.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 71
nities, or other collectives do not appear among the theoretical vocabulary.” Well, no! The
groups to which individuals adhere – from the family, to clubs, cities, churches, geographical
or affective communities, and all the way up to “society” or “country” – do not really exist.
They are mental constructs. Mises reminds us that “a social collective has no existence
outside of the individual members’ actions” (1949/2010, p. 42). A family cannot act. Society
cannot make choices. These social constructs can surely be useful, as human beings are
indeed social animals and their behavior can certainly change as they form part of a group.
But the danger comes in reification, or erroneously promoting a mental construct into an
actual, acting thing. Economist Murray Rothbard (1973), quoting Moon 1930, refers to this
reification as the “organismic fallacy”:
When one uses the simple monosyllabic “France” one thinks of France as a unit,
an entity. When... we say “France sent her troops to conquer Tunis” – we impute
not only unity but personality to the country. The very words conceal the facts and
make international relations a glamorous drama in which personalized nations are
the actors, and all too easily we forget the flesh-and-blood men and women who
are the true actors… If we had no such word as “France”... then we should more
accurately describe the Tunis expedition in some such way as this: “A few of...
thirty-eight million persons sent thirty thousand others to conquer Tunis.” This
way of putting the fact immediately suggests a question, or rather a series of questions.
Who are the “few”? Why did they send thirty thousand to Tunis? And why
did these obey? Empire-building is done not by “nations,” but by men. The problem
before us is to discover the men, the active, interested minorities in each nation,
who are directly interested in imperialism and then to analyze the reasons why the
majorities pay the expenses and fight the wars.
Ignoring methodological individualism, inventing an acting group, and subsuming the individual
into that (allegedly) acting group can have disastrous consequences. As a simple
example, what, indeed, constitutes a “community?” If a “community” rejects a new WalMart
in the name of protecting small businesses, who is, in fact, the “community?” Voters?
The consumers that Wal-Mart, in its quest for profit, predicts will choose to spend money
there? Or perhaps a coalition of small businesses seeking to thwart competition? Likewise,
neglecting methodological individualism can lead to a violation of rights, as the acting
individual loses status as an end (who is thus worthy of rights), and becomes the means to
the goals established by some putatively acting group. Thus can the individual’s rights be
sacrificed on the altar of “community,” “national preferences,” or other mental constructs
that offer a convenient excuse to impose private ends through public means – all too often
cloaked in the veil of citizenship, the common good, or a chilling raison d’état.
Politics without romance: the Buchanan critique
In order to be desirable, a proposed political theory or institution must stand up to the rest
of reality. To quote Callahan, fantasy is not an adult policy option (2010). We can thus use
New Perspectives on Political Economy72
political economy to determine whether the classical vision of citizenship is robust enough
to withstand the shortcomings of fallible human beings.
In simplest terms, robust political economy recognizes that people are not omniscient,
and cannot be assumed to be benevolent (for a detailed case, see Penington 2011; for a
briefer outline, see Leeson and Subrick 2006). Which institutions will be robust enough to
cope with these two problems? That is, which institutions will minimize harm and maximize
the opportunities for human flourishing?
In terms of intellectual heritage, robust political economy borrows the incentive problem
from Public Choice theory and the knowledge problem from Austrian economics.
Before the revolution in public choice economics, political analysis was romantically
divorced from reality, as “public servants” were assumed to be selfless executors of some
“common good.” Market actors were assumed to be narrowly self-interested. As a result of
these assumptions, markets were seen as yielding suboptimal results that could be corrected
by government action.4
For Public Choice theory, people are people. It rejects the premise of individuals acting
selfishly in markets and selflessly in government, acting for private gain in the market and
for public interest in government. In government, just as in markets, people will consider
a number of different things that give them satisfaction. But there is no longer a heroic
assumption that individuals, upon election to political office or ascension to bureaucratic
position, magically grow angel’s wings. Instead, people respond to incentives. They seek to
maximize their satisfaction within constraints, such as budgets, scarcity of time, laws and
other rules of the game, social norms and other informal institutions, ethical and religious
considerations, etc. Only through proper institutions can people properly orient their interests
to the service of others.
Public Choice theory explains how the political process distorts incentives, leading to
irrational and inefficient policies, and yielding incoherent information about voter preferences
(for general background, see Gwartney and Stroup 2005, chapter 6; see also Boettke
and Leeson 2002). In a market system, consumers must pay for what they want, so they
face the consequences of their actions. Likewise, firms face the discipline of profit and loss.
The government lacks such a test. Politicians can be changed, but only after their term is
completed and only through a voting mechanism that favors incumbents, and bureaucrats
are near impossible to fire. The feedback mechanism for governmental activity is weak to
non-existent, leading to inefficient outcomes and bad policies in ways that cannot exist
within the market’s mechanism of information and discipline.
The political process also breaks the individual consumption-payment link. In the market,
a consumer who wants more of something must pay for it. One beer, $5, two beers, $10.
In collective action, some people can pay much for little or little for much. One need only
4	 For a thorough and accessible overview of intellectual history, see the opening chapters of Leighton and
Lopez 2012; for a basic primer on Public Choice theory, see Buchanan and Tullock 1999. This section draws
on Schlueter and Wenzel (2016).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 73
look at the fact that roughly half of Americans do not pay federal income taxes – but have
a say, through the polls, on how tax revenue is spent. As of 2009, the top 50% of taxpayers
paid 98% of tax revenue; in other words, the bottom 50% of taxpayers enjoyed 25% of the
votes, but paid only 2% of the tax revenue. The top 5% of taxpayers paid more (59%) than
the bottom 95%. And the top 1% paid 37% of tax revenue, yet enjoyed only 0.5% of the votes
that allocated that spending.5
We thus have skewed incentives for additional public spending
at somebody else’s expense.6
Through the political process, policies will tend to emerge that concentrate benefits and
diffuse costs, transferring wealth from the politically unorganized and invisible many to the
politically organized and visible few, while increasing the size and power of the redistributive
state. As an example, each American adult pays an estimated $15 per year to subsidize
an inefficient American sugar industry that cannot compete in a free market, but relies on
trade protections and subsidies.7
While it is in the interest of the sugar industry to preserve
its estimated $3 billion in annual subsidies, it is not in the interest of any individual voter to
fight for a $15 refund. Nor will elected officials tend to listen to individual voters over an organized
lobby. In fact, most Americans don’t even know they are paying this subsidy. Thus,
an estimated 5/6 of American wealth transfers (not government purchases, but transfers
of wealth through the political process) do not flow from wealthier Americans to poorer
Americans. Rather, these wealth transfers flow from the disorganized many to the organized
few (see Gwartney et al. 2005, p. 139 and chapter 6 generally). In sum, the political
process amounts to rent-seeking: the use of government to take, rather than create, wealth.
Such rent-seeking amounts to legalized plunder, as political economist Frédéric Bastiat so
eloquently explains in his essay, “The Law” (Bastiat 1850/2012). In the words of journalist
H.L. Mencken, “government is a broker in pillage, and every election is a sort of advance
auction in stolen goods” (1996, p. 331).
A corollary problem involves information (a point emphasized by Austrian economics).8
In a market, entrepreneurs require information about the goods and services consumers
wish them to produce. This information is generated and transmitted through the price
mechanism (for a delightful illustration, see Read 1958). What of decisions that require collective
action? How are the preferences of individuals, in their roles as citizens (rather than
consumers) to be revealed so elected officials can make decisions on public spending and
public laws? The distorted incentives of politics will lead to inefficient outcomes because it
is possible to advance private preferences through public means: voters can lie about their
5	 National Taxpayers Union 2014, http://www.ntu.org/tax-basics/who-pays-income-taxes.html.
6	 Of course, this can cut both ways. On the one hand, the top income earners have more means to capture the
political process – especially in this era of crony capitalism. On the other hand, the 50% of Americans who
don’t pay taxes, but can vote, as well as the 50% of taxpayers who pay only 2% of tax revenue, have an incentive
to vote for more government spending – at somebody else’s expense.
7	 Perry 2013, http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/02/protectionist-sugar-policy-cost-americans-3-billion-in-2012/.
8	 See Hayek 1945 or Hayek 1960.
New Perspectives on Political Economy74
preferences because they can pass the cost to others. In addition, because of concentrated
benefits and diffuse costs, the political process will tend to emphasize the preferences of
organized interests rather than yielding correct information.
Where does this leave us? Post-romantic analysis of government pushes us to seek institutional
designs (including the foundation, in political theory, of citizenship) that will be
robust in the face of actors who cannot be assumed to act toward some “common good.”
When put to the test of political economy, the classical vision falls apart. Generously,
we can say it is a beautiful but unrealistic vision. Less generously, we can say that the classical
vision is horrifyingly collectivist. Instead of an idyllic aggregation of deliberation into
the general will, politics is a messy process of log-rolling, favor-swapping, and concentrated
benefits and diffuse costs.
Conclusion: Moving Beyond the People’s Romance
To be sure, a romantic vision of the state, citizenship, and public affairs can elevate our
hearts and lift our imaginations. While economists and political scientists would do well to
shed their romantic analysis of politics, voters (and some political theorists) are still very
romantic about politics.9
Economist Dan Klein, for example, writes about the beauty and
danger of the “People’s Romance” (Klein 2005). Klein describes situations where people irrationally
attribute special powers to their groups. Cheering for one’s preferred sports team,
wearing a political t-shirt, or flying a flag will usually have no effect whatsoever. But it makes
people feel good to refer to a team as “mine,” boast that “we” won today, or feel pride in a
victory to which they did not contribute. This sort of irrational group-think is harmless, and
can build affective bonds in civil society. Moving to the level of government and citizenship,
however, such romance can be downright pernicious. We thus see wars stirred by patriotic
fervor, or massive government redistribution programs that con people into thinking they
are participating in a large-scale effort of national solidarity – when they are really engaged
in inefficient but legalized plunder.
Klein writes of the disastrous consequences of romancing the state – a veneer which
leads people to venerate actions that would otherwise be reprehensible (2005). “If anyone
other than the government issued a serious threat to harm us for employing people at a
wage of less than eight dollars per hour, that person would be regarded as a coercive menace.”
But people grant magical powers to the state, as “the coercive programs force all to
admit their subordination vis-à-vis the government and therefore to recognize the government
as a unique, super-powerful romantic force.” The consequences can be disastrous,
but the People’s Romance explains “why atrocious policies such as the war on drugs can
be enacted and cheered and can persist. Even though Republicans supposedly care about
freedom and Democrats supposedly care about ‘the little guy,’ the politicians do nothing
to abate the policy.” Historically, the People’s Romance has whitewashed bad policies such
9	 See the literature on sociotropic voting generally; for two good overviews and discussion, see Brennan’s cutting
commentary on the ethics of voting (2011) or Caplan on the myth of the rational voter (2007).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 75
as the New Deal (which deepened and prolonged the recession; see Higgs 1997). Through
the optic of the People’s Romance, the New Deal is not remembered as a disastrous and
coercive economic policy, but “as a great event during a time in which ‘the country came
together’ and ‘we’ did something. What ‘we did,’ of course, was to assert and advance [the
People’s Romance].”
The People’s Romance finds its epitome in the romanticizing of war. As Randolph
Bourne (1919/1964, p. 71) wrote:
War is the health of the State. It automatically sets in motion throughout society
those irresistible forces for uniformity, for passionate cooperation with the Government
in coercing into obedience the minority groups and individuals which lack
the larger herd instinct. [War] seems to achieve for a nation almost all that the
most inflamed political idealist could desire. Citizens are no longer indifferent to
their Government, but each cell of the body politic is brimming with life and activity.
We are at last on the way to the full realization of that collective community
in which each individual somehow contains the virtue of the whole. In a nation at
war, every citizen identifies himself with the whole, and feels immensely strengthened
in that identification.
Klein concludes, pointing out how odd it is that every major government program ends up
being called a war – “the war on vice, the war on illiteracy, the war on poverty, the war on
crime, the war on disease, the war on AIDS, the war on hunger, and the war on drugs. Now
Americans have the war on terrorism” (2005).
This romantic vision of politics, and the perfectibility of flawed men and women through
state action, leaves us with W.H. Auden’s 1939 “Epitaph on a Tyrant” (Auden 1976, p. 149):
Perfection, of a kind, was what he was after,
And the poetry he invented was easy to understand;
He knew human folly like the back of his hand,
And was greatly interested in armies and fleets;
When he laughed, respectable senators burst with laughter,
And when he cried the little children died in the streets.
At its core, the classical vision fails because it subsumes the individual into a reified and
romanticized community. Nevertheless, there is much to be learned from classical citizenship,
and especially its critique of the liberal vision.
New Perspectives on Political Economy76
4. Problems with the Liberal Vision
After the dangerous group-think and deference to collectives embraced (if inadvertently)
by the classical vision of citizenship, the liberal vision is a breath of fresh air. Indeed, under
classical citizenship, everything is on the political table, and citizens decide what to exclude
through deliberation and voting. For liberal citizenship, certain things (like individual
rights) are completely off the table (Miller 2000, p. 58). Instead of attempting to discover
the good life through the political process then imposing it through the coercive power of
the state, “the liberal position… takes pluralism seriously. It assumes that people have radically
different conceptions of the good life, and argues that the way to cope with this is to
depoliticize citizenship, to convert the public realm into an ersatz version of the market”
(Ibid., p. 53). For the liberal, rights have a pre-political justification for the liberal conception;
for the classical, rights have grounds in political discussion (Ibid., pp. 59–60; see also
Hutchings 1999, p. 8 as quoted above, on the different approaches to rights in Locke and
Rousseau).
The liberal vision, starting with Locke, is quite clear that the state exists for the benefit of
the citizen and not the other way around. Rather than a mechanism for human flourishing,
the state exists fundamentally (and exclusively) for the defense of individual rights (Heater
2004, pp. 4–5).10
As quoted in the introduction, Constant draws a distinction between the liberty of the
ancients and the liberty of the moderns. While he is clearly a modern, he also worries that
modern liberty can lead to anomie and tyranny – this, combined with the concerns of Alexis
de Tocqueville and Adam Ferguson, constitutes the first critique to liberal citizenship I
outline here. The second critique involves the erosion under liberal citizenship of the public
orthodoxy that forms the “social glue” necessary for harmonious cohabitation of strangers.
The third critique involves authority and the potential for anarchy when liberal citizens
over-emphasize rights and under-emphasize duty. In the end, does the liberal conception of
citizenship sow the seeds of its own undoing?
Anomie and Tyranny: the Constant-Tocqueville-Ferguson Critique
Constant – while obviously sympathetic to the liberty of the moderns – also worried about
it (1816). “The danger of modern liberty,” he wrote, “is that, absorbed in the enjoyment
of our private independence, and in the pursuit of our particular interests, we should surrender
our right to share in political power too easily.” This can easily lapse into political
abuse: “The holders of authority are… so ready to spare us all sort of troubles, except those
of obeying and paying! They will say to us: what, in the end, is the aim of your efforts, the
10	 Of course, there is disagreement on rights; whereas Locke sticks with negative rights (life, liberty, property),
later thinkers in the liberal tradition, such as T.H. Marshall (1963), added social and positive “rights.” Still,
the principle remains that the state serves the citizen and not the other way around. On the impossibility of
positive “rights” see Rand 1967.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 77
motive of your labors, the object of all your hopes? Is it not happiness? Well, leave this
happiness to us and we shall give it to you.” Constant, naturally, rejects this “tender commitment,”
asking instead that the political authorities stick to the confines established by
rule of law, and the preservation of justice, rather than taking over all aspects of life that
moderns have abdicated.
This worry is echoed by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America: “When the taste
for material enjoyments develops among [democratic people] more rapidly than enlightenment
and the habits of liberty, there comes a moment when men are carried away, as if
beyond themselves, by the sight of these new goods they are ready to grasp” (1835, Book
II, Chapter 14, pp. 951–952). Parallel to Constant’s worry about all-consuming commercial
pursuits, Tocqueville worries that “preoccupied by the sole concern to make a fortune,
[democratic people] no longer notice the close bond that unites the particular fortune of
each one of them to the prosperity of all.” Wealthy moderns will ignore politics, as “the
exercise of their political rights seems to them a tiresome inconvenience that distracts them
from their industry. Whether it is a matter of choosing their representatives, coming to the
assistance of the authorities, dealing together with common affairs, they lack the time; they
cannot waste such precious time on useless works.” In the end, by neglecting politics, they
neglect “to remain their own masters” by distancing themselves from political involvement
(Ibid).
Tocqueville concludes that “the nation that asks of its government only the maintenance
of order is already a slave at the bottom of its heart. The nation is a slave of its well-being,
and the man who is to put it in chains can appear” (Ibid.).
Tocqueville’s concern is echoed in the writings of Adam Ferguson in his “Essay on
the History of Civil Society.” Ferguson, contra his contemporary classical liberals David
Hume and Adam Smith, believed that institutions alone were insufficient to protect liberty;
instead he recognized the “necessity of the active participation of citizens” (Varty 1998,
p. 182). For Ferguson, “liberty only exists in proportion to citizens’ willingness to sustain
the ‘burden of government’” (Ferguson 1996, p. 252 in Varty 1998, p. 185). Institutions
matter, of course, but, “in the end, it is only citizens themselves who can prevent despotism
from arising” (Varty 1998, p. 183). Alas, this requires citizens “who have received the
kind of political education one only gains by participating in politics” (Ibid.). While public
spirit, participation in politics, and active defense of the public good are requirements for a
free society, Ferguson worries (with Constant and Tocqueville) that wealth and commerce
will lead to a loss of people’s political persona and a desire for stability and efficiency over
liberty (Ibid., pp. 183–184). To be sure, Ferguson does not go as far as the classical vision
in claiming that “citizenship is, or should be, the core of our life” (Ibid., p. 186); he does,
however, admonish us to “lessen, rather than abolish, the separation between state and civil
society, as it is only through the active involvement of the citizenry in politics that state
power can be controlled and liberty preserved” (Ibid., p. 190).
These troubling concerns, coming from such distinguished friends of liberty as Constant,
Tocqueville, and Ferguson, should give pause to liberal theorists of citizenship – especially
because Constant, Tocqueville, and Ferguson are ultimately advocates of liberal
New Perspectives on Political Economy78
citizenship! Classical citizenship kills liberty ab initio, but liberal citizenship might very
well carry the seeds of its own destruction. Plato famously warned that “the chief penalty is
to be governed by someone worse if a man will not himself hold office and rule” (Republic
1, p. 347c).
Public Orthodoxy: the Scruton-Manent Critique
The second critique of liberal citizenship involves the requirement of a shared orthodoxy
for harmonious cohabitation with strangers. John Stuart Mill was an early articulator of
this concern when he wrote of the need for “a feeling of common interest among those
who live under the same government” to allow for “cohesion among members of the same
community or state” (1879, vol. 2, p. 522). He worried that “free institutions are next to
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellowfeeling,
especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion,
necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist” (Ibid). If there are
great national or cultural divisions, the different groups’ “mutual antipathies are generally
much stronger than jealousy of the government. That any one of them feels aggrieved by the
policy of the common ruler is sufficient to determine another to support that policy.” If the
state oversteps its bounds, and “even if all are aggrieved, none feel that they can rely on the
others for fidelity in a joint resistance; the strength of none is sufficient to resist alone, and
each may reasonably think that it consults its own advantage most by bidding for the favor
of the government against the rest (Mill 1977/1861, p. 547).
If we substitute significant intellectual or cultural heterodoxy for “nationalities,” the
problem remains. This worry is picked up by contemporary defenders of classical citizenship;
despite a communitarian streak that is troubling for individual rights, their critique
should give us pause. For example, Pierre Manent (2006, p. 95) longs for a “true democracy
that presupposes the long and slow elaboration of a distinct common life.” Roger Scruton
(2006, pp. 1–3) similarly opines that “democracies owe their existence to national loyalties…
Wherever the experience of nationality is weak or non-existent democracy has failed
to take root.” He writes that while “the nation-state is not the only answer to the problems
of modern government… it is the only answer that has proved itself… Territorial loyalty… is
at the root of all form of government where law and liberty reign supreme.” He concedes
that “nationality is not the only kind of social membership, nor is it an exclusive tie” – but it
is the only form of membership that sustains democracy and rule of law (Ibid., pp. 10–11).
In sum, it is impossible to share a territory without “sharing many other things too,” such
as language, customs, markets, and religion (Ibid., p. 13).
At a fundamental level, there must be agreement on the form of government – or on limited
government, if liberal citizenship and fundamental civil rights are to prevail. Constitutional
theorist Russell Hardin (1988) explains that “without support from relevant people,
perhaps often in the grudging form of those unable to co-ordinate in refusing support...
rules would not be worth the paper on which they are recorded.” Similarly, Alexander
Hamilton noted of the American Constitution that it was a “frail and worthless fabric” in
the hands of the wrong people. Informal constraints, starting with a willingness to be bound
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 79
by constitutional constraints, maintain a central importance for constitutionalism (Elster
2000 and Hardin 1999). If a critical mass of individuals refuses to be bound, if it rejects
constitutionalism generally or the constitution specifically, if it does not accept the deferral
of current power for long-run stability, the entire constitutional undertaking will fail. Expediency
will trump principle. Power will prevail over rules. And short-term gain will win over
long-term coordination. In the words of Franklin and Baun, “in the constitutional state the
rule of law prevails, not because the courts or police say it should, but because there exists
a general acceptance of and confidence in the law” (1995, p.VII). Hardin, in fact, models
a constitution as a coordination mechanism among the “interests that matter” in society
(1999); economist Frank Knight echoes this, concluding that “society depends upon – we
may almost say that it is – moral like-mindedness” (1939).
We now return to Miller’s assessment (quoted above) that liberal citizenship “takes pluralism
seriously” and “cope[s] with this by [depoliticizing] citizenship” (2000, p. 53). He
continues, however, by worrying that the extreme version of liberal citizenship “founders
on the fact that citizenship at its core concerns common rights and goods enjoyed in common”
(Ibid). In sum, liberal citizenship and the ensuing limited state (dedicated exclusively
to the protection of individual rights) provides an umbrella under which other associations
can co-exist without one “claiming absolute validity” (Manent 2006, p. 201).11
But there
needs to be sufficient agreement – if only about the nature, scope, and function of the um-
brella – for people to live harmoniously under it. Liberal citizenship does not address this
sufficiently in terms of fostering public orthodoxy and of coping with fragmented opinion.
Authority: the Pitkin Critique
The third problem centers around free-riding.12
All enjoy the benefits of common life and
the protection of government, but all may seek to free-ride by shirking from the defense
of the commonwealth or paying taxes. Thomas Hobbes famously asked who will face the
enemy’s cannon and how the civil/political association can survive if nobody does (Hobbes
2002). Of course, Hobbes solves the free-rider problem in a manner most dissatisfying for
friends of liberty, since he would have individual rights subsumed under the protection of
Leviathan. But the troubling nature of his solution does not dismiss the free-rider problem.
This problem raises questions of affection for the state (and specifically affection that is
strong enough that citizens are willing to die to preserve the state and the benefits it confers).
But it is primarily one of authority. And it is best captured in the writings of political
theorist Hanna Pitkin on the problem of “obligation and consent” (Pitkin 1965). Pitkin
starts by identifying the reductio ad absurdum of the radical liberal approach to citizenship:
11	 Ironically, Manent’s political umbrella does exactly that – “claiming absolute authority.” But the critique is
still a serious one.
12	 Free-riding refers to attempts (often successful) to obtain a benefit or service without paying for it. Of course,
if too many people enjoy the service without paying for it, provision will ultimately cease. Generally, see
Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
New Perspectives on Political Economy80
Each individual is obligated to obey only while it is best for him, and becomes
obligated to resist when that could promote his personal welfare. Thus the same
government will be a legitimate authority for some of its subjects but naked illegitimate
power to others. And anyone is free to disobey or resist whenever it benefits
him to do so; he can have no obligation to the contrary. Indeed, the sum total of
such a doctrine is that you have no obligation at all, or none except the pursuit of
your own welfare.
Unfortunately “there are bound to be occasions when the public welfare requires serious
sacrifices (perhaps even of life) by some individuals. To suppose otherwise seems
incredibly unrealistic” (Ibid.). Setting aside the all-too-common invocation of the public
welfare as a justification for raison d’état, and the use of public means to advance private
preferences, Pitkin identifies a real problem. A partial solution to the problem comes
from Locke. Indeed, Pitkin argues, the fundamental obligation to obey in Locke’s system
comes not from consent (which is essentially automatic rather than explicit), but because
of certain characteristics of the government, i.e., whether the government acts according
to the common good and limits itself to the defense of natural rights. Pitkin concludes –
following Locke and the liberal tradition of citizenship – that “if it is a good, just government
doing what a government should, then you must obey it; if it is a tyrannical, unjust
government trying to do what no government should, then you have no such obligation”
(Ibid.).
Bastiat echoes this sentiment when he writes that “the law is the organization of the
natural right of lawful defense. It is the substitution of a common force for individual forces.
And this common force is to do only what the individual forces have a natural and lawful
right to do: to protect persons, liberties, and properties; to maintain the right of each, and
to cause justice to reign over us all” (1850). But the law is often abused, and becomes a tool
of legalized plunder. According to Bastiat, then, the solution to the Locke-Pitkin problem
of authority is straightforward:
[H]ow is this legal plunder to be identified? Quite simply. See if the law takes from
some persons what belongs to them, and gives it to other persons to whom it does
not belong. See if the law benefits one citizen at the expense of another by doing
what the citizen himself cannot do without committing a crime.
Pitkin, however, is less sanguine. She reminds us that Locke’s provision for majority resistance
to tyranny and the duty to follow the majority are clear, but individual resistance is
“highly ambiguous at best, and is certainly not a duty” in Locke (Pitkin 1965). After stating
the question superbly, she ends by admitting her own frustration with the matter of individual
choice:
Who is to say? Who is to say what times are normal and what times are not, when
resistance is justified or even obligatory? If we say “each individual must decide for
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 81
himself,” we seem to deny the normally binding character of law and authority. If
we say “society” or “the majority” or “the duly constituted authorities” decide, then
we seem to deny the right to resist, since it may be the majority or the authorities
themselves that need to be challenged. Yet these seem to be the only two alternatives
(Ibid.).
Pitkin identifies a very real problem. While proponents of liberal citizenship do well to be
skeptical of classical citizenship and the “common good” veneer that lies thinly over power
and tyranny, they must also contend with the problem of authority and its limits. After all,
if each individual is free to decide (and without clear parameters) when it is convenient to
follow the rules of government, then the whole apparatus of government as protector of
rights will fall apart, as minarchy lapses into anarchy. There are, obviously – and perhaps
mostly – clear-cut cases, as identified by Bastiat. But Pitkin has identified a paradox with
which liberal citizenship has not sufficiently contended. And Pitkin warns us that “there is
no... absolute answer, and can be none” (Ibid.).
Conclusion: Liberalism, Anomie, and the End of Liberty
Classical citizenship can be readily dismissed as inimical to individual rights. But liberal
citizenship – while a lovely aspiration and a good model for the defense of the individual –
is fragile, and contains the seeds of its own downfall. In order to be robust, liberal citizenship
must address the problems of citizen vigilance, public orthodoxy, and authority. A
minimal government that defends individual rights must somehow foster the necessary
cultural conditions for its own survival. This includes the micro-level of participation in civil
society, and the bourgeois virtues that sustain commerce (see McCloskey 2006). But it also
includes the macro-level civic virtues of political vigilance and participation, and willingness
to be bound by the constitution. While the former is obvious, proponents of liberal
citizenship are often reluctant to address the latter. Beyond Pitkin’s paradox of authority,
we are left with a second paradox: while a minimal government requires civic virtue, the
state cannot produce it without violating its remit (see Read [1964, p. 199] or Rogge and
Goodrich 1973). It must thus rely on civil society and markets to foster the civic virtues…
but if those fail, the state itself can do nothing more than hope, lest it go beyond its mandate,
with the usual barrage of unintended consequences. In the end, citizens themselves
must foster citizenship.
5. Classical Foundations to a Liberal Order… without the
Collectivist Trap?
I do not have clear answers to the problems I raise here. What is needed, somehow, is a
classical foundation to liberal citizenship, without the collectivist trap of consuming the individual
within raison d’état, under the guise of promoting some putative “common good.”
New Perspectives on Political Economy82
Extra-political Virtue to Advance a Narrow Common Good
A preliminary answer comes from Brennan (2011). As I wrote in a recent book review
(Wenzel 2013), “Brennan defines the common good (with delicious narrowness) as a combination
of institutions – such as social order, shared ethical/social norms, rule of law, and
markets – that are generally to everyone’s advantage.” After expressing worries about the
public choice considerations of voting, Brennan makes a case instead for extra-political
civic virtue, which advances republican participation without romancing the state. “Brennan
reminds us that in an economy where everybody produces political goods, we would
all starve, because those who produce political goods require the services of others for
clothing, food, transportation, artistic and intellectual production, etc.” (Wenzel 2013).
However, in liberal societies, there are many ways to advance the republican ideal beyond
the traditional means of voting, or military or political service: “many activities stereotypically
considered private, such as being a conscientious employee, making art, running a forprofit
business, or pursuing scientific discoveries, can also be exercises of civic virtue. For
many people, in fact, these are better ways to exercise civic virtue” (Brennan 2011, p. 44).
In sum, there are ways, outside of politics proper, to advance the classical foundations
of liberal citizenship – and, what is most important, these methods do not have the same
potential dangers of the classical ideal, taken to its extreme.
Galt’s Gulch: A Classical Citizenship in an Ultra-Liberal World
We appear to be at an impasse. The classical ideal of citizenship would snuff out the individual,
but the liberal ideal could very well lead to its own destruction. There is no clear
answer to the puzzle, but at least I am in the good company of frustrated political theorists
and political economists. As a potential avenue to resolution, I expand on Brennan’s
(2011) compromise of extra-political civic virtue by using a case study from literature: Galt’s
Gulch, a.k.a. Mulligan’s Valley, a.k.a. Atlantis, in Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged.
Galt’s Gulch is the secret hideaway in Colorado where the drivers of the economy – the
leading entrepreneurs and best minds – gather to escape from the legalized plunder of their
property and productivity. In many ways, it exemplifies the extreme of liberal citizenship, as
reflected in the “oath that was taken by every person in this valley” (Rand 1957,p. 675): “I
swear by my life and my love of it that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask
another man to live for mine” (Ibid.). What is more, “it is against [the Valley’s] rules to provide
the unearned sustenance of another human being” (Ibid., p. 701). Clearly, there is to be
no redistribution and government – such as it is – is rather limited. Governance (rather than
government)13
is limited to a three-man Committee of Safety (implied rather than explicit).
This is supplemented by a former judge who acts as arbiter of disputes, but “he hasn’t had
to be called upon as yet” (Ibid., p. 690). To clarify, though, “we are not a state here, not a
society of any kind – we’re just a voluntary association of men held together by nothing but
every man’s self-interest.”
13	 See Hasnas 2008.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 83
Suspending disbelief – this is, after all, a novel, and a voluntary association of rational
geniuses – how does the valley work? Its social harmony, in fact, relies on a shared public
orthodoxy. At the most basic level, all immigrants to the valley must agree to, and take,
an oath, before becoming a citizen of the valley. The shared philosophy continues, with a
rejection of unearned sustenance, and a shared belief in rational self-interest and unhampered
exchange. One citizen of the valley explains a further point of common agreement:
“[we’re] all aristocrats, that’s true, because [we] know that there’s no such thing as a lousy
job – only lousy men who don’t care much to do it” (Ibid., p. 665). There is a deep sense
of the common good – rightly understood – from the valley’s owner who quit the world of
plunder for love of principles (Ibid., p. 685), to the judge who left because he saw himself
as a “guardian of justice” in a world that had replaced justice and property with plunder
and naked use of public means to advance private preferences (Ibid., p. 686). Within this
shared public orthodoxy, minimal governance (without coercive government) is possible:
“we have no laws in this valley, no rules, no formal organization of any kind… But we have
certain customs, which we all observe, because they pertain to the things we need rest from
[i.e. plunder, redistribution, and arbitrary state power]. So I’ll warn you that there is only
one word which is forbidden in this valley: the word ‘give’” (Ibid., p. 659). The valley itself is
privately owned (Ibid., p. 652) and tenants pay rent to the valley’s owner for their land – and
to the appropriate owner for anything borrowed (technically, also rented, since nothing is
borrowed for free). Within this agreement, no state is necessary, because rational men and
women recognize that “violence is not practical” (Ibid., p. 698). It is commonly said outside
the Valley “that it’s hard for men to agree. You’d be surprised how easy it is when both parties
hold as their moral absolute that neither exists for the sake of the other and that reason
is their only means of trade” (Ibid., p. 736). In an anticipation of market failure theory14
and
the so-called “productive state” that fixes the market’s shortcomings, even “public” utilities
are privately provided, including “water lines, the power lines, and the telephone service”
(Ibid., p. 663).
To be sure, Rand has admirably engaged in the “transfer from our inward nature a human
interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination
that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith”
(Coleridge 1817). As philosophers, political economists, and social theorists, however, it
behooves us to doff our poet’s hat and don our scientist’s hat, and to question the realism of
Galt’s Gulch. The story is aspirational, but Rand has given deep thought to the structure of
governance and the Valley’s underlying philosophical code and civic culture. But we must
remember that Galt’s Gulch is populated by the best and brightest, who are also governed
by rationality, combined with Objectivist self-interest: they recognize what is good, and will
work toward it.15
The free-rider problem is thus sidestepped in a way we could not expect
14	 See Samuelson 1954; for a more nuanced view, see Buchan and Tullock 1962.
15	 For more details see Rand 1964a.
New Perspectives on Political Economy84
within the traditional definitions of public choice where individuals are rational but narrowly
self-interested.16
The same problem emerges in Rand’s essay on “Government Financing in a Free Society”
(Rand 1964). In this essay, Rand states that imposition of taxes, as an initiation of
force, is immoral and unjustified (Ibid., p. 135). However, in a fully free society, government
services will be provided through voluntary financing because citizens need them, and rational
individuals recognize this (Ibid., p. 136). Rand concludes that “a program of voluntary
government financing would be amply sufficient to pay for the legitimate functions
of a proper government” (Ibid., p. 137). Granted, government spending would be much
lower if government limited itself to its proper activities of defending “life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness” (through police, courts and the military, period). Let us assume that
the American defense budget (about 18% of government spending) is actually devoted to
defense, rather than foreign military adventures; add to that about 1.5% for administration
of justice, 1.5% for international affairs, and 1% for administration of government, and we
are at roughly one quarter of the $3.5 trillion of current government spending, or roughly
$875 billion (Boccia 2014). Rational and broadly self-interested men and women could
indeed finance this voluntarily, to the tune of roughly $4,000 per year per American adult.
Beyond the rationality cum enlightened self-interest of its citizens, Galt’s Gulch is a
small, homogenous community of like-minded individuals. It is, in fact, very much like a
Greek polis; returning to Constant (1816), we can thus anticipate a high likelihood of success,
as the citizens of Galt’s Gulch – who cherish a modern understanding of liberty qua
individual autonomy – are also called upon to exercise the ancient understanding of liberty
qua political participation.
Plainly, it would be disastrous for a state to enforce virtue; but plainly it is just as disastrous
for virtue to disintegrate – hence the need for a strong civil society and a strong sense
of citizenship.17
Galt’s Gulch shows that a strong liberal citizenship still requires a foundation
of classical citizenship – but that classical citizenship cannot be allowed to snuff out
the individual in the name of the collective. Ayn Rand’s illustration does not offer a complete
answer to the puzzle, and relies on Objectivist premises about self-interest; perhaps
there is no complete answer. But it sheds light on some of the conditions for a free society,
where individuals can flourish in harmony with others.
16	 It is a separate, if important question, whether and when we can expect individuals to combine rationality
with broad self-interest – whether non-Objectivists, small groups with a shared orthodoxy, or even larger
groups. I leave this to further research.
17	 See the entries by Meyer and Bandow, and the debate generally, in Carey 1998.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 85
6. Conclusion
This is a preliminary exploration born of a sense of frustration with the two existing and
competing notions of citizenship. Classical citizenship fails ab initio because the public suffocates
the private. Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori, it is sweet and right to die for your
country, wrote Horace. Maybe – on the off chance that the country is indeed my polis, and
its government limits itself to legitimate activities of enforcing natural rights. Otherwise,
emphatically, no.
But the liberal conception of citizenship, with its high risk of anomie and skeptical
repudiation of public engagement, carries its own risk of lapsing into tyranny. While rejecting
classical citizenship, it would do well to learn from it. Perhaps federalism, polycentric
orders, and the writings of the American founding offer fruitful consideration; I leave these
questions to future work. In the meantime, with Pitkin (1965) as quoted above, I fear “there
is no…absolute answer, and can be none.” But I hope my musings have shed some light on
the problem.
New Perspectives on Political Economy86
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A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 89
A Free Market Alternative
to Anarcho-Capitalism
Youliy Ninov1
Abstract
Paying for the protection of private property contradicts the ethical and economic ideas
conceptualizing private property ownership. Because of this, a new system of organization
of the police, courts, and prisons is suggested. The system is stateless and market-based, i.e.,
anarchic, and represents an alternative to anarcho-capitalism. The specific structure and
organization of the police, courts, and prisons is discussed in detail and it is demonstrated
how they can function without external support. A comparison with anarcho-capitalism is
drawn. It is shown that the suggested system functions according to the rules of the free
market.
Keywords
Austrian economics, anarchism, Ayn Rand
1. Introduction
A common problem in the Austrian school of economic thought is the way in which the
prerequisites for the existence of a free market (namely the availability of a police force,
courts, and an army) are to be ensured. A typical solution is offered by anarcho-capitalism,
which is stateless and market-based. The aim of the present article is to present an alternative
system of organization of the police, courts, and prisons from a normative point
of view only. Although the suggested system is also stateless and market-based, it differs
significantly from anarcho-capitalism. Its structure conforms completely to Ayn Rand’s
principle of non-initiation of violence. Comparisons between the suggested system and
1	 youliy.ninov@gmail.com
New Perspectives on Political Economy90
anarcho-capitalism will be drawn. The particular organization of the police, courts, and
prisons will be discussed.
2. Ethical Considerations
An assessment of anarcho-capitalism and the suggested system will be performed with regard
to their conformance to Ayn Rand’s principle of non-initiation of violence (Rand
1964, ch. 1) and its direct consequences, such as the equal treatment of all people.
Ethical Problems of Anarcho-Capitalism
Let us first take a brief look at anarcho-capitalism with regard to how private property
protection is organized. In anarcho-capitalism private property owners are clients of a protection
services market. In addition, in most cases they pay directly or indirectly for the
services they obtain (Tannehill 1970; Rothbard 1973). However, being the client and paying
for the protection of one’s private property engenders several ethical problems all by itself.
First, people do not pay for the police, courts, and army because they are eager to use
their services, but because, unless they do it, their quality of life would deteriorate. Basically,
one is forced to pay for these services because the alternative is to suffer losses in
the form of stolen property, physical damage (mugging, killing), etc. Unless one takes preemptive
action, it is guaranteed that physical aggression would be used on him. The threat
of initiated physical aggression is what makes people pay for protection services.
The above-mentioned threat is not caused by the private protection agencies which people
would hire to protect themselves under anarcho-capitalism (i.e., it is external to this
agent-client relationship), but it is nevertheless a credible one which forces people to take
part in that particular market. Such situations, in which the initiation of aggression on the
side of one party causes the other party to interact with a third one, are typical nowadays.
An example is the compulsory insurance imposed by the state which causes people to
insure themselves with a private insurance company. Another one is the regulatory requirements
that companies possess a certain good (fire extinguisher, etc.) which in turn force
them to buy one from a private producer/seller of such goods.
The discussed threat is, however, fundamentally different from such nature-caused threats
such as floods, fires, and earthquakes and from ones determined by human nature (the threat
to die of thirst if no water is available, the necessity to eat, to wear clothes, etc.). All those
threats to well-being force people to act in order to prevent them or cope with them, but they
all have one aspect in common — no force is being initiated by them. Only human beings can
initiate force because only human reason has the capacity to purposefully implement a particular
course of action. Earthquakes or cold weather cannot choose to occur. Only human
beings can choose their particular actions and thus be able to initiate force (Rand 1964, ch.1).
In this sense the threat of being robbed, mugged, killed, etc. is a threat caused by the
initiation of physical force. As discussed, anarcho-capitalism suggests that people yield to
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 91
this threat and pay to avoid it. However, markets in which one party acts under initiated
violence or the threat thereof are not free. From this point of view, anarcho-capitalism offers
a non-free market solution. Generally, two entities are able to initiate force: the state
and criminals. Anarcho-capitalism has effectively taken care of the former, while letting the
threat of the latter determine its structure. From this point of view, contrary to the claims
of its supporters, anarcho-capitalism is a non-free market system.
Second, when freedom is obtained through the purchase of a service, as in anarchocapitalism,
the following problem occurs: one gets only as much freedom as one is able or
willing to pay for. This is an inevitable consequence of the way the free market works. In
a free market, one obtains from a service/good just as much as one has paid for. Because
freedom would be the result of a market transaction, one would get exactly as much as one
has given. The aftermath is that there would be no common standard for freedom, i.e., there
would be “equal” and “more equal” people. In particular, those with more money would be
“more equal” than others. Taking the above into consideration, we can say that in anarchocapitalism
people will not be equal with respect to their fundamental rights.
Ethical Solutions
The only way to avoid the above ethical issues is to offer a system in which one is not the
client and does not pay for private property protection. In this way, we avoid the aforementioned
problems, i.e., I.) people do not yield to the threat of initiated violence and II.) the
amount of freedom one gets is not contingent on one’s financial status or personal prefer-
ences/abilities.
However, if we release private property owners from the obligation to pay for the protection
of their own property, who would pay for the police, courts, and prisons? The answer
to this question is quite clear from an ethical point of view: the one who has caused the
problem, the one who has initiated physical force, i.e., the criminals themselves.
Considering the above, an ethically clean solution for police organization, for instance,
would be that criminals themselves pay for the operation of the police. In effect, we would
have the police be funded from and by the very act of fighting crime. Thus, when a crime
is committed, the police would have the right to catch the criminal and let him pay for its
services, for the effort expended in the criminal’s apprehension. This would guarantee that
private property owners would not pay for property protection. In such a way, a new type of
market is suggested, one in which the police are on one side and the other side (the client/
the customer) are the criminals themselves.
The first question which begs to be answered is if such a market can exist at all. Let us
show how and why its existence is possible. For a market (not necessarily a free one) to
exist, an exchange of goods or services is required to take place. A defining characteristic
of a market is the existence of market prices, which are the result of the exchange between
the trading parties.
Let us take as an example the market for compulsory insurance created by the state.
Companies take part in this market under the threat of being punished, i.e., this is not a
free market, but a market nevertheless. Market prices are formed, which reflect the prefer-
New Perspectives on Political Economy92
ences and financial situation of the parties involved. The forces of supply and demand are
allowed to function and a compromise in the form of a mutually acceptable insurance price
is reached. Thus, what we observe is a non-free market with its resulting market prices.
When looking closely, however, what we note is that companies are forced to choose a
trading partner among the ones available on the market. In this sense, one of the defining
characteristics of a free market, i.e., the freedom to choose, has been severely hampered.
At the same time, the other defining characteristic of a free market, namely the mutually
beneficial nature of the exchange, is missing. The exchange is beneficial for the insurance
companies but not for the company which must insure itself. What the above shows is that
a market (not necessarily a free one) can exist without the above-mentioned characteristics,
namely the freedom to choose and the mutually beneficial nature of the exchange. In this
sense, the suggested prospective police-criminals market could exist even without the above
prerequisites.
Here, however, one could object that such a market would not be free. Let us discuss
this point. Since the free market is based on non-aggression, then is the market interaction
between police and criminals a free market transaction? After all, criminals do not choose
to be arrested. The latter seems to contradict the way in which free market services operate,
namely by allowing everyone to freely choose or not choose a particular service or goods.
In order to answer the above question from an ethical standpoint, it is instructive to review
the definition of freedom. Once again, freedom is the absence of initiated force, so if no
force is initiated, then one’s actions are considered free (Rand 1964, ch.1). In view of the
above, the interaction between police and criminals, as outlined, is a free market interaction
because both sides act freely. Neither the police nor the criminals are subjected to initiated
force. Force is applied to criminals while they are apprehended, kept in jail, etc., but this
force is retaliatory/defensive. And since in such a law-enforcement market there is no initiated
violence, this would be a free market. It would be a strange kind of market, in which
one of the sides (the criminals) does not get to choose who will provide the service, but it
would be consistent with free market principles. No contradiction occurs and the existence
of such a market is not proscribed. The proposed market stipulates the only way in which
physical force can rightfully be applied.
What is left, so that we can say that we have a market is to make sure that market
prices are formed on it, i.e., that the forces of supply and demand be free to function.
The latter can be accomplished by inserting an impartial intermediary between the police
and criminals. This intermediary would make sure that the interests of both sides
are preserved and a mutually beneficial compromise is found. An impartial judge would
guarantee that both sides find themselves in equal positions. The police would not be able
to impose its preferences on the criminal (force him to pay) and the criminal would not
be able to evade punishment (not to pay for his crime). If we could organize the system
in such a way that judges can be impartial and interested in a compromise between the
two parties, then market prices could be formed. The goal of this article is to show that
such an organization is theoretically and practically possible, and consequently that such
a market can exist.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 93
In order to make our general proposal clearer, it is helpful to highlight the differences
between anarcho-capitalism and the proposed system.
In an anarcho-capitalist market of law enforcement, the private property owners are the
clients who pay for protection, either directly to a defense company or indirectly to a private
property insurance company (Tannehill 1970; Rothbard 1973). In the suggested system,
they are neither the clients nor the ones who pay the above-mentioned companies. Instead,
the criminals/law-breakers are the clients of the police and pay for its services.
In the anarcho-capitalist civil law market of judiciary/arbitration services the private
property owners are the clients who pay for services directly or indirectly (to an insurance
company) at first. They are either compensated for their expenses by the opposite side when
it has lost the lawsuit or the insurance company covers their court fees, respectively (Tannehill
1970; Barnett 1998). In criminal proceedings, the clients of the court are the defense
or insurance companies involved. When they win the case, they would also be compensated
for their expenses (Tannehill 1970; Friedman 1979). It is evident that the private property
owners pay for the work of the court in all cases, be it directly or indirectly, through having
paid the defense/insurance companies beforehand. In contrast, in the suggested system
the private property owners do not pay at all. Those who pay for judicial services are the
criminals/law-breakers.
In anarcho-capitalism the prison system (also called “debtor’s workhouse”) is organized
in such a way that the defense/insurance companies are the clients of the prison services because
they are the ones who determine what these services would be. Prisoners do not have
any choice or have a limited choice in deciding which prison they would be placed in, how
they would work, and under what conditions they would work and live (Benson 2014). The
fact that prisoners have the option to work while serving time does not make the prisoners
into clients. Yet they are the ones who pay for prison services. So, in anarcho-capitalism, the
private property owners are generally not the clients and do not pay for prison services. In
the proposed system, private property owners are similarly not the clients and do not pay.
Instead, the real clients who pay for prison services are the criminals/law-breakers.
This is the fundamental difference between anarcho-capitalism and the suggested social
system. In anarcho-capitalism, the private property owners are typically the clients of private
property protection services and pay for them directly or indirectly, although in some
cases for a limited amount of time. In the proposed system, the criminals/law-breakers
are the clients and they pay for private property protection. The latter is accomplished by
making them a party to the market transactions involving the police, courts, and prisons.
Because a defining characteristic of anarcho-capitalism is that private property owners are
required to pay for their own protection, then the suggested system is fundamentally different
from anarcho-capitalism. Under anarcho-capitalism, people would not pay only if the
private protection companies fund their costs themselves, which could only happen with
a 100% conviction rate, not possible in practice. The suggested law-enforcement structure
does not require a 100% conviction rate in order to exist.
From another point of view, the difference between anarcho-capitalism and the suggested
system is that, whereas in anarcho-capitalism the right to pursue justice typically
New Perspectives on Political Economy94
belongs to the particular private property owner being affected, in the suggested system this
right belongs to society. Every company or individual in the suggested system has the right
to pursue justice for profit. The latter point will be elaborated later.
Another seemingly small but actually significant difference is the following. In anarchocapitalism
people could be compensated for their expenses for private property protection.
For instance, if a private property owner wins a case against another one, then the latter
will be required to pay the former his expenses for court and legal fees. It must be stressed,
however, that “being compensated” and “not paying at all” are two differing concepts. With
“compensation” one must have the money in the first place, then live without it during the
court procedure, and only when the court has found the defendant guilty can the prosecuting
side get its money back. In other words: one must possess some free capital, live without
this capital for some time, and then restore his original capital position. Assuming that one
has this money available (which can never be guaranteed in practice), one is denied the
possibility to use it productively for some time. Money has a price and it is reflected in the
interest banks charge on their loans. In comparison, the suggested law enforcement system
does not require from the private property owners to possess any capital, and in such a way
never prevents them from using it (if it is available) for productive purposes.
An interesting consequence of the suggested system is that one gets his freedom “for
free.” In anarcho-capitalism, one obtains freedom through paying for a service, but in the
suggested system, the ones who use police and court services are the criminals themselves,
not the private property owners. In effect, freedom is a byproduct of “servicing” the criminals.
It is the result of a market transaction to which private property owners are not a party.
One gets his freedom without asking for it, which is exactly what the definition of a basic
human right is, a right which is yours just by virtue of your existence.
3. Economic Considerations
Paying for the protection of one’s private property in any way has negative economic implications.
It amounts to a waste of resources that could have been better utilized elsewhere.
By committing a crime against private property, the criminals force the productive part
of the population to spend money just for securing what it has. In effect, the money for
burglar alarms, fences, etc., could have been used to further improve one’s life, either in the
form of investments in new goods/services or for personal satisfaction. Just as an example:
Buying a lock for your house does not make your life better; it prevents it from getting
worse. You could have bought an item of aesthetic value instead, which in itself would have
made your life richer/more enjoyable, or you could have saved/invested the money in order
to obtain a future benefit.
In the same way, the money spent for police services in anarcho-capitalism is a forced
expense on the part of the private property owners, and this expenditure translates into a
slower rate of capital accumulation/economic growth. Paying for private property protec-
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 95
tion makes perfect sense when there is no way to avoid it because people would be worse
off without it, but not so much when the alternative not to pay exists. The latter is what the
suggested system offers.
From an economic standpoint, the suggested system would amount to a transfer of economic
resources from counter-productive hands into productive ones. The system would
punish the people who subvert society without burdening the productive part of the population
by forcing it to pay for prisons, for instance.
4. System Organization
Prerequisites
A necessary and sufficient condition for the suggested system to function is the existence of
a pre-established, monopolistic body of law governing a certain land area, whose sole intent
is to ensure the protection of private property.
The standard anarcho-capitalist proposal with respect to the organization of the law
system is the polycentric law, namely when several law systems exist in parallel in the same
geographical area (Barnett 1998; Friedman 1979). In order to prove that polycentric law
is better than its monopolistic counterpart, authors typically draw a comparison with the
existing structure of the law, i.e., the monopolistic law imposed by the state through the
initiation of force. From this comparison, they derive the conclusion that the polycentric
system would be superior to the existing one. What seems to have been neglected is the fact
that monopolistic systems can exist without the state or in general without initiating force.
The typical example is the so-called market monopoly, namely, a monopoly created by the
free market itself. In the same way, the existence of monopolistic laws does not contradict
the free market. There is a way that a monopoly of law can exist without the initiation of
force. This can happen in the following way: A land owner is a private property owner and,
as such, he is entitled to decide how to use his property (land). The latter, however, also
includes the rules which are valid within it, the rules which the people living on this piece of
land must obey. A good analogy can be drawn with our own homes. In our home, we have
the right to determine who enters, stays, how our life goes, etc. Therefore, private property
owners have the right to determine the laws which are valid on their land. If said right was
denied to them, this would mean that their land is not theirs, i.e., that their property is not
actually private.
However, private property owners may decide that they prefer monopolistic laws and
there is nothing to be done about it if the initiation of force is banned. Similarly, there is
nothing which can or should prevent private property owners from joining their lands with
those of other owners who share their views with respect to what laws they wish implemented
on their property. However, a common set of laws over a given land area forms a
jurisdiction.
New Perspectives on Political Economy96
From an economic perspective, it is beneficial for private property owners who share
the same views in regard to laws to join their lands because the latter increases the size of
the market they jointly control. Economies of scale could be achieved in this way. In other
words, the market forces would stimulate private property owners with similar views to
create jurisdictions of their own (societies/communities) with laws corresponding to their
wishes.
Non-owners who wish to live in such a jurisdiction would have the option to either live
there and accept the laws or leave the jurisdiction. The latter would lead to the creation of
homogeneous societies because only the people who agree (or at least accept/tolerate) the
imposed laws would remain in the particular jurisdiction.
Thus, the existence of monopolistic laws and homogeneous societies supporting them is
not proscribed by the rules of the free market. It should be noted, however, that law creation
would have market implications. Landowners would not be free to impose whatever laws
they feel like because people would leave their land if they disagree. Private property owners
need people on their land because otherwise there would be no one to produce goods
and services. From an economic standpoint, landowners would be dependent on the people
living on their land. This would ensure that the landowners in a jurisdiction could create
laws only if these laws correspond to the views of a large enough group of people wishing to
live under them. In such a way, different homogeneous societies based on culture, language,
faith, race, lifestyle, etc. can be formed. As demonstrated, the formation of such societies
does not contradict the rules of the free market. On the contrary, this means that monopolistic
laws can exist without a state, i.e., without the initiation of force.
From this point of view the prerequisite for the existence of the suggested system, namely
the existence of monopolistic laws, is fully justified. It should be noted that under monopolistic
laws one can ban anything (e.g., guns or drugs) without initiating force simply because
all land would be private. The laws created to ban a particular activity, whatever it is, would
reflect the preferences of the people who live under them. Thus, laws would be based on
the market.
Police
As discussed, in anarcho-capitalism the clients of the police/defense companies are the
private property owners and they are the ones who pay for police services (directly or indirectly)
by buying private property insurance. In the suggested system, the clients of the
police are the criminals, who are the ones who pay for police services.
Organization of the police and its consequences
In the proposed system, the police would finance itself from and by the act of fighting crime.
In particular, when the police capture a suspected criminal, it would send him to court to
be sued. If the court finds the defendant guilty, then it would make him pay a marketdetermined
price for the expenses incurred by the police. In this way, we guarantee a direct
correlation between the level of criminal activity and the quality/quantity of the police. The
latter would ensure that the size and organization of the police forces would correspond to
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 97
the actual protection needs of the society. In societies with high criminal rates, the police
force would be large and well-organized because there would be more money to be earned
there, but where crime is almost non-existent, the police forces would be barely noticeable.
Basically, the volume and severity of crime would determine, with the help of market forces,
a police system of the right size and organization necessary to counter such crime.
The proposed system allows for the existence of many competing police forces, as in
anarcho-capitalism. However, since in our case the police would have different clients (the
criminals), some differences in the way the police forces operate would emerge. The most
notable one would be the lack of the specific conflict between private police organizations
which is inherent in anarcho-capitalism. In anarcho-capitalism, two police forces could
have opposing interests if the client of one of them commits a crime against the client of the
other, and this could potentially lead to an aggressive confrontation between the two police
forces (Rand 1964, ch. 14). Moreover, the police under anarcho-capitalism would frequently
find itself in a conflict of interest. This would happen when one of its clients perpetrates
a crime against another of its clients. The problem is that the police would have to arrest a
person from whom it obtains money for protection (Nozick 1974). Under the suggested system
such specific problems among the competing police forces would not exist because the
interests of their clients (the criminals) cannot clash like they do under anarcho-capitalism.
The reason is that the offenders do not have the right to choose who will serve them and
how. They can be served by any police force which manages to capture them.
The structure of this branch of the economy would be the same as the ones in the rest of
the economy. This would ensure that the general conflicts between the different police forces
and the way these conflicts are resolved would be the same as everywhere else. If conflicts
arise (for instance if two police organizations argue with each other over who has captured
a particular criminal), a court would resolve these conflicts. If a police company refuses to
go to court and accept the court’s decision, then it becomes a law-breaker. The reason is
that there are laws which specify explicitly what behaviors are allowed and what are not. As
a comparison: in the standard anarcho-capitalist system there are no compulsory laws valid
for everybody; therefore, a defense company which does whatever it wishes is not necessarily
a law-breaker. In the suggested system, if a police company commits a crime, it would be
opposed by the whole of society because this society is a homogeneous one. Moreover, it
would represent a valuable asset to capture legally for competing police companies. Under
such circumstances, an aberrant police company would not be able to withstand the pressure
of its competitors and society as a whole for the simple reason that, in order to function,
it requires society’s support. Such a situation cannot occur under anarcho-capitalism
because a police company is not necessarily opposed by the whole society there.
Even if a police company is a market monopoly or the dominant force, it would not be
able to break the laws with impunity. Such a situation cannot happen in a homogeneous
society. The contemporary police force can be given as an example. It functions in a society
where the vast majority of people supports its way of operation and organization. The police
are an absolute monopoly, but it dare not overtake the power of the state or reject the
decisions of the courts. From this point of view, the temptation for a police company in the
New Perspectives on Political Economy98
suggested system to drive its competitors out of the market using force would exist as in any
other branch of the economy. However, a police company would not be able to act on it for
the same reason that prevents competing companies in the other branches of the economy
to drive their competitors out of the market by initiating force. There would be sanctions
which would make it behave accordingly.
The existence of anarcho-capitalist style protective agencies would be possible, but they
would most probably be confined to market niches where clients require specific services
(e.g., a personal bodyguard). It would be practically impossible to charge prices for something
which one can get for free by the common police.
Because of the suggested structure of this branch of the economy, it would be impracticable
to bribe the police. First, the police are not a monopoly, and second, all police forces
are interested in capturing all criminals. In effect, one would need to bribe all police forces
and probably a large portion of the general population to avoid being arrested for a crime.
Since conflicts between the police forces would be resolved in court, the police companies
would not be forced to cooperate with each other in order to resolve them. The latter
shows that the suggested police organization is not a network industry. From this point
of view, the criticism in Cowen (1992) that the police in anarcho-capitalism is a network
industry, and this by itself may lead to collusion between the police forces, does not apply
to the suggested system.
Motivation of police
It would be guaranteed that the motivation of the police would be exactly the same as with
any other free market sector. In comparison: In the current social system, the police are not
motivated to do its job well because there are no standard market-driven incentives. The
income of the police is independent of the value of its services; furthermore, it does not
bear full responsibility for its actions. Such a situation allows the police not to do its job well
and yet not to suffer the full weight of the consequences. Again, in comparison: In anarchocapitalism,
the police are motivated to do its job well, but its motivation is determined not
by the level of criminal activity, but by the subjective perceptions of its clients. The police
would be more concerned with ensuring that the subjective needs of its clients are satisfied
than with objectively persecuting criminals. It would be more important how its actions are
perceived by the society than by how much work it has done. In other words, because the
police serve private property owners, it would try to satisfy their interests and this would
make it efficient from a market point of view, yet this not the same as being efficient in fighting
crime. The problem is that the general population would be able to influence how the
police does its job, which is wrong because the general population is not an expert in capturing
criminals. It lacks the necessary skills and experience. An apt analogy would be for the
general population to instruct a surgeon on how to perform brain surgery. Let us illustrate
this general problem with an example. Since how much money the police would get would
be dependent on the number of private property owners who subscribe to its services and
on their willingness to pay, the police would make sure to persecute more vigorously those
criminals that have achieved more media attention. The capture of a notorious criminal, for
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 99
instance, would bring much more money to their coffers than that of an unknown gangster
who has committed similar crimes. Objectively, however, the two cases are identical and
should be treated in the same way, which would not happen. Again: in anarcho-capitalism,
the motivation of the police forces would be extremely subjective, which is not as effective
as we would wish.
Let us now try to evaluate the motivation of the police in the suggested system. The
motivation of the police would derive from the crime itself without any intermediary. No
preference would be given to conspicuous cases unless the general population is willing
to pay for them additionally. The latter would give the people the chance to express their
preferences about “seeing justice done.” Still, typically the only parameter which would be
of importance would be the type of crime, big or small, because this would have a direct
impact on the money to be obtained from it. The police would try to be as efficient as possible
and would not let the rest of the population dictate how it does its job, just as any
company would do. If there is a public gathering, the police in the suggested system would
do its best to assess the number of policemen necessary to guarantee the safety of the
crowd and deploy just the number needed. In anarcho-capitalism, the number of policemen
sent to safeguard the same gathering would likely be much higher than necessary since it
would be of an extreme importance that the police presence be noticed by the public and
appreciated. In effect, the suggested police organization would adjust objectively to the
actual crime protection needs of the society, not to its perceived crime protection needs, as
in anarcho-capitalism. This would guarantee efficiency, which is what every market-based
company strives to achieve.
Since the police would be motivated by the income it obtains from criminals, it would
be on the lookout for new crimes. It would try to anticipate them, predict them, and be
where it is necessary in order to capture the criminal. For instance, if there are parts of the
city where more crimes happen, then there would be more police there. The simple reason
is that there would be more work for the police to do, and consequently, more money to
be earned. Thus, the preventive function of the police would be preserved in the suggested
system. What is more, the motivation to prevent would be stronger than the one in anarchocapitalism.
In anarcho-capitalism, the police forces are mainly interested that their own
clients are not hurt by criminals, not that non-clients are not hurt. Therefore, criminals who
commit crimes outside the region of control of the particular police force would not be of
immediate interest to the defense company. In the suggested system, all police forces are
interested in capturing all criminals independent of where or against whom they commit
crimes. In this sense, the interests of all police forces are the same. In anarcho-capitalism
this is not the case.
Functioning of the police
When a crime is committed, the police would do its best to find the criminal since this
would bring it income. In order to get money from a potential criminal, the particular
criminal case would have to stand trial, which in turn means that the evidence the police
collected would need to be good enough to result in a conviction. Because the police would
New Perspectives on Political Economy100
incur significant expenses for capturing the particular defendant/criminal, for keeping him
in custody, and for hiring the services of an attorney to sue the defendant in court, it would
have to be convinced that the case it has would stand in court. Because if the defendant is
acquitted, then the police would not be able to recover its expenses. What is more, if the
court does not convict the person detained by the police, the police would have to pay
for all court services and for the attorney fees of the acquitted. This would guarantee a
responsible action by the police. It would not be tempted to arrest people on insufficient
charges because such charges would not be accepted in court. So, the police would bring a
case to court only when the evidence it has is solid. What would happen is that the police
would take responsibility for its wrong decisions, just as every other private company in the
economy, by paying for them.
However, if the defendant is found guilty, the police would be compensated for its work
by collecting a certain price for its services from the convicted criminal. This price would
be determined by market forces and would correspond to the severity of the crime. (The
mechanism will be explained below in the discussion on the way the court system functions).
However, since the price for the particular crime would correspond to the severity of
the crime itself, the police would have indicators as to what is more or less important to the
market. In short, police work would be driven by the market system. Crimes such as murder
would have a high price tag; therefore, they would be high on the priority list on the police.
On the other hand, crimes such as shoplifting would be quite “cheap,” although they may
be much more numerous, and consequently they would be of a lower priority for the police.
In effect, the market would guide the police in its actions.
Because the police would get paid only when the court convicts a particular person,
there would always be a temptation to plant evidence in order to ensure a conviction. The
problem is that by doing so, the police itself becomes an outlaw. Such an act would attract
the attention of the competing police forces because it would be a potentially lucrative opportunity
for them. The already-convicted criminal would always have the opportunity to
claim a wrongful conviction because of false evidence. The last option would surely minimize
all attempts for planting evidence, although it cannot eliminate them entirely.
Due to the desire of the police to minimize expenses, it would never keep a suspect in
custody longer than is necessary to organize a trial. Still, if deemed necessary, the maximum
length of detention could be codified in the legislation governing the police.
To be able to sue the criminal successfully, the police would have to hire the services of
an attorney. The defendant himself would also be able to get an attorney who will be paid
after the court has come to a decision (i.e., the “loser pays” rule would apply). In case
the defendant is acquitted, he would not pay at all. The police would have to pay all the
expenses. However, in case the defendant is found guilty, he would have to compensate the
police and pay all court and attorney fees.
The money to compensate the police would have to be obtained, as already suggested,
from the convicted criminal. This money could come from the criminal’s savings, from sale
of personal property, bank loans, private interest/charity organizations, relatives, and, last
but not least, from the criminal’s future work in jail. The convicts would be allowed (but not
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 101
forced) to work while in jail to repay any debt they have incurred. In case the criminal cannot
pay the police immediately, the police would have the right to collect money from the
criminal’s future income. If the convicted criminal has no property and very little earning
power, he may be forced to pay for a long time, possibly until the end of his life.
A typical problem which would arise is that some relatively poorer criminals/law-breakers
may not be able to pay what they owe immediately, which could potentially lead the
police to persecute richer ones more vigorously. The latter, however, is not a real problem
when people who cannot pay immediately are required to pay the current market interest
rate on the amount of money they owe. In this way, from a market perspective, the money
which was supposed to be obtained now would be equal to the money to be obtained in the
future. Thus, it would be immaterial if the persecuted is rich or poor.
A question which might be asked is how the costs for the preventive measures and for
the unsuccessful prosecution would be funded. Since the aim of the author is to make the
structure of this branch of the economy the same as any other one, then these expenses
must be funded in the usual way this is done by the market. Let us take as an example a
private company for public transportation. In order for the company to remain profitable,
it is necessary that its revenues surpass its costs. What is not required is that every transaction
it makes be profitable. It is accepted as something natural when some of the bus routes
the company offers do not pay themselves out. After all, nobody can predict the behavior
of his clients. Some trips can be almost empty. Do companies charge higher prices in such
circumstances? Typically, no. What companies do is to raise their general price level so that
their losses on these routes be compensated by the successful ones. Similarly, in the suggested
system the police would raise its expected price for successful prosecutions so that
it can stay profitable. From another point of view, every company in a free market must pay
for its mistakes (since a case in which an apprehended person is not convicted represents a
mistake by itself.). The latter guarantees that the company stays vigilant and tries to avoid
such situations. From this point of view, if one raises the argument that the size of the punishment
must fit the particular crime, then one must explain why, in practice, equivalent
situations must not happen in the other branches of the economy.
Laws
The laws in anarcho-capitalism are based on restitution (Tannehill 1970; Barnett 1998;
Benson 2014). It is correct that in order to protect the private property rights, restitution for
loses is necessary. Furthermore, it is pointed out that in the current social arrangement, i.e.,
when a guilty person is kept in jail at the expense of society, one cannot guarantee the compensation
of the victim (restitution). Because of this, it is suggested that criminals should
work off their debt in prisons (also called “debtors workhouses” or “work facilities”). It is
argued that the function of deterrence (i.e., disincentivizing future criminals) would be better
implemented by means other than the punishment of prison confinement.
What seems not to be considered is that if punishment for deterrence purposes is intended,
it can be implemented in the same way as restitution, i.e., when the inmate pays
for his stay in jail by working there (or by using his savings). In this way, punishment can
New Perspectives on Political Economy102
be given without burdening society. In this sense, it does not contradict private property
rights because no force is initiated. In short: the existence of laws based on punishment by
incarceration is entirely acceptable. The issue of the effectiveness of these laws, as discussed
in Barnett (1998), will not be considered here.
Laws based on retribution as a form of punishment and as a right to which the victim
is entitled (Rothbard 1998) are not compatible with the principle of non-initiation of violence
because retribution on a personal level cannot be applied according to an objective
criterion. Retribution means, in effect, that people would take justice in their own hands
and would be sued and punished afterward if they have not performed it properly. The real
problem, however, is that if one makes a mistake, this would mean that society approves of
violence initiation. In effect, no attempt to stop the initiation of violence would be made,
but responsibility would be taken afterward. Being wrongly punished, however, is of little
consolation to the injured party after the fact. As an example: The wife of a particular man
has been murdered. Believing to know who the perpetrator is, her husband kills the suspect
(performs retribution) who later turns out to have been innocent. The husband was not
able to objectively assess the situation because he was grieving at the time and looking for
somebody to punish in order to alleviate his suffering. However, an innocent man has been
killed, and this has been allowed because it has not been discouraged beforehand. In general,
no objective criterion for assessment of the situation can be applied when the victim
is allowed to take justice in his own hands. In effect, by accepting retribution on a personal
level, one accepts the initiation of force.
Another problem with retribution as a victim’s right is that it cannot guarantee an end
to the circle of violence. If some of the parties involved believe they have been wrongly
punished, the conflict can go on forever.
Laws based on retribution as a right vested in the particular community seem to be
compatible with the principle of non-initiation of violence. As they are applied by the
community, it would be possible to put an end to the initiated violence. It can be argued,
however, that such laws would be ineffective from an economic point of view. Retribution
in general represents a destruction of resources available to the particular economy
which could otherwise have been used to productive ends. As an example: killing a convicted
murderer does not help economic development because he will not be able to
contribute to the division of labor with his work. Letting him work in jail while serving
his sentence there would, however, achieve that end. In addition, it should be noted that
killing someone as a punishment for murder could prevent him from paying restitution
to his victim’s family.
All of the above leads to the following suggestion: laws should be based on restitution
and punishment without retribution (for deterrence purposes).
Court and Legal Services
In anarcho-capitalism, private property owners may or may not be the clients requesting
court and legal services, but they always pay for them directly or indirectly. In the case of
civil lawsuits, private property owners pay either directly for court services and may be
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 103
compensated afterward if the defendant loses the case, or their court expenses are covered
by their insurance company. In both cases, private property owners pay for legal and court
services directly or indirectly, even if for a limited amount of time. In the case of criminal
lawsuits, it would be either the defense company or the insurance company of the plaintiff
that would pay for court and legal services. If these companies win the lawsuit, they would
be compensated for their expenses by the opposite side. Still, these companies are initially
paid by the private property owners, and consequently, the private property owners pay
indirectly for court and legal services.
In the suggested system, the private property owners are not the clients and do not pay
for court and legal services at all.
Legal services
Not paying for legal services can be accomplished by organizing the market for legal services
in such a way that each crime has a market price. In particular, the suggested system
could function in the following way: the alleged criminal is one of the parties to the lawsuit.
If he loses the case, he is required to pay a market price to the other party. The latter
makes profiting from crime possible. But when crime is a profitable option, private property
owners need not pay for the prosecution of the criminal. When the potential for profit is
available, there would always be people willing to take part. So, the opposing party in the
lawsuit would be the police or law companies (or even private individuals seeking profit).
They would strive to win the particular case in order to obtain the associated market price.
The latter guarantees that the victim of a crime or a private individual seeking justice need
not pay for the lawsuit personally. This would be done by the police/attorney at their own
expense. In case they win the lawsuit, they would expect a monetary compensation which
would exceed their expenses. As can be seen, in the proposed case the victim/private individual
seeking justice is not a client at all and in general is not a part of the market transaction.
That is why he would never pay for justice. The defendant (a suspected criminal or a
private property owner) would also be able to get a lawyer to defend himself in court free
of charge. The latter would happen because the profit incentive would serve the defendant
as well. In case of an acquittal, the claimant would have to compensate the attorney of the
defendant for his expenses. In case the defendant loses the lawsuit, he would have to pay
his attorney for the effort expended in defending him. In addition, the convicted person
would have to pay the claimant the market price for the particular crime. As can be seen,
the defendant would pay only if proven guilty.
The discussed market mechanism guarantees that people who are victims of crimes do
not have to pay anything for legal and court services. In such a situation it is irrelevant how
rich or poor they are. The opposite side (the defendant) would also not be obliged to pay
anything if not guilty.
Because the prosecuting lawyers would pay for court services and possibly for the expenses
of the other party if they lose the case, this would guarantee a responsible handling
of all cases. Lawyers would try to estimate if the case they are about to undertake has
enough supportive evidence to be won in court.
New Perspectives on Political Economy104
The number and specialization of lawyers would be determined by the demand of the
market. When there is more money to be made by suing potential criminals, more lawyers
would enter the profession. Similarly, if the level of crime was low, there would be fewer
lawyers on the market because the amount of money to be made would be lower.
Court services
The court system would be a free market one. This means that its size, structure, and the
organization according to which it would function would be determined by the market. In
order for this to happen, the funding for the court system needs to come from its clients.
In the current social system, judges are paid by the state. The idea behind such a structure
is that judges need to be independent of the two conflicting parties. Because of their independence,
they are able to impartially judge a particular case. However, what is necessary is that
judges be impartial, not independent. Independence of the two conflicting parties is just one
way of ensuring impartiality. Another possible way of achieving impartiality is for judges to
be chosen by both parties, as suggested by many authors. It follows from the last requirement
that judges cannot allow themselves to be partial or even to appear partial toward either of
the conflicting parties. If a judge is known to be biased toward one of the parties, he would
never be chosen by the other one. In effect, for the judge to be chosen, he would need to be
and appear as impartial as possible, as this would be the only way for him to win clients. Since
the conflicting sides would be free to negotiate with each other as to who is to handle the
particular case, they would have to come to a mutual compromise about the choice of a judge.
In the context of the suggested system, if for some reason the above does not materialize,
then the laws governing the particular jurisdiction would have to offer a solution. There may
be multiple solutions to this problem and any one of them may be chosen as long as the
case reaches the court so that justice can be served. For instance, the judge to hear the case
may be chosen at random from a list of prospective judges. The qualifications, number, etc.
of these judges may be regulated by the laws or left open. Or a single, well-known judge may
be chosen. The number of possible correct solutions is unlimited.
In the proposed system, the manner in which judges are paid would be irrelevant. They
may be paid by both sides equally or by the losing party. It is up to society to decide on this.
In any case, the judge would be equally dependent on both parties, which would guarantee
impartiality.
The suggested court system (the number, qualification and specialization of the judges)
would be decided by the free market. This suggests that there would always be a sufficient
number of qualified judges to satisfy market demand. If there is a shortage of judges, then
the price for their services would rise and this would stimulate new ones to enter the profession.
When there is an excess of judges, the prices for their services would go down and
some of them would leave the profession in search of more lucrative opportunities. At the
same time, the manner in which they would operate and the overall structure of the court
system would be as efficient as possible because it would be dictated by market forces.
There would be a market demand for judges whose fees are low and whose services are of
high quality (a quick, well-justified ruling, for instance).
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 105
The task of any judge would be to come to a decision about several distinct problems:
I.)	 If the defendant is guilty, the judge would have to decide how he is to be punished.
Such a punishment is necessary in order to deter future criminal acts. It would have
to be completely unrelated and independent of any other payments the criminal
would have to cover.
II.)	 The judge would also have to rule on how the criminal is to pay restitution to the
private property owner who has suffered damage as a result of the particular criminal
act. The latter is very important because only thus could private property be
regarded as private. In effect, what would happen is that the damaged private property
would be restored from the criminal’s property/funds/future work. In this way,
private property would move from counter-productive hands into productive ones.
So, aside from being punished (with a jail sentence, for instance) for his crime, the
criminal would be made liable for any losses he has caused.
It may be the case that the criminal has caused bigger losses than he can reasonably repay.
Such losses would never be compensated in full and should be accepted in the same way as
natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. The latter cannot be avoided in any
social system because they are a force of nature. Still, the owner of the particular property
must be compensated in the best way possible. This may or may not include for the criminal
to pay for his wrongdoings not only while in jail but possibly for the rest of his life.
III.) The judge would have to decide on the monetary compensation to the police/lawyers
for the capture, detention, and suing of the criminal. This would entail the
formation of market prices for the different types of offences, as explained below.
After the court reviews the case, it would issue a verdict. If the criminal does not comply, he
would be persecuted/prosecuted by the police/lawyer companies again for not complying
with the court decision. The monetary compensation which would be due for not abiding
by the court’s decision would guarantee their continued interest. In such a way, the court
need only issue a verdict which the market would impose.
An interesting consequence of the suggested organization of the judicial services is the
following: In anarcho-capitalism, the private property owners are the clients of the court
services. The latter may be a problem in a murder case, when the murdered person has not
left instructions in his will on how to handle this particular situation and has no relatives
to demand justice or his relatives are simply not interested in prosecuting. Such a problem
could never arise in the suggested system of organization because the right to pursue justice
belongs to everybody in the particular society/community. There would always be individuals
willing to pursue justice for a profit.
New Perspectives on Political Economy106
Formation of market prices for different types of offences
The court would be responsible for ruling on the remuneration of the claimant for its services
if the defendant is convicted. For this reason, the judges would have to balance between
the interest of the police/lawyers and those of the convicted. If a judge does not pay the
police/lawyers enough to compensate for their expenses and generate profit, he would never
be chosen by them. At the same time, if the judge makes the criminal pay too much, he
would never be chosen by the particular criminal. This, along with the specific criminal
code stipulated by the laws of the jurisdiction, would lead to the formation of market prices
for the different types of offences. In effect, the judges would be an active party to the price
formation process. They would have a vested interest that all types of offences defined in the
criminal code are prosecuted and, therefore, they would strive to raise the specific prices
of the offences so that the police/lawyers are motivated to catch and sue the perpetrators
against the particular rule of law. At the same time, however, they would not be able to raise
the prices as high as they wish because they would be bound by the competition for clients,
in particular for the criminals, who are an active party in choosing the judge for the case.
The defendant would surely choose a judge who typically rules low police compensations.
Since the profession of judge would be open to new competition, this would by itself limit
any attempts to raise prices too high.
It is very likely that the market prices to emerge from this interaction between the police/
lawyers, judges, and defendants would correspond to the severity of the cases as defined by
the criminal code. At the same time these prices would probably take into account the average
costs for solving a particular type of crime. Crimes, such as murder, which would typically
require more expenses, would be better rewarded. Judges would make sure that prices
outstrip average costs. In effect, the market price for a petty theft would be much lower than
the market price for a murder. This would guarantee that the police treat the murder case as
the one deserving more attention because of its importance for private property protection.
In effect, market prices would prioritize the offences with respect to their severity.
Prison System
A typical anarcho-capitalist proposal on how the prison system could be organized is the
following: When and if a person is convicted of a crime, he is sent to a private jail by the
defense/insurance company which has successfully prosecuted him in court. In jail, he
would have the opportunity to work, in particular to choose among different types of jobs
offered at the particular place. By working, the prisoner would be able to pay for his prison
expenses and pay restitution to the private property owners affected by the crimes he has
committed. It should be noted that the prisoner would support himself. In this arrangement,
however, the prisoner is not a client because it is not he who chooses which jail to
serve his sentence in. In comparison, in the suggested system the prisoner is both the client
and the one who pays for his stay in jail.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 107
Problems and solutions
The anarcho-capitalist proposal leads to several problems. They stem from the fact that
since the prisoner is not the client, a prison is chosen for him (i.e., the prisoner has no way
to influence the behavior of the prison system).
The first consequence of the above is that prisoners would typically be treated as dependents,
not as clients, similarly to the present situation, and therefore they would sometimes be
mistreated. Nowadays, the latter takes the form of prison guard brutality and inter-prisoner
violence. It is suggested that, because anarcho-capitalist prison guards would be kept more
stringently responsible for the brutalities that may occur, this would solve the problem. If
the latter actually occurs, it might improve the situation as compared to the current prison
conditions, but it could not by itself generate a sustained interest in the prisoner’s wellbeing,
as is usual for the clients of all other branches of the economy. Even if the prisoner
works in jail and his particular employer is interested in his well-being, this would have no
significant effect on the prison system. The reason is that the interests of the prison system
and those of the employers allowed to function there may not coincide. The prison system
would try to satisfy the interests of its clients, namely the defense/insurance companies, not
those of the inmates. In short, because prisoners are not clients, prison institutions would
have no vested interest in resolving the above problem by themselves.
From another point of view, the primary purpose of imprisonment is to punish the criminal
for his wrongdoings by limiting his access to/separating him from society. Punishing the
criminal by subjecting him to bad living conditions has never been the original intent of the
law, but this is what happens in reality because the prison system has no motivation to offer
adequate and acceptable living conditions. Again, there are no market-induced incentives
for this to happen because the prisoner cannot choose the prison and influence the conditions
offered there. Similarly, in anarcho-capitalism, the choice of what the conditions in a
prison would be is left to the organizations that have sent the prisoner to jail. The problem
again is that the interests of these organizations and those of the prisoners do not coincide.
The defense/insurance companies would be mainly interested in minimizing their expenses,
whereas the prisoners would clamor for improvements in their living conditions.
The suggested system solves the above-mentioned problems by changing the clientele of
the prisons. In particular, as clients the prisoners would be able to choose in which prison
to go and pay for their stay there in any way they can. This option would significantly
change the relationship between prisons and inmates. In effect, the prisoners would become
cherished clients to be taken care of because they are the ones who pay for their stay.
Prison brutality would be virtually non-existent because prisons would be highly motivated
not to allow it. In addition, since the system would be market-based, the quality and quantity
of its services would be defined by the market, which by itself guarantees constant improvement
and updating of the living conditions.
Similar to the anarcho-capitalist proposal, prisoners would be able to contribute to society
with their work even while in jail. Thus, rather than a burden on society, they would be
productive citizens.
New Perspectives on Political Economy108
Functioning of the prison system
In the suggested system, the convicted criminals would be allowed to choose the prison they
would like to go to. However, their choice would be limited to just where to serve their sentences,
not if. There is no problem if the criminal code defines different classes of prisons
with a range of limitations on the prisoner’s access to society. The prisoner would just have
to choose a prison in the respective class, as given in the judge’s ruling.
Since prisons would be dependent on the number and wishes/financial situation of their
clients, the number and quality of prisons would be directly determined by the needs of
society. If there are more would-be prisoners, more prisons would appear; if less, their
number would decrease. The quality of the services in jail would be determined, first, by the
criminal code and, second, by the prisoners themselves. However, there would be a general
tendency for the prisons to develop and offer modern, cheaper, and better services as any
other private company in the market economy. Competition would drive them. If, however,
a particular prison is tempted to offer more amenities/freedoms than stipulated in the
criminal’s sentence, then this prison could be sued by the police for breaking the law. The
monetary reward from suing the particular prison would guarantee that the police would
monitor the inner workings of the jails.
While in jail, prisoners would have all the rights normal people have except the ones
postulated in the particular laws/sentences. The prisons themselves would be motivated to
offer everything not forbidden by the ruling of the judge/criminal code.
Working while in jail would be common and ordinary. Still, if a criminal has the funds
to support himself in jail by paying for his stay there without working, then this would be
allowed. The prisoner would enjoy as much luxury/goods/services as he is able or willing
to buy, as long as these are not forbidden under the conditions of his sentence. Working in
jail would usually be necessary for the prisoners to support themselves. The market would
offer incentives to prisoners in the form of better living conditions so that most of them
would willingly choose to work. Work may even be necessary just to repay the debts one
has, in particular when one has to pay the police for its services and the compensation for
the committed private property violation.
Prisoners would be able to choose prisons matching their financial situation or earning
power. Still, it is very likely that some of the prisoners would refuse to work despite being unable/unwilling
to support themselves while in jail. Those would most likely be transferred to
minimum-amenities jails. Hopefully, when they see the big difference between the lifestyle the
working inmates would be able to afford and their personal situation, they would be incentivized
to start working. Such minimum-amenities jails would have to be supported by either the
prison system itself or by charity organizations, private companies, etc. (i.e., without burdening
society). It would be in the prison system’s best interest to support minimum-amenities jails for
which prisoners do not pay and consequently receive the bare minimum of services necessary
for their survival. Experiencing the difference between what one gets without working and the
privileges extended to the productive inmates would be a good, market-based incentive to start
working and be transferred to a better-quality jail. Criminals too dangerous to be allowed to
work and people unable to work will have to rely on the public for support while in jail.
A bilingual interdisciplinary journal 109
5. Conclusions
A new system of social organization has been offered. This system conforms fully to Ayn
Rand’s idea of non-initiation of violence. However, the proposed system differs significantly
from the anarcho-capitalist social organization. Here the people who always pay for crime
protection are the ones who have caused the problem in the first place. In this way, society
would be able to achieve a quicker economic development, since the productive part of the
population would not be burdened with expenses for the police, courts, and prisons, and
the convicted criminals could be converted from counterproductive actions to productive
ones. The proposed system ensures the freedom of its citizens for free, since they never pay
for law-enforcement. Freedom in this case corresponds exactly to the definition of a basic
human right, namely a right which is yours just by virtue of your existence.
New, market-based structures of the police, courts, and prisons have been offered. The
police/law companies would be allowed to finance themselves directly from the criminals.
The courts would be able to finance themselves directly from the police/law companies,
thus avoiding the necessity of state or private property owner support. The prisons would
be funded and chosen by the prisoners themselves. The latter would ensure that the prisons
function in full compliance with the principles of the free market.
References
Barnett, Randy (1998), The Structure of Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Benson, Bruce (2014), “Let’s Focus on Victim Justice, Not Criminal Justice.” The Independent
Review 19: 209–238.
Cowen, Tyler (1992), “Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy.” Economics
and Philosophy 8: 249–267.
Friedman, David (1979), “Police, Courts and Laws – On the Market.” In The Machinery
of Freedom, Guide to Radical Capitalism. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Nozick, Robert (1974), “Protective Associations.” In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New
York: Basic Books.
Rand, Ayn (1964), The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: New American Library.
Rothbard, Murray (1973) “The Public Sector III, Police, Law and the Courts.” In For A
New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. New York: Macmillan Publishers.
Rothbard, Murray (1998), The Ethics of Liberty. New York: New York University Press.
Tannehill, Morris, and Linda Tannehill (1970), The Market for Liberty. Lansing, Michigan:
self-published.
List of Articles
Pierre Desrochers, Vincent Geloso: Snatching the Wrong Conclusions
from the Jaws of Defeat: Part 1 – The Missing History of Thought:
Depletionism vs Resourceship..........................................................................5
Pierre Desrochers, Vincent Geloso: Snatching the Wrong Conclusions from
the Jaws of Defeat: Part 2 – The Wager: Protagonists and Lessons............42
Nikolai G. Wenzel: Classical Communitarianism and Liberal Anomie:
Toward an In dividual yet Robust Theory of Citizenship.............................65
Youliy Ninov: A Free Market Alternative to Anarcho-Capitalism...............89
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